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Abstract 
Recent research has indicated that although security systems are developing, 
illegal intrusion to computers is on the rise. The research conducted here 
illustrates that improving intrusion detection and prevention methods is 
fundamental for improving the overall security of systems. 
This research includes the design of a novel Intrusion Detection System (IDS) 
which identifies four levels of visibility of attacks. Two major areas of security 
concern were identified: speed and volume of attacks; and complexity of 
multistage attacks. Hence, the Multistage Intrusion Detection and Prevention 
System (MIDaPS) that is designed here is made of two fundamental elements: 
a multistage attack engine that heavily depends on attack trees and a Denial of 
Service Engine. MIDaPS were tested and found to improve current intrusion 
detection and processing performances.  
After an intensive literature review, over 25 GB of data was collected on 
honeynets. This was then used to analyse the complexity of attacks in a series 
of experiments. Statistical and analytic methods were used to design the novel 
MIDaPS.  
Key findings indicate that an attack needs to be protected at 4 different levels. 
Hence, MIDaPS is built with 4 levels of protection. As, recent attack vectors use 
legitimate actions, MIDaPS uses a novel approach of attack trees to trace the 
attacker’s actions. MIDaPS was tested and results suggest an improvement to 
current system performance by 84% whilst detecting DDOS attacks within 10 
minutes.
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1 Introduction 
 
This chapter will start by defining the terms and expressions specific to the 
thesis and by giving an account of the current state of Internet attacks. The 
thesis will then look into some of the technological advances that Intrusion 
Detection Systems (IDS) can benefit from i.e. multi-core processors.  The 
motivation, research aim and objectives will be presented. The research 
methodologies used throughout the thesis will be explained to add meaning to 
the results obtained. The original contributions of this thesis will be presented. 
This chapter will conclude by presenting the outline of the whole thesis. 
1.1 Terms and Expressions  
1.1.1 Abbreviations 
AMD: Advance Micro Devices 
DDOS: Distributed Denial of Service 
DMZ:  Demilitarised Zone 
IANA:  Internet Assigned Numbers Authority 
IDS:  Intrusion Detection Systems 
IPS:  Intrusion Prevention  
MIDaPS:  Multistage Intrusion Detection and Prevention System 
NIC:  Network Interface Card 
NIDS:  Network Intrusion Detection Systems 
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1.1.2 Terms and expressions 
Bot:  a piece of software that is programmed to execute a number of predefined 
tasks and usually await order of execution for a master computer.  
Botnet: A botnet is a group of bot infected PCs that are all controlled by the 
same "command and control centre". A botnet, also known as a zombie army, is 
a computer connected to the Internet that has been set up to forward 
transmissions (including spam or viruses) to other computers on the Internet, 
without the knowledge of the computer owner. 
Countermeasure: countermeasure is a process put into place to address a 
vulnerability in order to reduce the probability of attacks hence reducing the 
possible impact of a threat.  
DDOS attacks: a DDOS attack is a distributed denial of service. It is a denial of 
service that is performed in an orchestrated manner using multiple attackers 
against one victim. 
Denial of Service: a denial of service is an attempt to make computer 
irresponsive so that they stop delivering the services they intended for to those 
having right of access.  
Distributed Denial of Service: it is an alternative way to call DDOS attack 
False negative: We speak of false negative when an alert is not generated 
when it was supposed to be generated. In fact the system is generally thinks it 
is not attack when it is.  
False positives: we speak of false positive when attack did not occurs but the 
system generate an alert as if they was a security breach 
17 
 
Flood attacks: flood attacks refer to any attack that is perform against a 
computer system by overloading the system resources. This can be a flood of 
request, response, or unwanted messages. Flood attacks generally lead to 
Denial of Service 
Denial of Service: denial of service occurs when legitimate users are 
prevented from accessing and using their resources. This is generally achieved 
through DDOS, DOS, and flood attack.  
Flow: a flow in an exchange of message between two host from the SYN to the 
ACK after a FIN/AC as shown in Figure 1-1 
 
Figure 1‐1: TCP Flow 
Fragmentation Attack: it is also known as the overlapping fragment attack. 
Fragmentation refers to the IP datagram broken down into smaller packets and 
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over the network via different types of network media. These smaller packets 
are generally reassembled at the receiving end. They are different type of 
fragmentation attacks: Ping O’ Death Fragmentation Attack, The Tiny Fragment 
Attack, and The Teardrop Attack.  
Hardware based IDS: is it an IDS that has been implemented on chip. Here the 
IDS is embedded into the hardware.  
Hybrid IDS: a Hybrid IDS is an IDS that works both as a Network IDS and a 
Host IDS.  
Intrusion Detection Systems: An Intrusion Detection System (IDS) is a 
system, software or hardware that listens to incoming and outgoing traffic and 
reports any evidence of attacks or policy violation. An extensive definition of IDS 
is given in chapter two.  
Intrusion Prevention System: it is an Intrusion Detection System with the 
capability to react against malicious packets. The usual reaction is a simple 
block of the malicious packet.  
Multicore : multicore will generally be used as a short form of multicore 
processors  
multi-core processors : A multi-core processor is an integrated circuit (IC) to 
which two or more processors have been attached for enhanced performance, 
reduced power consumption, and more efficient simultaneous processing of 
multiple tasks [1].  
Multicore technologies : it refers to technologies that use multicore 
processors.  
19 
 
Multistage attacks: a multistage attack is an attack that is performed in 
multiple steps. For instance, the attack can start by the user clicking on a link 
from an unknown email. From the link a malicious program will then be 
downloaded unto the computer. The malicious program will then start to 
communicate with the master attacker in order to open door to attacks  
Parallel Programming: It is now common to have computers i.e. laptops or 
desktops with two or four CPUs also called cores. Multiple cores are equivalent 
to multiple CPUs. To take full advantage of this evolvement, the source code 
can be parallelised and its execution distributed across all the available CPUs. 
Not too long ago, concurrent programming was only possible from a low-level 
manipulation of threads and locks. With the recent technology and tools like 
visual studio 2010, it is possible to write codes that will be executed across the 
different processors with very little effort. Multiple tasks are executed at the 
same time 
Pre-processor / Preprocessor: preprocessors are blocks of code organised in 
a way that the block can be turned on or off. They are two major pre-
processors. One adds another layer of analysis to Snort. This layer of detection 
is intended to do complex tasks when rules cannot be used to detect attacks. 
When an attack cannot be expressed into a rules (based on a signature), a pre-
processor can be written for that purpose. In the other hand, pre-processor can 
be used to shape the traffic to make it easy for the detection engine. For 
instance, obfuscated URL go through a pre-processor to transform the URL into 
regular URL so that matching can be done by the matching engine.  
20 
 
Regular expressions: Regular expressions are also known as regex, or 
regexp. Regular expressions are expressions that are represented using a sort 
of compression language to shorten many expressions into one using similar 
groups of expression. For example, ab? Would match ab plus any single 
character (aba, abc, abd, ab1, abe, etc.) 
Sequential Implementation: a sequential implementation is an implementation 
where instructions are executed one by one, one after the other one  
Signature: Signature will always make reference to Intrusion Detection System 
signature in this thesis. In that sense, a signature is a pattern, a string that was 
written to match attack behaviour here identified as string in packets.  
Single core application: a single core application is an application that has 
been writing without taking on board more than one CPU. This type of 
application can still be a parallel application by using threats and dead locks.  
Social networking: social networking is a group of people with common 
interested. In this thesis, social networking will refer to group of people coming 
together with common interest using the Internet.  
SPAMS: SPAMS refer to the use of email to send huge amount of unsolicited 
emails.  
TCP Conversation: TCP conversations represent a complete communication 
between two ends during a full session. This communication can be broken into 
multiple packets. One conversation is sometimes refers as one session.  
Threats: it is the possibility to take advantage of vulnerability and turn it into 
attack against the vulnerable system. 
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Trace file: it is a file in which activity related to a user or a program is recorded 
Traffic generator: a computer program use to generate traffic with predefined 
conditions.  
Virus: computer program written with malicious intend to harm computer 
system.  
Vulnerabilities: A vulnerability is a flaw or weakness in system security 
procedures, design, implementation, or internal controls that could be exercised 
(accidentally triggered or intentionally exploited) and result in a security breach 
or a violation of the system’s security policy. It is also considered as the 
existence of a weakness, design, or implementation error that can lead to an 
unexpected, undesirable event compromising the security of the computer 
system, network, application, or protocol involved 
Worms: a worm is a malicious piece of code, software, is able to replicate itself 
without any human interaction and propagate itself across networks, using 
email, share folders etc. 
Zombies: a zombie is a computer who has been affected by a malicious 
program and made part of a botnet.  
1.2 Background  
 
Without question, the Internet today influences almost every single aspect of 
life. Social networking has proved to be a great tool in bringing the world 
together: MySpace in 2003, Facebook in 2004, and Twitter in 2006 [2], [3]  and 
other similar social websites have seen unprecedented growth. However, 
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malicious users have taken the opportunity to create applications that have 
been used to recruit computers (also called zombies) into an army of computers 
controlled remotely to serve in an attack at a later stage: a Distributed Denial of 
Service (DDOS) attack [4] . Almost every single possible opportunity has been 
exploited by malicious users to gain illegal access to computers or to have 
control over them.  Recent events revealed that these types of attack, targeted 
at social networking users, have been used against businesses and as a cyber-
war tool [5]. Important governmental and business websites have been forced 
to close for hours, days or even months by attackers sending excessive 
amounts of data to their servers causing them to stop delivering their intended 
services. Not too long ago, Internet security was a concern mainly for business 
users. In today’s world, Internet security has become a matter of National 
Security, forcing governments to take active part in the game [6]. 
DDOS attacks are performed by exhausting resources of other computers 
without the consent and knowledge of legitimate owners.  Computers 
participating in a DDOS attack are affected in speed and overall performance as 
excessive unplanned resources are used. In order to attack others computers, 
the attacking computer is force to use extra resources. This put the attacking 
computer in the position of being victim of DDOS attack if its resource used for 
the attack exceeds or approach the limit of resources needed for a normal 
operation.  DDOS, more than any other Internet attacks have raised a high level 
of awareness in the world. A great deal is spent by governments to try and 
solve the problem [7], [8].  In addition, research groups have had sponsorship to 
dedicate more time researching ways and methods to stop malicious users and 
their activities. A well know open source project, Emerging Threats, has 
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benefited from one of these grants. They have been carrying out research on 
how best to secure computer systems using Snort IDS [9]. Our research work is 
based around Snort.  There is a great need to secure online activities as 
demonstrated by the multiple actions and grants towards making the Internet 
more secure [10]. 
IDS have been increasingly used by communities around the world to detect 
and protect against attacks as they are free of charge and involve a wide 
community of experts. However the increased speed of communications, the 
pace at which attacks are performed and the sophistication of recent attacks 
make detecting and mitigating them very difficult. Despite their popularity, IDS 
have failed to offer a level of security that would protect against recent attacks 
as they grow in speed, bandwidth and sophistication, hence a move towards 
multi-core systems   [11], [12].  As shown in Figure 1-2  there has been a 
growing interest in multi-core technologies and a slight decrease in specialised 
processors. From 2003 to 2007 there has been an increased interest in finding 
an alternative to single core. This indicates that researchers have found that 
converting existing single core applications is not efficient [13]. As shown in 
Figure 1-2 research efforts in single core applications have been significantly 
reduced to the benefit of research in other field such as multicore. This is an 
indication that building an IDS that is capable of multicore is more relevant that 
working on a single core.  
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Figure 1-2: Evolution of research areas [13]  
Many studies around improving IDS have led to scrutinising how multi-core 
technologies would benefit the implementation of such systems [14]. As 
preliminary research results around this topic show, there is great potential in 
performance improvement by using such systems but no system to date has 
been successfully designed and implemented [10] . In addition, successful 
implementations of network based applications around multi-cores technologies 
need to be examined thoroughly. Some researchers argue that  
“Parallelizing legacy code is widely viewed as a deadend, but building 
compelling addons to existing applications that take advantage of multicore, 
and then “bolting on” these features to legacy codes is possible” [13] 
A successful implementation of IDS would be able to keep up with the 
technological advancements and the level of sophistication of attacks. Lately 
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using multi-core processors to improve speed and performances of systems 
has become a popular subject and has drawn a lot of attention [13]. There are 
many benefits from using multi-core processors that have yet to be exploited. 
However, producing a good parallel system from a traditional serial 
implementation remains a challenge as well as redesigning existing systems so 
that they could be compliant with multi-core system of today and in the future. 
There have been a few attempts [15], [16], [14] but these researches generally 
look at a particular aspect  inside the very complex structure of IDS without 
looking at the consequences that their partial solution could have on the whole 
structure of IDS systems or they use parallelism to prove that systems can run 
faster but with no indication of the improvement in attack detection. Other 
researchers have looked at improving current IDS systems based on a 
particular hardware that does not necessarily comply with the evolution of 
processors as stated by Moore’s Law [17]. Others still have looked at parallel 
IDS that do not address recent attacks.  As a consequence such systems would 
need to be readapted for new hardware requirements. In this research, the 
author focuses first on identifying why IDS systems fail against the latest attacks 
by looking at IDS components. The author then proposes a new IDS 
architecture that is compliant with the current technological evolvement and that 
would not need to be redesigned based on any particular hardware. The 
architecture is targeted at using available hardware on the market without any 
prior change to the hardware structure.  In addition, the architecture of the new 
IDS will partly focus on DDOS detection and mitigation as DDOS has been 
identified as compulsory feature for a security system protection.  
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1.3 Motivations 
 The motivation of this research came from the industrial challenges of 
producing a security system that would ensure availability, confidentiality and 
integrity in regards of the current state of Internet security. After several years of 
industrial experience and while working on the design of a security system for a 
10GB appliance, some interesting ideas raised few questions marks. A recent 
move by innovators to hardware based IDS implies a high speed and millions of 
packets processed at the same time. However, hardware based solutions have 
limitations in their capabilities to execute particular software functions. For 
instance, there is no regular expression system fully implemented in hardware. 
Currently, Snort rules contain 65% of rules with regular expression.  In addition, 
hardware based IDS have a lot of memory problems as there is hardly any 
dynamic memory allocation. While the hardware improves speed, the software 
implementation of IDS has more features even though there are currently many 
attacks that go undetected.  Securing Internet systems is more and more 
challenging. In addition, a good number of companies rely on IDS and IPS to 
protect their systems [18]. 
After investigation, it appears that there is a gap to fill. Hardware based IDS 
deliver speed but are very expensive; software solutions, even though they do 
not offer the conviviality of speed offered by the hardware IDS, they are able to 
support a wider range of functionalities. From these conclusions, the author 
started working on a system that will not only increase the packet processing 
rate but also offer deeper analysis in order to enable the maximum detection 
and mitigation possible. This will be achieved by adding additional analysis 
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capabilities to what currently exist in Snort. Further discussions in the coming 
chapters will go into details how this can be achieved.  
On the other hand, the author has a strong interest in contributing to the open 
source as it is an environment where experts meet, discuss and work together. 
In that regard, some of our work has been published to the open source 
community managed by Google [19] where the author has produced an HTTP 
code generator intended to test IDS resistance against spam sources.  
This work was started from the perspective of having a system that works i.e. a 
system that is able to cope with recent attacks and technology advancement, a 
system that will deliver granularity in analysis, a system that produces less false 
positive while improving the detection rate.  
1.4 Research Aim and objectives 
 
This research aims at producing a new architecture design for Network Intrusion 
Detection Systems that will not only take full advantage of multi-core processors 
as they continue to evolve but moreover, an architecture that is able to stand 
against the most dangerous attack faced by the Internet today i.e. Denial of 
Service attacks (DDOS) and multistage attacks i.e. attacks distributed amongst 
packets and flow. The new architecture aims to be a multi-dimensional parallel 
framework that will use readily available components i.e. widely available 
software and hardware.  
In striving to produce such a system, the following objectives would be 
achieved: 
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 Redesign IDS based on Snort using a multi-dimensional approach and 
ready for multicores architecture 
 Identify Snort specific engines component weaknesses  
 Produce a system that will improve the detection rate whilst reducing the 
false positive 
 Design a multistage attack detection system 
 Keep up to date with technological advancement by suggesting a parallel 
implementation of our architecture.  
 Extend rules format to enable flow tracking  
 Contribute to the state of the art of Internet Security 
 
1.5 Research Methodologies 
Different methodological approaches have been used, but mainly an iterative 
experimental approach has been followed. In this an idea has been developed 
and then tested, the results of experimentation have been considered and used 
to refine the idea or lead to the development of new approaches. Critical 
evaluation of the stages and then ultimately of the overall system confirm its 
novelty and expose areas for improvement. 
1.6 Identifying the state of the art 
A number of ongoing research studies have been identified by using the 
literature review. The literature review which follows in the next chapter was 
used as the starting point of our critical analysis which helped us to identify the 
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limits of current evolvement of Intrusion Detection Systems. Our literature 
review was mainly based, but not limited to researches published in:  
 Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) which is the 
world's leading professional association for the advancement of 
technology;  
  Science Direct which is one of the most extensive sites that provides 
online access to scientific and technical access.  
 Association for Computing Machinery, the world’s largest educational 
and scientific computing society which delivers resources that advance 
computing as a science and a profession 
 Google scholar and windows live academic which is a central point of 
researching through various online academic databases 
 Vern Paxson webpage. Vern is Associate Professor of Computer 
Science at the University of California, Berkeley.  His main active 
research areas are Bro and CCIED (the NSF-sponsored Collaborative 
Center for Internet Epidemiology and Defenses, a joint effort with UC 
San Diego).  The main topics of CCIED are botnets and Internet worms, 
including their network telescope project which is also what they are 
interested in. He has been awarded the Association for Computing 
Machinery’s Grace Murray Hopper Award for his work in measuring and 
characterising the Internet [20]. On various occasions, there have been 
email exchanges with Vern to discuss some points related to his 
publications.  He is the founder of the second most popular IDS: BRO 
IDS.  
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 The Intel® Parallel Programming and Multi-Core Community: The Intel® 
Parallel Programming and Multi-Core Community have been very helpful 
in providing good technical information on how to go about programming 
for multi-core processors. Also, this thesis has gained from the later 
community by learning how to avoid common errors and how to optimise 
the code written to improve IDS 
 OPENMP 
 Microsoft Parallel Pages 
1.7 Dataset Sources 
Most of the experiments in this thesis have been performed offline. Data used in 
our experiments have been collected in various ways and from different sources 
to test the limit of Snort and to validate our model and architecture. 
1.7.1 Evilfingers 
Evilfingers is a community portal for information security. They make packets 
i.e. recorded traffic from real events available that can be used for various 
purposes. Some of the packets are tagged with a Snort signature and others 
are not.   
EVILFINGERS data were merged with the 2009 Inter-Service Academy Cyber 
Defense Competition data to form the main source of data used in this 
research. They organise their files in such a way that one file/capture target one 
particular signature in Snort when a signature has already being identified.  
Using Linux command line, all the files were merged together so that all the 
attacks would run at the same time 
  Mergecap –w  *.pcap allpcap.pcap 
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1.7.2 PCAPR 
 
PCAPR organises data by categories. Similarly to EvilFingers, the files are 
organised in a way that each file will target one specific objective. Some of the 
files captured important events worth analysing without necessarily being 
attacks. In our research, this thesis has been mainly interested in files that were 
capture from attacks.  
1.7.3 The Metasploit Project 
The Metasploit project is collection of proof of concepts that have been 
packaged in order to help in penetration testing, IDS signature development, 
and exploit research. It has been used in many other researches [21-24]. In this 
research, Metasploit framework was used to generate attack traffic. Every time 
a signature was triggered, the packets that triggered the signature were isolated 
from the full packets capture file. At a later stage, all the files that were collected 
after signatures were triggered were joined to form a bigger file used test Snort 
resistance against recent attacks. Metasploit was used in conjunction with 
Fragroute and Fragrouter.  
1.7.4 Fragroute and Fragrouter 
Fragroute and Fragrouter are two very similar programs that are used for attack 
such as “Man in the middle attack”. They offer extensive fragmentation 
capabilities.   
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1.7.5 FX-HTTP-TRAFFIC-GENERATOR  
Fx-HTTP-Traffic generator is a program written during the course of this 
research. It has been used to test IDS against their resistance to a well know 
database of SPAM source: the URL blacklist service  
1.7.6 URL blacklist service 
This is a commercial URL Blacklist service. They are over 3165041 URL and 
domain entries. The database is updated regularly and provides an efficient way 
to block bad URLs and to write security policies. In the context of this research, 
the URL blacklist service was used to generate HTTP traffic to test IDS against 
their awareness and resistance for spam.  
1.7.7 SSL Black List 
Snort by default does not analyse encrypted traffic. Yet there are simple steps 
that can be taken to offer a level of security against bad SSL traffic. The work 
carried out in this research will use this list for the latter purpose.  
1.7.8 “2009 Inter-Service Academy Cyber Defence Competition” [25] 
This dataset was used in lieu of the DARPA dataset that have been long used 
as the standard dataset for IDS. This dataset is the result of the Military Cyber 
Defense Exercise between the National Security Agency (NSA) and all of the 
different service academies. Many efforts were made to make this dataset as 
accurate as possible by using state of the art attack tools such as Nessus, 
WebScarab and Nikto while a skilled team of 30 people generated background 
noise traffic by interaction each with three virtual stations. This interaction 
included activities listed as, but not limited to, browsing the web, sending 
emails, downloading and uploading files, and chat. The experimental testbed is 
represented in Figure 1-3 
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Figure 1‐3: Experiment testbed for CDX 2009 
 
1.8 Thesis original contribution 
The contributions the author has made are as follows 
1. The author has designed a new IDS architecture that improves the 
overall performance of such systems. The core elements of our new 
architectures are:  
a.  The multistage intrusion detection and prevention systems which 
is an hybrid intrusion detection system i.e. a mixture of network 
Intrusion Detection System and Host based Intrusion Detection 
System  
b. An extension to Snort rules to enhance the detection engine for all 
patterns relevant to protect their system.  This research led to an 
increase of 84% on Snort performance. 
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c. A DDOS detection and mitigation engine that leverages an 
exceptional level of mitigation and detection and is  able to detect 
attacks within twelve minutes 
d. A four level framework of visibility of attacks 
2. The IDS is designed following a uniquely extensive evaluation of current 
security threats including thorough experimentation with real threat 
scenario and data. 
 
1.9 Outlines the rest of Thesis 
Chapter 2 is about the literature related to the subject explored in this thesis.  
Various subjects covered in this chapter are the background and state of the art 
for IDS, Evolution of Intel cores, Botnets, Fragmentation attacks, parallel 
programming, multi-core implementations and their related problems, high 
speed networks.  
In Chapter 3 the thesis focuses on performance analysis.  It starts by stress 
testing Snort. The thesis then moves on to test Snort against known 
vulnerabilities. The tests aim at showing how well Snort resists attacks within 
high speed networks and also how Snort protects against recent attacks. 
Further tests will be performed to identify what component inside Snort is failing 
during the tests and the reasons why those components are failing. This 
chapter helps define the essence of the architecture that will be proposed as the 
original contribution of this research. The nature of components inside Snort 
that are failing and the reasons why they are failing would be vital information 
required to build the new architecture.  
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Chapter 4 will present the novel multistage detection methodology that the 
author has designed in order to reduce the false positive but to detect more 
attacks and have a complete knowledge that will enable us to give more 
meaning to the individual alerts.  
Chapter 5:  The proposed DDOS engine. This chapter will present the DDOS 
engine as a complete unit that will later be integrated with the whole system.  
Chapter 6: Our overall architecture. In this chapter, the author presents the 
different parts of our research as a whole.  
Chapter 7 will conclude with a description of the work achieved and make 
recommendations for further research by addressing the extension to our work 
to a multi-core architecture.  
After the conclusion, the references will be presented.  
Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed the background information related to developing a 
new IDS architecture that will take full advantage of multi-cores processors.  
The research aim and objectives have been presented. In addition to 
introducing the novel architecture, the research methodologies that have helped 
achieving our objectives were discussed. This chapter ends by presenting an 
overview of what will be discussed throughout the course of this research.  
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2 Literature review  
2.1 Intrusion detection System 
The work described in this thesis is based on Intrusion Detection Systems. An 
Intrusion Detection System (IDS) is a system, software or hardware that listens 
to incoming and outgoing traffic and reports any evidence of attacks [26], [27]. 
There are three major types of Intrusion Detection Systems: host based, 
Network based IDS and hybrid IDS. The work conducted here will be focusing 
on network based IDS. The author will be looking at Snort and Bro IDS. Snort is 
a modern network security application that can be used to monitor, save and 
report incidents as they happen on the network [28]. Bro is also a Network IDS 
which differs from Snort in that Snort has based its architecture around static 
keyword matching whereas the Bro architecture is based on events and 
algorithms [29].  
Intrusion Detection Systems can be organised either by the type of detection 
they perform or by where they sit on the network.  
2.2 Signature based IDS – the case of SNORT 
Signature based IDSs perform intensive string comparison. Keywords used in 
signatures are generally based on software vulnerabilities or on packet capture 
of a suspicious behaviour, or on packet capture of a successful attack.  The live 
traffic, incoming and outgoing traffic is compared to a database of phrases that 
have been previously used by an attack or phrases that can be used by 
attackers based on vulnerability. The problem of signature based IDS is that 
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they rely in most cases on the fact that the attack has to happen at least once. 
After analysis of the packets captured from attacks keywords are extracted from 
the attack to make the signature. However, this approach could give enough 
time for hackers to perform malicious activities between the time the 
vulnerability is discovered and the time an appropriate signature is published 
[30]. In order to defeat attackers honeypots are generally used to identify the 
techniques used to perform attacks [31], [32].  Honeypots can be set to auto-
generate signatures based on the packets they have captured.  Alternatively, 
signatures would be manually written. In their work, [33] suggest a system to 
auto generate signatures based on honeypot captures.   
The use of regular expressions in IDS signatures have improved the potential 
that signature matching systems offer as one regular expression can contain 
numerous variations of an attack. However, with recent advancement of 
network speed and a shift to hardware based IDS and IPS, improving keyword 
identification remains a very engaging topic of research [34-37].  
Snort has been used by millions of users and is the de facto standard of IDS. 
Snort is built around keyword matching and its architecture is as follows.  
As shown in Figure 2-1 the packet capture handles packets at the NIC level. 
Snort uses an external library to capture packets. Snort uses WinPcap Under 
Windows OS and Libpcap under unix systems.  Once the packets have been 
captured, they are sent to the packet decoder that will identify the different parts 
of the packet headers; at this stage, the malformed packets can be dropped 
depending on the configuration in the configuration file: snort.config.  The pre-
processor will do a preliminary analysis of packets to detect any potential 
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packets. Again, the detection options depend on the settings made by a user. 
One would chose to ignore scans and another user will chose to be alerted on 
every possible alert. The packets are then passed to the detection engine that 
will look into the packet headers and packet payloads in order to detect any 
possible trace of attacks. Once the packets are analysed and depending on the 
results of the analysis, an alert will be generated. Various alerts system can be 
added to Snort by the means of plugins.  Snort processing schema is 
represented in Figure 2-1 
 
Figure 2-1 Snort Processing Schema 
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The author introduces more layers of security and suggests a parallel 
implementation rather than a sequential implementation as  is the case for 
Snort. For example, Snort is not configured by default to prevent IANA reserved 
addresses to appear in the traffic. This is justified by the fact that Snort 
generally sits inside the network. However, when Snort sits at the network 
border, there is no security feature in place to control and prevent IANA 
reserved addresses usage. Also, with the recent advancement in activities 
aiming at fighting BOTNETs, up-to-date IPs that have been found to participate 
in  bot activities are available in a list format. This list will be used as part of the 
first line of defence. This will reduce the load of the detection engine.  Also, 
during the routine rules analysis, Snort engines do not verify whether a rule is 
relevant to the system being protected. If Snort was to classify and check only 
rules that are relevant to the system in which it runs, the time spent to perform 
string matching will be reduced by up to 84%. The author will demonstrate this 
at a later stage through some experiments.  
2.3 Anomaly based IDS – the case of BRO 
Anomay IDS  analyze every byte of traffic without in advance necessarily 
expecting a specific attack [38]. However, when attacks are already known, 
security features will be put in place accordingly. The anomaly based IDS needs 
a certain knowledge of the system being protected. During the learning period, 
the anomaly IDS will gather enough information to form the baselines, the 
normal behavior. In addition to deep protocol analysis, a border line is then 
defined as the normal behavior. When a network activity is detected and not 
mapped to the normal behavior  action is taken. This can sometimes generate 
false alert indicating the false presence of attacks activities: false postive. In 
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contrast to Snort, Bro offers a complex detection mainly based on anomalies 
rather than keywords. Keyword detections have their advantages that to some 
extent the number of false positives does not change when a network behaviour 
changes. As for anomaly based IDS, the detection mechanism needs to go 
through a perpetual learning curve . Depending on the activities of the network 
or of the time of year,  or even the period of time during the day, activities can 
vary significantly [39]. There is a need for well written algorithms that will adapt 
to the changes without generating too many false positives.  
One the biggest problems that anomaly based IDS faces is detecting attacks 
that fall into the category of normal behavior.  The directory transversal is a web 
attack that does not breach any protocol definition or specification. This attack 
can easly go undetected by anomaly based system as it is performed under 
normal behaviour [40], [41].  
In opposition to Snort, Bro was not built with the intention of being a system 
ready out of the box. Rather, it was built for research purposes in the field of 
IDS and traffic analysis(Paxson, 1999). Bro is built on events and its 
architecture is as follows: 
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Figure 2-2: Bro Architecture [42]  
As shown in Figure 2-2, Bro is built for real-time network analysis. 
Fundamentally, Bro provides a real-time network. At the Bottom of its 
architecture, Bro listens to network communication passively and sends a copy 
of the network traffic as it been captured to the  libpcap library that will parse the 
traffic. Once the traffic has been organised, it is then sent to the event engine 
that checks the packet integrity. Once packets have been certified as valid, a 
hash key is created based on the flow information if not already in existance 
[42].  The Event engine will then generate events based on the analysis done.  
These events are then reviewed by the policy script interpreter. The appropriate 
action is taken from the policy script interpreter. These actions vary and could 
be as simple as logging an alert, sending an alert to an external system such as 
syslog, or blocking the packets.  
Research around Bro IDS has evolved and a new architecture for multicore 
processors has been suggested. This architecture is discuss in more details in 
2.9 below. One of the strengths of BRO IDS is that every single packet and flow 
is analysed and has to get a go ahead before it is released [43]. By scrutenising 
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every single flow, the problem of packet fragmentation is very well addressed as 
BRO IDS ensures that every single byte is analysed. However, with the 
advancement of recent attacks, analysing flow independently is not proven to 
be enough to detect multistage attacks. In the architecture designed in this 
work, the author has introduced some flow management in order to corolate 
information between flows.  
It is virtually impossible to have a system that will ensure 100% detection rate 
as well as 0% false positives. Combining the anomaly and signature based 
intrusion detection system has proved to be much better. Bro integrates a 
signature matching engine  as well as maintaining an anomaly network  system 
analysis. The system proposed in a later stage of this research will integrate 
both anomaly and signature to combine the power of signature for known 
attacks and to detect unknown attacks – the zero day attack. This is generally 
achieved by creating a baseline based on a “normal” behaviour that has been 
recorded during a learning curve. Based on a history, a behaviour profile is then 
defined. Anything that falls out of that behaviour would be considered as 
anomaly.  
2.4 Intruvert Network 
Intuvert Network was created after a series of Denial of Services (DoS) hit 
Yahoo and CNN and other websites in 2000. The objectives that Parveen Jain 
and Ramest Gupta, creator of Intruvert Network, had was to provide a novel 
approach that would provide a reliable protection to fight a wide range of 
Network security problems. The product from Intruvert Network was then called 
IntruShield.  IntruShield performs a deep packet inspection on every packet that 
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crosses the network [44]. IntruShield claim to deliver cost-effective appliances 
offering high-performance and reliability for various segments of network 
independently of their location on the network. IntruShield is relatively simple to 
use and to set up; a web based interface has been provided for its 
management. IntruShield offers a reasonable performance over network with a 
bandwidth up to 10 Gb. A number of security problems are addressed by 
IntruShield such as zero-day, DoS, DDoS, SYN flood, and encrypted attacks, 
and threats like spyware, VoIP vulnerabilities, botnets, malware, worms, 
Trojans, phishing, and peer-to-peer tunneling. IntruShield detection system is 
based on signature, shell-code detection algorithms, DDOS detection and 
prevention [45] [46]. IntruShield is able to parse about 100 protocols with over 
3,000 signatures.  
2.4.1 Intruvert architecture 
IntruShield architecture as represented below Figure 2-3 
One of the key implementation of the deep packet analysis used by IntruShield 
is based on packet reassembly. Packet reassembly could be problematic in 
high speed network. The next section will address issue relating to Intruvert 
Security performances.   
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Figure 2‐3: Intruvert Architecture [45] 
  
2.4.2 Intruvert Security limits and problems 
 
Intruvert clearly display a good range of security features Figure 2‐3. However, 
Intruvert was not the choice of this research as it was not possible to have 
access to the source code for a deeper analysis of the performance of each of 
its components and suggest an improvement. For instance, one of the 
drawbacks in Intruvert is that the signatures are not available to be changed. 
The IntruShield appliances are based on a custom hardware platform yet. This 
research aims at looking at systems that are widely available and not restricted 
by a certain platform. Working on a hardware specific platform would mean that 
anyone willing to use the results produced in this research will be forced to have 
45 
 
the same platform. While they use standard Intel processors for general 
management, they include network processors, ASICs and FPGAs to speed-up 
computing intensive tasks (e.g., signature matching and SSL-decoding) [47].  
Unfortunately, McAfee does not provide concrete details about the system's 
internals. From its architecture, it is not clear or rather non-existent the way 
IntruShield will address multi-stage attacks.  
In this thesis, Intruvert was not physically tested as the author could not afford 
to acquire it as it is a commercial product and expensive. However, In the 
recent attack (Figure 2‐4) that Hosteur [a French web hosting company] has 
experimented, Cisco IDS and IPS security system was subject to a live test and 
failed to prove its efficiency. The French company ended up blaming a client 
who was running a game, Warez, on his web site. The French company has not 
revealed the exact model of Cisco equipment they are using but they claim to 
use one of the latest Cisco security device.  
Intruvert is based on packet reassembly which would pose a number of issues 
related to the performance. At 5GB, there is literally no time for packet 
reassembly. The model that we propose later in this thesis will give a possible 
solution to the problem of reassembly. 
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Figure 2‐4: attack reported by hosteur 
2.5 GRIDS - a graph based intrusion detection system for large 
networks 
The concept presented by GRIDS is very interesting as it moves away from the 
traditional detection methodology in that the detection and the reporting are 
both based on a grap. One the great things of GRIDS is that it builds the 
network architecture in which it is installed. However, GRIDS only runs on Unix 
hosts connected by IP nets [48]. Also, this system assumes that the networks 
belongs to single organisation which have autonomous departments. However, 
departments in realality have many interdependences and generally share 
resources. It is difficult to picture how this system would work in a modern 
enterprise environment. Last  but not least, this system assumes that no part of 
the network is actively hostile. The author did not understand why an IDS would 
would be designed to work in a non hostile environment. The paper that 
presents this modele [48] was purely based on principle and no experiments 
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was done. No other work related to this IDS was identified. This system was not 
consider as important in this research as the author belived that the design 
wass not mature enough for further consideration.  
2.6 Sguil: The Analyst Console for Network Security Monitoring 
Sguil was writing a tcl/tk programming language [49]. This limits Sguil to linux 
like systems. However, using a Unix like integrated environment for Windows 
platform like Cygwin, Sguil is able to run on windows platform. Howeer, there 
there will be communcation between the Unix like integrated environment and 
the host Windows operating system. Sguil is an engine that is based on many 
other tools to perform collection, analysis, and escalation of indications and 
warnings to detect and respond to intrusions [50]. Sguil is based on Snort and 
Snort rules to perform the detection. One of the differences between Snort and 
Sguil is the graphical interface that Sguil offers. the later is very user friendly 
and make the analysis easier. The auther did not feel this was the tool to 
consider as it pure a management of many tools put together. Hence this 
system was not considered for this thesis.   
2.7 Intrusion detection System and their current level of protection 
 Reports on the Internet show that the number of attacks is still very high 
 [51-54] and continue to rise (Figure 2-5). Despite great efforts, secure 
transactions and communications over Internet security is not guaranteed. 
Being intrigued by the current state of Internet security and despite the many 
efforts accomplished in making the Internet more secure, a decision was made 
to investigate why intruders and malicious Internet users are still able to bypass 
or to bring security systems down. Figure 2-5  shows that in 2008, Symantec 
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had created over 60% of their entire malicious signatures database to date. 
There has been an increase of about 150% in malicious activities [55]. 
 
Figure 2-5: New malicious code signatures [55] 
 
Our efforts started with a quick review of the current state of the Internet 
regarding network IDS. Statistics reveals that Flood-Based attacks are the most 
common vector attacks. Flood-Based attacks are aimed at overflowing the 
network resources so that targeted systems become unavailable.  They are also 
known as Denial of Service Attacks (DOS) or Distributed Denial of Service 
Attacks (DDOS).  
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Figure 2-6: Attack Vectors [56] 
Looking at Figure 2-7, during the year 2008 there was a serious increase in the 
speed at which attacks are performed. This implies that security systems have 
to be able to perform at high speed. One of the biggest consequences of not 
being able to perform at this pace would be that attacks will not be reported, 
actions will not be taken hence the system protected will crash. In fact, most 
traffic will go without being analysed causing many attacks not to be detected.  
 
Figure 2-7: Attacks based on speed ([92]) 
Figure 2-7 confirms that the most serious threats are based on botnets which are 
networks of infected computers ready to execute commands from a bot master, 
the commanding computer. One of the largest botnets to date  is evaluated at 
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1,5millions computers (Sanders, 2005). In regards to internet security, it is 
possible to flood almost any network from such a powerful botnet by only 
sending 1Mbs/host. Sending 1Mb/s per host or bot would mean sending 1.5 
million Mb/s. Currently, there are very few systems that support 10Gb/s i.e. 
10,000Mb/s. This shows that botnets can easily flood networks. Traditionally, 
botnets have been used to send spam i.e. up to 3 billion spams per day [57]. 
Lately, they have been used not only to send spam but to install malware, 
Trojans, delete data from computers and flood networks. Botnets have also 
been recently used in cyber war [58] 
 
Figure 2-8: Most Concerning Threats [56] 
In an effort to fight recent attacks there has been a general tendency of moving 
towards hardware based IDS instead of improving software based solutions. 
This could be due to the rapid evolution of bandwidth and the speed at which 
attacks are performed in today’s Internet. Figure 2-9 shows that IDS overall 
speed could be improved about 28 times if solutions were implemented in 
hardware.  
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Figure 2-9: speed improvement of hardware over software 
This improvement is significant as the number of packets analysed can be 
boosted considerably whilst the number of packets queuing to be analysed will 
also be reduced. Later in this thesis the author demonstrates that Snort does 
not perform well in a high speed environment. If Snort is able to process x 
packets during a period of time using a software implementation, Snort would 
be able to process 27.8 x more packets. The study will show that Snort does not 
process many packets at high speed and instead drops them without analysing 
them. When this happens the chances are that attacks will not be detected 
hence there is a very high chance for these attacks to be successful. This 
implies that all systems protected by Snort at high speed might be as 
transparent to attacks as systems with no protection at all.  
Speed definitely matters when it comes to securing Internet based systems. 
Recent research as in Figure 2-10 [59] shows a serious increase in bandwidth 
usage in the UK. In 2008, an estimate of 16.46 million UK households has been 
using the Internet which represent 65 per cent of households and an increase of 
1.23 million households since 2007 [60].  The current average download speed 
of broadband in the UK is currently 3.6 Mbs  [61]  
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Figure 2-10: Bandwidth usage growth 
Internet security systems must keep up with the latest advancements in 
technology. Research shows that attacks are performed at higher speed hence 
using more bandwidth. Recent tests performed on Snort show that Snort has a 
very weak ability at detecting attacks at high speed. Yet hardware based IDS 
are expensive and are not in the reach of most companies or organisations. 
Snort can take advantage of multi-core processors widely available in home 
based computer systems. One of the tasks of this thesis is to investigate why 
Snort components fail to perform under high speed, and how this situation can 
be revoked. Snort can be improved in many ways. These include but are not 
limited to: improving detection rate; improving the number of packets 
processed; reducing false positive, etc. Each of these aspects could be 
addressed differently. However, the improvements of each of these elements 
separately would not necessarily ensure the overall performance as improving 
one aspect could generate other issues.  During our tests, Snort did not detect 
all the attacks.  
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In recent years, multi-cores technologies have become more and more 
common. Intel Corporation has modified Snort IDS to run on a multi-core 
platform. As a result Snort processed the same number of packets 6 times 
faster. This demonstration suggests that multi-core processors can be used to 
speed up Snort. However, Intel Corporation did not make any changes on the 
detection mechanism. As a consequence, even if Snort was to process packets 
quicker, there would still be some unresolved issues.  As discussed in our 
section “related work”, current work on improving Snort is mostly based on the 
processing speed. This research looks at improving the detection mechanism 
as well as the processing speed.  
2.8 Multi-core evolution 
The constant evolvement of technology has resulted in the need for better 
computers. Looking at home users, people need better systems to handle the 
latest video and picture quality. In addition users will also need to download 
bigger files. In general, they will need better systems to benefit from the latest 
technological advancements. From an industrial perspective, there is a need to 
better manage the work environment; a need to facilitate network sharing 
resources; a need to collaborate with partners around the globe, and a need for 
faster communications.  The first response for these needs was the AMD64 
processor architecture [62]. Since then it has been possible for Advanced Micro 
Devices (AMD) to support multiple cores in one processor. The benefits are 
listed, but not limited to: less power consumption; concurrently executing 
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programs that are processor intensive such as database searching, image 
processing, ripping and burning audio and video CDs or DVDs and downloading 
heavy files from the Internet.  As for multi-threaded capabilities, computers have 
been able to perform concurrently multiple tasks also called threads.  Some of 
these tasks include data mining, heavy mathematical calculations, and heavy 
repetitive tasks.  As shown in Figure 2-11, multi-core technologies have become 
the standard for IntelTM processors as the single core processors could not 
respond to the market demand and users expectations.    
 
Figure 2-11: Intel Multi-core Road Map [63] 
IntelTM has been developing processor micro architectures with the objective of 
reducing the power consumption. For that reason, the processor’s clock speed 
depends on 2 factors, the clock speed and the number of instructions per cycle 
[63]. The performance can be computed by 
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[Performance] = [Clock speed] x [Number of instructions per cycle] 
Another important indirect factor of the overall performance of CPU is the power 
consumption. As predicted by Moore’s law, Figure 2-12, the number of 
transistors has been growing.  
In 1965, Moore stated that the number of transistors on a chip will double about 
every two years. Intel has kept that pace for nearly 40 years. However much 
was not said about on how the transistor power would scale.  
 
 
Figure 2-12: The Moore Law 
 
The processing power which is measured in millions of instructions per second 
(MIPS), has steadily risen because of increased transistor counts. But Moore's 
Law can also mean decreasing costs. As silicon-based technology gains in 
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performance, they becomes less expensive to produce, more plentiful and 
powerful, and more seamlessly integrated into our daily lives 
Figure 2-13 show that a better performance is reached when there is less power 
consumption. 
 
Figure 2-13: Performance Over Power Consumption 
The formula for the power consumption would be: 
 [Power consumption] = [Dynamic capacity] x [Voltage] x [Voltage] x 
[Clock speed]  
The multi-core technology clearly offers many advantages. However, changing 
current implementation of network application is challenging. Few approaches 
in the analysis of parallelising network application need to be considered: 
Independent process on each core, pipelining which divides application into 
various stages and the symmetric multi-processing which runs identical process 
in parallel with a load balancer to equally share the tasks load amongst the 
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different cores [64]. These parallel approaches will be discussed further in the 
architecture design and implementation.  
The advancement in microchip has caused a shift to IDS hardware [65] away 
from the traditional software.  
2.9 Related work 
In their work Wheeler, P. and E. Fulp [14] propose a framework to parallelise 
Network Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDS). They suggest 3 levels at which 
parallelism could occur: the node level, the component level and the sub-
component. For the node level, they suggest that multi identical systems to run 
in parallel where rules are taken from their original group and spread across all 
the running nodes. Snort organise rules into groups and each of these groups is 
generally identified by its filename. For instance “pop.rules” will refer to all the 
rules related to POP protocol, the Post Office Protocol. Incoming packets are 
duplicated by a packets duplicator across all the nodes at the same time, 
identical rules are sent to the different nodes. This suggests that one packet will 
go through the same inspection many times. This method clearly suffers from 
repetition.  They also propose a variance for which when a packet is sent to a 
node, the node will check if there is a rules in relation with that packet. Even 
though Wheeler and Fulp [14] do not give details about how the check would be 
done, the Author argues that there are many inconveniences with the Node 
level. Firstly, the node level would work only if all communications are 
considered to be stateless which is unrealistic with today’s attacks described by 
[66-68]. Secondly, there are endless repetitions. In Addition, there is no 
correlation between the packets sent in multiple frames. Also, this method does 
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not take into consideration fragmentation which is one of the latest techniques 
used by malicious users to overflow systems as current IDS do not handle 
fragmentation at high speed [69]. This has also been proven by some of our 
results that show that Snort detection rate of fragmented packets will drop about 
95% when speed changes from 0.1 Mb to 10 Mb refs. The architecture that 
proposed in the work carry out in this research will consider dividing packets 
without repeating them. Also, the author has introduced a flow correlation for 
attacks spread over multiple flows.  This will be presented under the shape of 
context record management that will help correlate detection across the multiple 
parallel processes.  
At the component level, Wheeler and Fulp suggest that specific functions such 
as defragmentation might be parallelised. This could be interesting. However, 
there is not a clear definition on how this will fit into the overall system. There is 
a risk of creating a bottleneck at this level if a top level classification is not done 
in order to separate fragmented packets with complete packets.  
Paxson et al [10]define an architecture that ignores keyword matching as they 
argue that the level of sophistication of attacks have gone beyond the keyword 
matching. The same idea is supported by many researches [70-72]. However, 
not only that, there is still a lot of research trying to improve keyword matching 
[73-76] Snort remains by far the most popular IDS due to its ease of use and 
modification. It is commonly agreed that only keyword matching would not be 
good enough to prevent against the latest attacks(Barman, et al., 2009). Having 
said that keyword matching remains a great tool for detecting attacks [77]. The 
architecture presented in this research will be based on keyword matching with 
additional level of packet inspections. A correlation between different keywords 
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would be done before alerting as the author believes that a stateless keyword 
matching is not efficient for recent polymorphic attacks. In their Model as shown 
in Figure 2-14, they define three stages.  
 
Figure 2-14: Parallel Execution of Network Analysis [78]  
At the first stage, they perform all packets reassembly before proceeding to any 
analysis. The author argues that this could be a major inconvenience for the 
whole structure. An attacker could send millions of fragmented packets and that 
will cause the analysis to be slow. Also, they argue that “Ideally, the front-end 
ANI would retain each packet until all events to which the packet contributes in 
any way” have fully processed.  This has some inconveniences in packets 
processing. There will certainly be a delay in communication and this may 
require more buffers to handle big numbers of packets. The architecture the 
author proposes will correct important missing features for a first stage parallel 
architecture. A good number of security features can be implemented in the first 
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stage or layer of protection of IDS.  Spoofing is generally used when an attacker 
is trying to remain anonymous. For strong first layer of protection, the 
architecture proposed in this research will eliminate all unnecessary traffic 
present in the wire. The IANA reserved address should not appear in any 
routing table. Hence at the first level of security, the author cleans any traffic 
that should not be in the routing table.  
At their second stage, they define a series of parallel processors based on 
events. This approach is similar to what Wheeler and Fulp [14] describe in their 
model but with more details of what is been processed in parallel.  
Even though Paxson et al [10]aim at building a network IDS that will be used by 
general-purpose commodity hardware, their work has been based on a 
particular hardware the ANI device. This does not guarantee that other 
hardware will support the architecture they implement. No specific limitation was 
made as per the type of hardware supported.  
 
In a white paper, Intel Corporation [15] claimed to have improved Snort 
performance by a multiplication factor of 6 in the best case. They have adopted 
3 approaches in improving Snort.  The first approach runs five functional Snort 
process in a single core. The five functional processes of Snort are known as 
packet capture, packet decoder, preprocessors, detection engine and output 
plug-ing [28]. In the second approach, Intel ran the five functional components 
on each of the cores. This approach is referred to as the node parallelisation 
level in other research [14]In the last approach used by Intel in these 
experiments, the capture was executed in one core and all the other cores were 
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running in parallel. There has been a great achievement as claimed by Intel. 
However, there has not been any security improvement over Snort architecture. 
The current implementation of Intel certainly improves the speed of Snort but 
does not provide any relation between flows enabling multi-stage attack 
detection such as attacks identified by [79-84].  There are important limitations 
on the accelerated implementation performed by Intel Corporation in regards to 
recent attacks. For static attacks that are all contained in separate flow without 
any relation to other flow, the implementation discussed here would be a very 
good improvement of Snort. In addition, Intel does not give details on the 
modification that they have made on Snort hence the difficulty to repeat their 
experiments.  
Even though Snort aims at offering an overall security, they are other valuable 
research works that have been accomplished looking at application layer 
security especially web services [85] [86] [87].  
2.10 Conclusion 
A great deal of work has been done in advancing the effectiveness of security 
systems. Before parallel IDS were discussed, attacks that are split into different 
stages have always been very difficult to analyse, detect and mitigate. With the 
shift toward parallel IDS, multistage attacks would be even more difficult to 
detect. The difficulty resides in the fact that there is no correlation between the 
different cores that perform the analysis. The IDS will certainly improve in terms 
of speed i.e. the number of packets processed per second and at the same 
time, but when attacks are split into different flow, most current systems do not 
correlate flows. In this research, the author adds that dimension to the existing 
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system. However, this would cause the IDS to be redesigned and that’s what 
this research is all about.  
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3 The problem 
3.1 Introduction  
Snort is a Network Intrusion Detection (NIDS) that was considered to be a lightweight 
Intrusion Detection System IDS [88]. However, technology has evolved and Snort has 
been considerably improved [89]. Snort remains an open source network intrusion 
prevention and detection. It is based on a language rule-driving used in combination 
with signatures; signatures and protocol anomaly based inspection methods [90]. 
Despite the big improvement over the years, Snort stills struggle to keep up with the 
fast growing network industry and attacks [91].   
Many researches [91] report the inability of Snort to cope with current attacks. This 
triggered the author to test Snort in order to see its limitation and propose applicable 
solutions. In this chapter, the author will  
 Review the trend of latest threats and attacks on the Internet 
 Test Snort accordingly to these threats and attacks to study its ability to resist 
current and future threats and attacks  
o HTTP Complex multistage attacks.  
 Obfuscated JavaScript 
 Obfuscated HTML 
o Flood attacks (ICMP, UDP, HTTP) 
o Other not so well classified attacks 
 Propose  solutions to the problems identified 
Solutions proposed in this chapter will be integrated in the design of our new IDS.   
64 
 
3.2 Security trends: threats and attacks  
 
From analysis performed by Arbor Network Inc, the size of the attacks has 
grown almost double from 2007 to 2008. In the course of last year, 2009, the 
size of the attacks has continued to growth by over 22% [92] [93].  
 
Figure 3-1: Attack size, ([92]) 
On another note, Arbor Network Inc, anticipated that the Link, Host or Services 
DDOS as the single biggest attack on the Internet for 2009 as shown in Figure 
3-2 
 
Figure 3-2: threats prediction for 2010 ([92]) 
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The above attack’s classification does not clarify what is really included in the 
Link, Host or Services DDOS as these days hackers use every single 
opportunity to make any computer a zombie.  McAfee reports of threat 
prediction for 2010 will go into more details by naming social networking sites 
as one of the biggest threats for Internet security stability. The reason behind 
social networking being the biggest threat is that more and more people have 
joined social networks. For instance Facebook network is as big as 350 million 
users with more than 350,000 applications as claimed by McAfee in their report. 
As social networking is still relatively new, most people are inclined to be 
curious. This attitude is not necessarily in favour of security as most people tend 
to click on any link. In addition the Internet has seen the so called “tinyurl.com” 
use to shorten Internet links. However, when using tinyurl.com, the user does 
not know the real link and is more likely to click on the link [94].  
Botnet activities are relentlessly increasing either by using malware or Trojan 
through emails or by taking advantage of social networks both for mobile 
devices as well as for PCs [95]. Botnets have been used mostly for SPAM but 
recently a move toward cyberwarfare has become popular [96][97].  
Search engines poisoning is yet another attack that has made victims of millions 
[98]. Internet users, especially social community users, are tricked into thinking 
that they are using a genuine search engine but yet they are redirected to 
results (i.e. links) that, when opened, install malware and Trojans [99] [100].  
In the light of these recent trends, the author chose to test Snort for its 
resistance against  
 Flood attacks (i.e. ICMP, UPD, HTTP/TCP),  
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 DDOS attacks 
 High speed networks 
 Malware intrusion 
 Recognition of botnet traffic.  
The above list of tests may cause confusion between DDOS attacks and flood 
based attacks. DDOS attacks are typically any distributed effort to cause the 
system to stop offering services it is intended for. However, flood based attacks 
are a type of DOS or DDOS attacks are they generally cause the system to stop 
responding and offering services. DDOS attacks can be performed either by 
generating millions of small packets against a victim of generate only few jumbo 
packets that will cause the same effect. In the latter case, there has not been 
any flooding.  
The objectives of the author here was to test Snort against attacks that are 
current and attacks that are likely to affect system in the future. Traditional 
attacks for which many solutions exist already or attacks that are very specific 
to a system have not been given priority. These include attacks such as buffer 
overflow, SQL injections.  
3.3 Choosing the IDS 
Even though snort is the most popular IDS, Bro is nevertheless one of the most 
interesting IDS used for research purposes [43].  Various comparison have 
been made comparing Snort to Bro. Most comparisons aim at guiding a 
customer who is trying to purchase an IDS product. For instance, [101] 
suggested a checklist of features that need to be met before purchasing any 
IPS. These features are found Figure 3‐3.  
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Looking at the features identified by the ICSA, there is no concern as to how the 
system is built. What is important in this case is the performance of the IPS 
based on the identified criteria. For research purposes, it would be more 
interesting to look at the different architecture, the programming languages, the 
structures used when designing the IPS, the level of customisation possible, 
and the support available for further research.  
 
Figure 3‐3: ICSA IPS comparison features 
Very little comparison in search for the best tool for research purposes have 
been made between Snort and Bro. Bro is a Network Intrusion Detection 
System (NIDS) which is highly customisable. The first purpose of Bro has 
always been defined as a research tool that can be used to advance detection 
technique against Intruders [102].  . Rather than being an "out of the box" 
solution, Bro was geared at UNIX expert 
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Bro is designed for use by UNIX experts who place a premium 
on the ability to extend an intrusion detection system with new 
functionality as needed, which can greatly aid with tracking 
evolving attacker techniques as well as inevitable changes to a 
site's environment and security policy requirements. [103]  
One of the major drawbacks that we found for the research carried in this thesis 
was that Bro does not provide any default security feature. Bro has to be 
tailored to the network in which he is installed [43]. Correlation of event is 
important to ensure a good overall protection of the system. Bro provides a 
better correlation of events that Snort in the fact that Bro uses syslog output as 
an input to create a better picture of what is happening in the system. This 
feature is nonexistent in Snort and will be considered as an addition if the work 
carried in this research is based on Snort.  
The author looked at the different communities related to Snort and Bro to 
ensure that help could be provided when needed. Snort  
Snort community represented in Figure 3-4 is estimated at 300,000 registered 
users. 
With nearly 4 million downloads and approximately 300,000 registered users 
with more than 4 million download, with hundreds of universities actively using 
Snort for research purposes or simply for tutorial [104]. As opposed to Bro, 
there is no clear indication how many people are involved in the community. 
[43] recognises that involving the community has not been a prime objective.   
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Figure 3‐4: Snort community 
The author also looked at the number of tutorials available for both Bro and 
Snort. A Google search returned 23,800 for “Bro IDS tutorial” and 438000 for 
Snort. This means that Bro provides an equivalent of 5,434% support as 
compared to Snort. At the time the author started this research, his knowledge 
of UNIX system was very minimal.  
Looking at the research platforms, Snort is supported for virtually any Operating 
System (OS) yet Bro is only on UNIX like OS. In addition, the level required to 
use Bro is of a UNIX expert.  
Without a shadow of a doubt, the level of analysis that Bro provides is far 
superior to the one that Snort provides. There are many limitations to keywords 
based IDS which mainly rely on the fact that a previous attack was successfully 
analysed and represented as rules. These rules are then used to detect future 
identical attacks.  
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Snort is mainly based on C programming language, yet Bro is based on various 
languages with specialised scripting language i.e. Bro custom language.  
The criteria rating technique [105] was applied to make a decision on whether to 
perform the test using BRO or Snort. Each of the factors identified were given a 
weighting factor in the overall comparison based on literature review.  The 
following table was produced with a scoring mechanism ranging from 0 – 100; 
the highest score representing the most favourable option.  
3.4 Snort overview 
The basic structure is represented in Figure 3-5.  When a packet arrives at the 
network, Snort listens and captures packets. The packet is then parsed and 
sent to the appropriate preprocessor for more analysis such as the 
“http_decode” responsible of normalizing HTTP traffic.; The minfrag 
preprocessor is another example of pre-processor and it deals with mini  (tiny) 
fragments.  Any tiny fragment found on the network is then sent to the minifrag 
preprocessor for more analysis. 
 
Figure 3-5: Basic Snort Architecture 
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The preprocessors are also referred to as plugins. There are currently three 
types of plugins in Snort which are preprocessors plugins, detection plugins and 
output plugins.  Once the preprocessors job done, the packets are passed to 
the detection engine that will cause Snort to either fire an alert, or log an alert in 
the case of IDS or drop the packet in the case of IPS.  
3.5 Testbed  
The main testbed used for this experiment is represented in Figure 3-6 
 
Figure 3‐6: testbed 
 
3.6 Test under high speeds networks  
Under Fedora, a Linux distribution, the author ran over 5 consecutive tests to 
analyse the Snort performance using the number of packets received, the 
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number of packets analysed, the number of packets dropped, the number of 
alerts and the number of logs as our parameters.  For each of the tests, the 
speed at which the packets were sent was increased. The tests started by 
running [snort –r].  The author then used Tcpreplay to vary the speed at which 
Snort received the packets. As a result, the author observed that Snort 
analysed every single packets that reached the wire. The number of alerts 
produced was optimal as Snort was controlling the speed at which each packet 
was sent.  The results are presented in Figure 3-7.  
 
Figure 3-7: Snort performance under controlled speeds 
Figure 3-7 shows that the number of packets received remained constant while 
the number of packets analysed changed considerably. The number of packets 
received was predefined to allow fair comparison between the different data 
rate speeds. The author first observed a sudden drop in the number of packets 
analysed which then remained constant over a certain speed then continued to 
drop. As the speed increased, the number of packets dropped increased as 
well. Similarly, Snort logging capabilities were reduced as the speed increased 
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as shown in Figure 3-8. Not only did the number of packets logged decreased, 
the number of alerts also decreased.  
 
Figure 3-8: Snort performance based on logs variable 
 It is important to note that under different circumstances i.e. different computer 
systems and network environments, Fedora could have performed differently, 
whether better or worse. The results presented here are a representation of the 
performance of Fedora under our systems.  
More interestingly, the author has noticed that the number of IPs that Snort was 
able to see decreased as the speed increased as shown in Figure 3-9 .  
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Figure 3-9: Snort performance based on the number if IPs 
The latter graph shows that an attacker can take advantage of Snort 
weaknesses by generating a lot of noise around the attack, using a tool like 
“bonesi” [106] - a tool that generates up to 50k IPs addresses with up to 
150,000packets per second. Our experiments show that Snort was only able to 
see up to 26% of the IPs when the speed was increased. In this experiment the 
author has used Tcpreplay to replay the traffic at various speeds. At 2000 
packets per second, the number of unique source IP and unique destinations 
IPs were recorded. The traffic speed was increased by 500 packets per second 
three times. The third time, when packets were passing the network at 3500 
packets per second, Snort was not able to analyse all the traffic. This resulted in 
a drop of 74% of IP that were passing the network. This suggests that whatever 
attacks these 74% of IPs were carrying did not get analyse. From 9088 IPs, 
Snort did only analyse traffic for 2303 IPs. 6785 IPs traffic went undetected.  
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Figure 3‐10: IP lost in transaction performance study 
Figure 3-10 show that the number of packets received was kept to the same 
value for a fair analysis between the different speeds. The later graph show a 
quick increase in packet drop which matches a quick decrease of the number of 
packet analysed. Table 1 show that from 4933926 packets Snort only analysed 
1560217 packets at the end. Hence the big loss noticed earlier.  
Speeds  snort  1500pps  2000pps  2500pps  3000pps  3500pps 
Packets 
Received  4933926 4933926 4933926 4933926  4933926  4933926
Packets 
Analysed  4933926 3848739 2256913 2294284  2166329  1560217
Packets 
Dropped  0 1085187 2677013 2639642  2767597  3373709
Alerts  54289 21565 13726 13209  12940  10643
Logs  62147 55426 47695 46498  38585  33896
Unique IPs Scr  9088 4722 3084 2964  2685  2303
Unique Ips Dest  10999 6522 4578 4589  3826  3697
Table 1: Statistics IP lost in transaction 
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There are serious implications to packet dropping. Many attacks simply go 
undetected and the systems that should be protected become unprotected and 
open to attacks. Preventing a system to alert has proved to be fatal. In 2008, 
the computer system that was responsible of alerting fault in the plane during a 
routine check before taking off, failed to report [107]. Believing that there was 
not fault, the plane was allowed to take off. Later, the plane crashed causing 
154 dead with 14 survivors.  Dropping packets without prior analysis could have 
similar fatal consequences depending on the environment that is being 
protected.  
In the quest of finding what could be the reasons behind that lack of good 
performance, the research looked at how the rules are analysed by Snort, and 
how they were performed. After running the “rules performance monitor”, a tool 
that comes with Snort, the author observed that some of rules go through the 
detection process many more times than others and yet, they did not generate 
alerts.    
SID GID Rev Checks Matches Alerts Microsecs Note: rules for …  
11966 1 1 324257 0 0 1136496 Internet Explorer 
11965 1 2 117045 0 0 1085734 HTTP SERVERS 
3154 1 5 101123 0 0 595723 DNS traffic 
11671 1 2 117045 0 0 533102 HTTP SERVERS 
2660 1 8 117045 0 0 532240 HTTP SERVERS 
16291 1 2 95534 0 0 438676 Mozilla Firefox 
2329 1 10 70514 0 0 295143 SQL SERVERS 
477 1 3 83173 0 0 219236 ICMP 
473 1 5 83173 0 0 215193 ICMP 
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1838 1 10 37845 0 0 209482 Microsoft Windows 
485 1 5 83173 1032 1032 166204 ICMP 
13948 1 3 101217 0 0 158021 DNS, Windows 
3059 1 5 8039 0 0 128357 HTTP SERVERS 
1388 1 15 13225 0 0 127934 Microsoft Windows 
2584 1 6 16091 0 0 117668 eMule, Windows  
Table 2: Snort rules performance snapshot 
In Table 2, for the purposed of presentation the top 15 results were selected 
from the “rules performance monitor” ordered by the time Snort had spent 
checking the rules. From the top 15 results, one could observed that only one of 
the rules “sid:=485” returned an alert. All the other 14 rules were checked and 
did not returned any alerts.  Also, Figure 3-11 shows that the time spent to 
check the top 15 rules was 39% of the full timing.  
 
Figure 3-11: Time repartition for rules analysis 
Looking further in Table 2 and having identified the category for each rule, the 
author observed that the same rules are checked whether the work carry was 
under Linux or Under Windows environment.  Despite many rules related to 
HTTP attacks being checked, the targeted server did not have an HTTP server. 
Not only was extra time spent performing irrelevant tasks, but any match of 
HTTP rules would be a false positive. This led us to conclude that Snort 
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performance is affected by performing unnecessary tasks such as checking 
rules that are not relevant to the system being protected. By reducing the tasks 
that Snort performs the time that Snort spends checking rules would certainly 
be reduced.  
3.7 Snort reaction to ICMP flood 
In this section the research the focus will be on studying the behaviour of Snort 
against ICMP flood.  The objective here is to find out how well Snort performs 
against flood attacks.  Also, the victim system performance is also studied.  One 
of the objectives of the study is to establish at what particular time an alert 
should be raised in order for Snort to go into “attack state”.  Later in this work, 
similar studies will be carried out studying Snort behaviour against UDP and 
HTTP floods. This section of the study will help to finding common problems for 
various situations in order to suggest a solution that will consider most 
problems.  
3.7.1 Experiment 1 
Tools:   
 Bonesi, a Bot net and DDOS attack simulator – Bonesi was used to 
generate packet at an average rate of 500 packets per second, each 
packet carrying 1024bytes , from up to 50K IPs addresses.  
 Snort, an Intrusion detection System  
 Ifstat , a tool to collect network statistics 
 Sar, a tool to collect CPU utilisation  
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Figure 3-12: experiment 3.1 
Based on Figure 3-12, the CPU utilisation has increased from an average of 20 
to an average of 48.  This study aims at looking at CPU variations when the 
system is under attack.  DDoS attacks, utilize all resources available in order to 
prevent the Computer System to serve legitimate users.  More studies have 
been done to set the level at which the internal agent will notify the IDS of the 
attack level hence changing the state of the IDS.  Also, a fault can occur and 
cause the CPU to become very busy.  Even though this might not be caused by 
an external attack, it is important to make sure that Computer Systems continue 
to provide services for which they are intended.  The IDS should be notified that 
the correct system is not able to handle a lot of traffic. Actions should then be 
taken to avoid Denial of Service.  
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Figure 3-13: ICMP data analysis 500KB/s 
In this graph one will see that when the system was not under attack the 
incoming traffic as well as to outgoing traffic was very low.  However, the traffic 
has increased by 500KBps. 
3.7.2 Experiment 2 
Traffic speed was set to an average of 100KB/s. When compared to the 
behaviour in experiment one, the CPU utilization has not changed.  However, 
data speed rate has doubled.  Again, one could notice that there are two peak 
values when monitoring traffic.   The same scenario was observed in the 
second experiment Figure 3-14 
Figure 3-14: CPU Utilisation - 100KB/s 
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This behaviour could be an indication that the IDS were dropping more and 
more packets.  In this experiment only 3% of packets were analysed.  
 
Figure 3-15: ICMP data analysis 1000KB/s 
The number of packets dropped was considerably higher when testing Snort 
against ICMP flood  
 
Figure 3-16: Analysis of packet drop against ICMP flood 
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Figure 3-17: Analysis of CPU Utilisation against ICMP Flood 
When putting all ICMP results together, it appears that the CPU utilization has 
not changed much even though the data rate has considerably changed over 
the time, from 500Kps to 1500KBps. This implies that it could be a while before 
an attack is detected.  Therefore it is important to monitor the traffic and CPU 
variations concurrently. Further studies are on the way, to identify the specific 
characteristic of system changes when an attacker is happening.  An algorithm 
is to be defined taking into consideration the CPU utilization, the number of 
packets sent and received, and the consistency of the changes. 
In recent experiments, it has been interesting to note is that the number of 
packets sent and a number of packets received where almost equal.  When 
ICMP packets are sent, the receiving system will reply whether the system is 
alive or not.  Even when the system is locked by administrator configuration, 
there is always a reply; this will double the number of packets on the network. 
ICMP messages can be blocked but this does not reduce the number of 
packets in a system.   
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3.8 Snort reaction to UDP Flood  
In this experiment, Snort was tested against UDP flood.  The objective here is to 
find out if Snort has the same behaviour or ideas with ICMP flood.  Snort was 
tested against UDP flood using the same conditions as in previous experiments. 
A common prevention mechanism would apply to both.  
3.8.1 Experiment 1 
Tools:   
 Bonesi, a Bot net and DDOS attack simulator – Bonesi was used to 
generate packet at an average rate of 500 packets per second, each 
packet carrying 1024bytes , from up to 50K IPs addresses.  
 Snort, an Intrusion detection System  
 Ifstat , a tool to collect network statistics 
 Sar, a tool to collect CPU utilisation  
 
Figure 3-18: CPU utilization when sending 500KB/s UDP packets 
 
In this experiment, the CPU utilization jumped to an average just below 40%. In 
comparison to Snort behaviour when tested against ICMP traffic under the 
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same conditions; the CPU concentration was above 40%.  The number of 
packets dropped when under ICMP flood was 11% yet with UDP flood, it was 
13%. The main difference between the two was the number of outstanding 
packets waiting to be analysed. When under ICMP flood, the number of 
outstanding packet was jump 1 yet under UDP flood, the number of packet was 
1339. There could be various reasons to justify this behaviour. UDP is more 
complex than a simple ICMP packet; the number of checks Snort performs for 
ICMP packets is much less than the number of checked performed by UDP. 
Over all, the system was in a better state when under UDP flood than he was 
when under ICMP flood.  
Looking at Figure 3-13, throughout the course of the experiment, there was 
hardly any difference between the number of packets sent and the number of 
packets received. One would then note a very high number of packets send and 
received. Yet, looking at Figure 3-19, there is a clear difference between the 
number of packets sent and the number of packets received. Each ICMP packet 
sent generates a response whereas UDP packets do not need a response. 
Each response will cause more traffic hence a higher CPU utilization and a 
slower performance. This explains further why Snort would handle UDP flood 
better than ICMP flood.  
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Figure 3-19: UDP data rate transfer analysis 500KB/s 
Further analyses were performed comparing Snort behaviour as data rate was 
increased.  
 
Figure 3-20: CPU utilization 1000KB/s 30bots 
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Figure 3-21: CPU Utilization for 1500KB/s 
 
 
Figure 3-22: CPU utilization data rate = 2000KB/s 
Looking at all the results from UDP flood attack, Figure 3-20, Figure 3-21, and 
Figure 3-22, the CPU utilisation remained very constant. It is important to note 
that the CPU utilisation remained high for many cycles. Further studies done at 
a later stage in this research will design and implement a method for detecting 
flooding back based on the network data rate variation, the CPU utilisation, and 
the data rate 
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As the speed of data was increased, the number of packets dropped also 
increased (Figure 3-23).  
 
Figure 3-23: UDP - Snort performance analysis 
To conclude this experiment, one could look at the variations of the CPU in 
combination with the number of packets loss and the data rate.  DDOS attacks 
occur when the system under attack is not able to provide services any more to 
the legitimate users.  DDOS can be caused by either a then external element to 
the system concerned by launching a specific attack; DDOS can also occur by a 
fault in the system causing the system resources to be too low to provide any 
service. Either way, an IDS should be able to detect that system resources are 
low enough and either slow the packets down or take other appropriate action. 
The architecture proposed later by this search will address this issue.  
3.9 Snort reaction to HTTP Flood 
Tools 
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 Bonesi, a Bot net and DDOS attack simulator – Bonesi was used to 
generate packet at an average rate of 500 packets per second, each 
packet carrying 1024bytes , from up to 50K IPs addresses.  
 Snort, an Intrusion detection System  
 Ifstat , a tool to collect network statistics 
 Sar, a tool to collect CPU utilisation  
 Apache with Joomla installed  
The behaviour of Snort is once again analysed when the network is subject to 
HTTP based DDOS attacks. Looking at Figure 3-24, Snort performance has not 
been seriously affected by the number of botnets used. As seen on the latter 
graph, the number of packets analysed was predefined for fair analysis and 
comparison. Snort managed to analyse over 14% of traffic. Snort performed 
better in handling HTTP traffic than handling UDP and ICMP traffic. At this 
stage, there is no clear indicator that the system is under attack. After looking at 
the internal performances of Snort, the CPU utilisation and the network 
bandwidth rate were analysed.  
 
Figure 3-24: HHTP based DDOS attack view by Snort 
 
89 
 
 
Figure 3-25: CPU Utilisation 120bots 
 
Figure 3-26: CPU utilisation 30-60bots 
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Figure 3-27: CPU Monitoring 30bots 
CPU utilisation in the case of HTTP presents different characteristics than those 
observed when studying Snort under ICMP and UDP flood. In the case of ICMP 
and UDP, the CPU utilisation raised and remained constant throughout the 
attack. In this case, there are many variations.  For a better view of the CPU 
utilisation, a zoom on Figure 3-27 was realised.  
 
Figure 3-28: Zoom on Figure 3-27 
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A close look at the zoomed in figure gives the impression of a mathematical 
sinus function.  One could easily think that a pattern is repeating. This could be 
true and will be subject to mathematical calculation later in this research. At this 
stage it is very difficult to determine what would signal of an attack. However, 
the repetition of high peak of the CPU usage over a period of time could be a 
very good indicator that an attack is taking place. Determining the accuracy of 
the repetition will be subject to more tests and mathematical design.  
When the variation 30-60bots were used, the CPU level remains constant for 
sometimes before dropping and goes back to the previous high level. A possible 
indicator of attack here would be the constancy of the CPU level when the 
system is under attack.   
The CPU pattern recorded when under 120bots is similar to the pattern 
recorded for 30-60 in that when the CPU hit a peak, the value remains constant 
for a moment before going down 
3.10 Snort reaction to multistage attacks  
This section will focus on analysing a modern HTTP attack reflecting the type of 
attacks that are current nowadays. 
The analysis in this section will be organised as follow: 
 Summary of file information  
 Percentage of participants IPs 
 Summary of conversations 
 Summary of protocols 
 in depth analysis 
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The file used for this analysis was used the challenge 2 of the forensic 
challenge 2010 – Browser under attack [108].  
3.10.1 Summary of file information  
 
Figure 3-29: Suspicious-time file information 
This section is purely informative and does not carry any attack hint. However, 
information such as the type file, the file size the data bit and data byte rate, can 
give an indication as per what to expect in the file i.e. slow traffic, flood attack, 
etc.  
3.10.2 Percentage of participants IPs  
This section gives good indication on the traffic behaviour and the number of IP 
participant.  For instance, a presence of closely related IPs could indicate a 
scan. In this case, few IPs are above 10% of the overall traffic. It is important to 
note at this stage that the traffic has been synthetized and foreign IPs have 
been replace by 192.168.x.x. In this scenario, IPs 192.168.56.52 and 
192.168.56.50 are the two external IPs with the most presence in the 
communication.  
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Figure 3-30: IP participant 
 
3.10.3 Summary of conversation 
 
After analysing a trace file, 16 Ethernet conversations were found, 29 IPv4 
conversations, 25 TCP conversations, and 15 UDP conversations.  Looking 
further into the conversations, it appears that four different systems in the 
communication had the same netbios name.  However, they appear to be in 
different subnets.  This is a typical setting for virtual machine environment.  
root@ubuntu:/home/administrator/stuff# tshark -r suspicious-time.pcap | grep 
'NB.*20\>' | sed -e 's/<[^>]*>//g' | awk '{print $3,$4,$9}' | sort -u 
Running as user "root" and group "root". This could be dangerous. 
10.0.2.15 -> 8FD12EDD2DC1462 
10.0.3.15 -> 8FD12EDD2DC1462 
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10.0.4.15 -> 8FD12EDD2DC1462 
10.0.5.15 -> 8FD12EDD2DC1462 
The setting used by the malicious user here is simple to build yet carries 
technicalities that IDS systems are not able to detect. Current IDS systems are 
not able to build a map of the attacking system or the system being attacked.  
3.10.4 Snort analysis  
The current file was analysed using Snort IDS 2.8.5.1 and no alert were 
reported. There are various reasons why Snort was unable to detect any 
possible threat or attack in the trace file provided for analysis. The following 
section, an in depth analysis, will go into details of what is actually taking place 
in the trace file.  
3.10.5 In depth analysis  
 
Obfuscating the attack using VMware settings  
As shown in the section 3.10.3 above, the attacker makes connection to various 
systems by using the same computer but with a different virtual machine each 
time. Being in the Local Network, the IDS will view each connection as a 
different and separate connection. Even if the IDS was able to detect each 
separate occurrence of connection, there will be no connection whatsoever 
between the different connection yet they are all from the same attacker. This 
technique is more and more used as a way to obfuscate the attack. IDS should 
be able to detect this as the clear indication was given by the fact that four 
different IPs had the same name.  Figure 3-31 and Figure 3-32 show IP == 
10.0.2.15 and IP == 10.0.3.15 registering the same Netbios name.  
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Figure 3-31: IP 10.0.2.15 registration 
 
 
Figure 3-32: IP 10.0.3.15 Registration 
 
Attack scenario 1  
 
Figure 3-33: Attack Scenario 1 
 In this scenario, the attacker use one of the virtual machine to connect to 
rapidshare.eyu32.ru/login.php using Firefox. Snort did not complain as 
there is nothing visible or apparent that appear illegitimate. The only way 
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for Snort to catch this action was to have the URL specified as a string to 
be searched.  
GET /login.php HTTP/1.1 
Host: rapidshare.com.eyu32.ru 
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; en-US; rv:1.9.1.3) 
Gecko/20090824 Firefox/3.5.3 
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8 
Accept-Language: en-us,en;q=0.5 
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate 
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.7 
Keep-Alive: 300 
Connection: keep-alive  
 The page is then returned successfully, however, with a non-readable 
text. Snort does not provide any mechanism to read non-trivial text. Any 
encrypted text is generally ignored by Snort hence considered as safe. 
This is yet a popular way to hide attacks.  
...........Vmo.6..._.j.l!..[......I....5)......-...RT.7...Q.c.C. 
~...{.Ew.....:.......ys.......!........n...5e88D7..%S..8..._,d..w..<..j.:HTb...P.]..ed.J...[....?.r. 
'.I#m.aJq.w:..B.TF..X..:.....;..Y..t..R.b.z 
...Tad.]..b..5....ro6.Z.4..R.NyF....-.....u...&..2H.+VH.,.J..h.R.,....&ei.T.Ed../i..e.......[...a.!..._..O..<.7..>a........>.^-..^..p.. 
......j......)...[...UA....>....O......9q.%U..U.O.....&......;.s..........k%!......B6.......9!...j....a...g..@Rp......o..s.NY.......t>F.....f=]E....[.
.0~|.8.3}K.......0%..a.C......x4..k.....D........^......%..J...~..^....>..;..=....=..o?..}d....O..>.X.{....3.....3...'..oW }..C{a.......c.... 
.....:..C.E..9........%P'.[....9Xc.....r.....+/.=..g............s...?............z4..W:...H.C...s...P./t.J..up....O....N...L.%STW.-
..T...R...H...Gz<..X..}..;..g....2....`.....5du..[...ZK,........(d....D..k.R.._..'.4t.D.d.!....Q".H..J. ...`|.v.8.m.{V...4.0T$..!.<Zx.e...b..r.. 
.OV|%i...}.Z7|...&...W4..q@..Q.5'../Y.g.......X...5.U.E.^I$ .k....@.F..?sV....o............ 
:..p..,.DqY.|.m..%..?. 
..<.......X..ux.hw......S......i...ix+.q...1.................47...~-...MT..m"....)Z..\@.V-
.u%...i.9..]._6.......D..v....Y.!.`Vh...f..N....oO.zg.$. 
....C.0.KG{..r.........%s.lW..?5-.R.........q.Y...sY.B..b...W..Q/Tg.p}.E.~..TX0=...+....WxnF.P..@..|..u1.. ......R..9.......&j........ 
|.c.%.0..=.N.e\/.._F...[.............K..Dn..IS.[.e5....z..^...N..V...+....P.o).. 
....U.N.S...'S*..&.D.f..1OH.h.j....H.(d.@JJ*..6 7.............|...........k.R..e.nA..n..A1..65.....<>.h.'..?........  
 
Using a popular and free tool widely available [109], the obfuscated code was 
made clear, readable and returned  
eval(function(p,a,c,k,e,r){e=function(c){return(c<a?'':e(parseInt(c/a)))+((c=c%a)>
35?String.fromCharCode(c+29):c.toString(36))};if(!''.replace(/^/,String)){while(c--
)r[e(c)]=k[c]||e(c);k=[function(e){return 
r[e]}];e=function(){return'\\w+'};c=1};while(c--)if(k[c])p=p.replace(new 
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RegExp('\\b'+e(c)+'\\b','g'),k[c]);return p}('...........y.6...x.j.l!..[......I....5)......-
...A.7...Q.c.C.~...{.G.....:.......M.......!........n...10..%S..8...x,d..w..<..j.:11...P.]..12.J.
..[....?.r.\'.I#m.13.w:..B.14..X..:.....;..Y..t..R.b.z\n...15.]..b..5....16.Z.4..R.17....-
.....u...&..18.+19.,.J..h.R.,....&1a.T.1b../i..e.......[...a.!...x..O..<.7..>a........>.^-
..^..p..\n......j......)...[...1c....>....O......1d.%U..U.O.....&......;.s..........k%!......1e.......
9!...j....a...g..@1f......o..s.1g.......t>F.....f=]E....[..0~|.8.3}K.......0%..a.C......1h..k.....
D........^......%..J...~..^....>..;..=....=..o?..}d....O..>.X.{....3.....3...\'..1i}..C{a.......c......
...:..C.E..9........%P\'.[....1j.....r.....+/.=..g............s...?............1k..W:...H.C...s...P./t.
J..1l....O....N...L.%1m.-
..T...R...H...1n<..X..}..;..g....2....`.....1o..[...1p,........(d....D..k.R..x..\'.1q.D.d.!....Q".
H..J. 
...`|.v.8.m.{V...4.1r$..!.<1s.e...b..r..\n.1t|%i...}.1u|...&...1v..q@..Q.5\'../Y.g.......X...
5.U.E.^I$ 
.k....@.F..?1w....o............\n:..p..,.1x.|.m..%..?.\n..<.......X..1y.1z......S......i...1A+.q
...1.................1B...~-...1C..m"....)Z..\\@.V-
.u%...i.9..].1D.......D..v....Y.!.`1E...f..N....1F.1G.$.....C.0.1H{..r.........%s.1I..?5-
.R.........q.Y...1J.B..b...W..Q/1K.p}.E.~..1L=...+....1M.P..@..|..1N........R..9.......&j..
......|.c.%.0..=.N.e\\/..1O...[.............K..1P..1Q.[.1R....z..^...N..V...+....P.o)......U.N.
S...\'S*..&.D.f..1S.h.j....H.(d.@1T*..6 
7.............|...........k.R..e.1U..n..1V..1W.....<>.h.\'..?........',62,121,'||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|||||_|Vmo||RT||||||Ew||||||ys||||||||||||||5e88D7|HTb|ed|aJq|TF|Tad|ro6|NyF|2H|VH|e
i|Ed|UA|9q|B6|Rp|NY|x4|oW|9Xc|z4|up|STW|Gz|5du|ZK|4t|0T|Zx|OV|Z7|W4|sV|
DqY|ux|hw|ix|47|MT|_6|Vh|oO|zg|KG|lW|sY|Tg|TX0|WxnF|u1|_F|Dn|IS|e5|1OH|
JJ|nA|A1|65'.split('|'),0,{}))  
The latter even though not completely clear, suggests that the malicious user 
was trying to hide some code that could have been detected by the IDS.  
A complete DE obfuscation of the code reveals that the attacker was using 
iframe to hide another link with more malicious code  
<iframe src="http://sploitme.com.cn/?click=3feb5a6b2f"width=1 height=1 
style="visibility: hidden"></iframe>  
 
 The successful page then redirects the malicious user to another page 
[HTTP code 304] 
Redirecting a page to another page is a normal behaviour in TCP/IP 
communication. However, in this case the intention was malicious. Snort 
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does not analyse traffic with much depth to actually see the intention 
behind actions. Snort would have been able to look at this behaviour if 
Snort supported attack tree and if the attack tree was defined. 
Obfuscating HTML code becomes more and more attractive as this 
would bypass most security system. It is therefore important to have a 
system that is capable of analysing obfuscated portions of code.  
HTTP/1.1 304 Not Modified 
Date: Tue, 02 Feb 2010 19:05:12 GMT 
Server: Apache/2.2.9 (Ubuntu) PHP/5.2.6-2ubuntu4.6 with Suhosin-Patch 
Connection: Keep-Alive 
Keep-Alive: timeout=15, max=99 
ETag: "5e472-fef-47ea19070f940"  
 
As a result of the redirection, the server returns the code [HTTP 404] which 
normally would mean that the page was not found. However, the page even 
thought a normal looking error page a further analysis will look at the irregular 
non-readable section of the page.  
 
..........MP.j.0...+.9..h]. 
-.A.;$.&...=*...........P.e`fgv..w.n.|.%... 
....,a6G... 
.h..$#)b....*.:2.$..x....i.[.aeB/(....d.{#.c....D...5J..?A:/.......ugz....A.C.1......'.YZBq....\.+.co....
.d....}.}x.z].s...,LRN.p.^.WP..~^s.E6.....A.....3'"..)#6@m.......Xr....oI~..J..Q...  
 
When deofuscated by the free online tool identified earlier the script becomes  
 
eval(function(p,a,c,k,e,r){e=function(c){return(c<a?'':e(parseInt(c/a)))+((c=c%a)>35?Stri
ng.fromCharCode(c+29):c.toString(36))};if(!''.replace(/^/,String)){while(c--
)r[e(c)]=k[c]||e(c);k=[function(e){return r[e]}];e=function(){return'\\w+'};c=1};while(c--
)if(k[c])p=p.replace(new RegExp('\\b'+e(c)+'\\b','g'),k[c]);return p}('..........4.j.0...+.9..h].-
.A.;$.&...=*...........5.e`6..w.n.|.%.......,7....h..$#)b....*.:2.$..x....i.[.8/(....d.{#.c....a...f..?A:/....
...g....A.C.1......\'.k....\\.+.l.....d....}.}x.z].s...,o.p.^.q..~^s.r.....A.....3\'"..)t@m.......u....v~..y..
B...',39,39,'||||MP|P|fgv|a6G|aeB||D|||||5J|ugz||||YZBq|co|||LRN||WP|E6||undefined|Xr|oI|
||J|||Q|'.split('|'),0,{})) 
 
 
Scenario 2  
In this scenario, start another virtual machine as shown in Figure 3-32. Given 
that Netbios name are unique per network. This suggests that the attacker 
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turned off the first virtual machine to start a second. The objective of such 
actions is to deceive security systems in a way that even if individual attacks are 
traced, it will be very difficult to link these different attacks as coming from the 
source.  
Similar actions to scenario 1 are repeated.  
 
The attacker connected to rapidshare.com.eyu32.ru 
 
GET /login.php HTTP/1.1 
Accept: image/gif, image/x-xbitmap, image/jpeg, image/pjpeg, application/x-
shockwave-flash, */* 
Accept-Language: en-us 
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate 
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1) 
Host: rapidshare.com.eyu32.ru 
Connection: Keep-Alive 
 
The attacker gets a response with a redirection to another page. Just as in 
scenario 1, the script behind the pages was obfuscated.  
Under the page login downloaded as seen above, the following script was 
embedded   
 
...........Vmo.6..._.j.l!..[......I....5)......-...RT.7...Q.c.C. 
~...{.Ew.....:.......ys.......!........n...5e88D7..%S..8..._,d..w..<..j.:HTb...P.]..ed.J...[....?.r. 
'.I#m.aJq.w:..B.TF..X..:.....;..Y..t..R.b.z 
...Tad.]..b..5....ro6.Z.4..R.NyF....-
.....u...&..2H.+VH.,.J..h.R.,....&ei.T.Ed../i..e.......[...a.!..._..O..<.7..>a........>.^-..^..p.. 
......j......)...[...UA....>....O......9q.%U..U.O.....&......;.s..........k%!......B6.......9!...j....a...g..@
Rp......o..s.NY.......t>F.....f=]E....[..0~|.8.3}K.......0%..a.C......x4..k.....D........^......%..J...~..
^....>..;..=....=..o?..}d....O..>.X.{....3.....3...'..oW }..C{a.......c.... 
.....:..C.E..9........%P'.[....9Xc.....r.....+/.=..g............s...?............z4..W:...H.C...s...P./t.J..up.
...O....N...L.%STW.-
..T...R...H...Gz<..X..}..;..g....2....`.....5du..[...ZK,........(d....D..k.R.._..'.4t.D.d.!....Q".H..J. 
...`|.v.8.m.{V...4.0T$..!.<Zx.e...b..r.. 
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Using the same online tool, the obfuscated code was made more readable.   
On successful download of the login page, the user was redirected to hidden 
page using iframes.  
 
3.11 Analysis:  
In this attack commonly known as “the browser under attack”, the attacker uses 
four almost identical scenarios almost identical to deceive computer security 
systems. The attacker used four different techniques to bypass Snort security 
checks.  
Javascript obfuscation: currently Snort does not provide any analysis method 
to prevent against attacked embedded into obfuscated Javascript. Introducing a 
deobfuscation features for IDS would be very possible as they are already 
existing codes that are commonly used to obfuscate and deobfuscate 
Javascript.  
A pretended error page – 404 error code:  Pages usually display 404 when 
the page is not found. But in this case, the 404 page is the page intended as it 
contains hidden malicious code. Some security systems check for error code 
404 to trigger certain alerts based on a predefined threshold. In this case, the 
page will not generate any alert as the return code number is 200 which 
indicates that the intended page has been successfully downloaded.  
Iframe: more and more, iframes are becoming a serious security concern as 
attackers use them to hide malicious code 
Content compression: content compression is becoming more and more of a 
security challenge. The great difficulty in this is that most files sent over the 
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internet are compressed in order to limit the amount data sent and increase the 
speed at which the date is sent. However, malicious users take advantage of 
file compression to upload and download their script which can then be 
interpreted by the received end.   
At the end of this study, is it safe to conclude that Snort is not adapted to detect 
the latest attacks.  This is an indication that strictly string matching for security 
systems nowadays is very limited.  Later in this research work, an alternative 
design is suggest for a current and revolutionary IDS.  
Reconfiguration vs. new plug-ins  
In order to change Snort behaviour, a common practice is to reconfigure Snort. 
However, Snort reconfiguration is limited to assigning values to existing 
variables [110]. They are few areas where Snort would accept new variables. 
When defining group of IPs, Snort is flexible enough to accept new variable 
such as New_IP_Group = <list of IPs>.   
However, Snort would not recognise values that are not predefined in most 
cases. If Snort has not been compiled with an option, any variable related to 
that option will generate an error. For instance, if Snort is not configured with 
the option to support database any attempt to connect to database will fail and 
generate an error that will prevent Snort from running. Moreover, even if 
database access was compiled, specific database need to be specified. For 
instance the configuration line specifies MySql database access.  
output database: log, mysql, user=snort password=56y7@po#90 dbname=snort 
host=localhost  
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Any change of behaviour of Snort that cannot be done by modifying existing 
parameters need to be compiled before it can be used. This implies that the 
source code to support the addition needs to be provided. Whenever the source 
code is provided for a new option that Snort did not support, a new plug-in is 
then written. To date, many plug-in have been written to extend Snort 
functionalities [111]. For instance, SnortSam is a Snort plug-in that enables the 
communication between Snort and different firewalls such as Checkpoint 
Firewall, Cisco PIX firewalls, Cisco Routers (using ACL's or Null-Routes), 
Former Netscreen, now Juniper firewalls, IP Filter (ipf) [112]. When an IP has 
been flagged as attacker, Snortsam will then send the IP to the firewall with 
instructions to block the given IP.  
The solution proposed to the various problems identified during our 
investigations will require to write different plug-in. One plug-in for rules 
optimisation, one plug-in for DDOS detection, one plug-in for DDOS mitigation, 
one plug-in for detecting multistage attacks, one plug-in for mitigating multistage 
attacks, one plug-in for source code analysis, etc. Instead, the author decided to 
produce a new IDS architecture for a better integration of these new 
components.  
Conclusion  
 
After various experiments, Snort does not handle well traffic any flood situation. 
Up to 90% of traffic can be dropped whilst the CPU becomes very high and 
remains so for many cycles. At the same time, the data rate increased. There is 
a clear link between the variations of the CPU, the variations of data rate and 
the increased number of packets drop. This link will be used to build an attack 
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indicator raising the IDS state to attack in progress. In addition, there were clear 
indications that an attack was in progress but Snort failed to notice them. For 
example, Snort received the same payload from over a thousand IPs; the 
system generated over a thousand ICMP response based on the same port 
number. The problems that will be addressed later when building the new IDS 
architecture are:  
 To detect increased change in data rates 
 To detect Increased CPU utilisation  
 To detect increased packets drop 
 To detect regular pattern such as repeated payload from multiple host  
 To provide a way to analyse obfuscated Javascript 
 To provide a way to analyse obfuscated HTML  
 To provide multiple encoding system 
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4  Modelling Multistage attacks for Intrusion 
Detection System 
 
“DDoS is a threat that must be included in all risk mitigation plans for any 
company with critical online services and applications”. By Richard Stiennon 
Introduction 
 
Mitigating today’s attacks has become a very serious challenge for Internet 
based businesses and services.  Recently, hackers have developed systems 
that allow them to compromise and infect computers and then put the later 
computers into an army of computer ready to obey commands from a master 
computer. These armies are referred as botnet. Botnets are generally used to 
send SPAMS or to launch Denial of Service Attacks.  Also, when computers 
have been compromised they are subject to various attacks as they are 
controlled remotely. The malicious user having control over the computers could 
decide to perform various actions listed as but not limited to installing key 
loggers, installing worms, viruses, destroying data, copying data. 
In this chapter, presents our understanding of multistage attacks based on real 
live traffic capture. The author will then use Snort to perform an offline analysis 
of our trace file and discuss the ability of Snort to detecting multistage attacks.  
The author presents a new model that will help detecting and mitigating 
multistage attacks.  The model is very extensible and attacker tree can be used 
to extend the model.  
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4.1 Multistage attacks 
Over the years, various solutions have been proposed to resolve cyber-attacks. 
However, it is becoming increasingly difficult to distinguish legitimate traffic from 
illegal traffic. Often, some network communications that are not considered to 
be problematic are actually crucial to the attackers. These steps are generally 
ignored by IDS as they do not violate any rules.  In this section, the focus will be 
on analysing captured traffic from live network and honeypot.  One of the 
highlight is the steps that are generally ignored by IDS and most security 
systems.  
4.2 Analysis strategy 
As a general strategy, important statistics of each trace file analysed are obtained to 
have a quick general overview of what could have been going on during the capture.  
The steps taken would be, whenever applicable: 
 General file statistics: trace file statistics 
 List of IPs participants and their percentage of participation 
 Operating system involved  
 Summary of TCP transactions 
 Summary of conversation  
 Extract any file present in the trace file 
 In-depth analysis  
4.3 Scenario Alpha  
This scenario is about a capture that was made as the attacker was trying to 
register computers to its bot army.  
Trace file statistics summary  
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Figure 4-1: Sick-client.pcap file information 
4.3.1 Trace file analysis  
 
Table 3: List of IP participants 
A quick look at the Table 3 shows a succession of IP address. This could indicate 
a scan. Also, one of the IPs 10.129.211.13 is involved in every single 
conversation. This can be seen by its participation rate of 100%.  
Looking at the OS, it appears that the attacker is a Windows machine 
107 
 
 
Figure 4‐2: List of Operating System 
Looking at more indications of attacks, there are many connection initiation as 
shown Figure 4‐3[Seq = 0, Len = 0]. This could indicate a session flooding or a 
TCP scan. Further analysis will give us more details on the exact nature of the 
activity.   
 
Figure 4‐3: Open connections 
Another quick command revealed that there have been 130 conversations in 
total. These conversation were observed around port 445 (Figure 4-4), port 139 
(Figure 4-5)  
 
Figure 4‐4: port 445 usage 
 
Figure 4‐5: port 139 usage 
Given the number of conversation on port 445 and port 139, there is a strong 
indication that the host was vulnerable.  
Further analysis of the trace file indicates an apparent problem as there are 
many repetitions of the same message. This could be fine if it was a usual TCP 
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or UDP connection but many ICMP messages would indicate something 
unusual.   Table 4 shows a good number of repeated ICMP messages. As 
shown on the table, one could observe the same ICMP message originating 
from different IPs and directed at a single IP. This generally indicates the sign of 
a Scan.  
Packet 
No 
Timestam
p 
Source IP Destination 
IP 
Protoc
ol 
Other info 
175 341.22190
3 
10.129.102.
20 
10.129.211.
13 
ICMP Destination unreachable (Port 
unreachable) 
176 341.22263
3 
10.129.102.
21 
10.129.211.
13 
ICMP Destination unreachable (Port 
unreachable) 
177 341.22336
1 
10.129.102.
22 
10.129.211.
13 
ICMP Destination unreachable (Port 
unreachable) 
178 341.22384
8 
10.129.102.
23 
10.129.211.
13 
ICMP Destination unreachable (Port 
unreachable) 
179 341.22457
8 
10.129.102.
24 
10.129.211.
13 
ICMP Destination unreachable (Port 
unreachable) 
180 341.22506
4 
10.129.102.
25 
10.129.211.
13 
ICMP Destination unreachable (Port 
unreachable) 
181 341.22579
7 
10.129.102.
26 
10.129.211.
13 
ICMP Destination unreachable (Port 
unreachable) 
182 341.22628 10.129.102.
27 
10.129.211.
13 
ICMP Destination unreachable (Port 
unreachable) 
183 341.22701 10.129.102.
28 
10.129.211.
13 
ICMP Destination unreachable (Port 
unreachable) 
184 341.22773
9 
10.129.102.
29 
10.129.211.
13 
ICMP Destination unreachable (Port 
unreachable) 
185 341.22822
5 
10.129.102.
30 
10.129.211.
13 
ICMP Destination unreachable (Port 
unreachable) 
186 341.22895
5 
10.129.102.
31 
10.129.211.
13 
ICMP Destination unreachable (Port 
unreachable) 
187 341.22944
2 
10.129.102.
0 
10.129.211.
13 
ICMP Destination unreachable (Port 
unreachable) 
188 341.23017
1 
10.129.102.
1 
10.129.211.
13 
ICMP Destination unreachable (Port 
unreachable) 
189 341.23065
7 
10.129.102.
2 
10.129.211.
13 
ICMP Destination unreachable (Port 
unreachable) 
190 341.23138
7 
10.129.102.
3 
10.129.211.
13 
ICMP Destination unreachable (Port 
unreachable) 
191 341.23211
6 
10.129.102.
4 
10.129.211.
13 
ICMP Destination unreachable (Port 
unreachable) 
192 341.23260
3 
10.129.102.
5 
10.129.211.
13 
ICMP Destination unreachable (Port 
unreachable) 
Table 4: Repeated ICMP Messages 
At the beginning of the trace file, starting from packet 1 of the trace file, the IP 
that was identified at the compromised IP sent a DNS query to a domain name. 
This exchange of information between two parties is absolutely normal and 
does not indicate a problem.  This step will be identified as step 1 in the attack 
process of our analysis. Even though the communication seems normal, a later 
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analysis will show that the DNS server being queried is found amongst the DNS 
blacklist.  The DNS query is shown as:  
10.129.211.13 10.129.56.6 DNS Standard query A 
bbjj.househot.com 
In the following packets (packet No2 from our capture), the compromised IP 
gets a response back from the DNS query made earlier. This will be referred as 
step 2.  
2 0.237997 10.129.56.6 10.129.211.13 DNS Standard query 
response CNAME ypgw.wallloan.com A 216.234.235.165 A 151.198.6.55 A 
216.234.247.191 A 68.112.229.228 A 61.189.243.240 A 218.12.94.58 A 
61.145.119.63 A 202.98.223.87 A 218.249.83.118 A 68.186.110.158 A 
221.208.154.214 
Step 2 show some signs of unusual behaviour.  A DNS response will generally 
have 5 IPs or less. In this case the answer came back with 11 hosts, 11 IPs.  
Step 3, the compromised host try to establish connection with the first IP that 
appeared in the DNS query.   
3 0.239858 10.129.211.13 216.234.235.165 TCP neod1 > 
18067 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=64240 Len=0 MSS=1460  
Right after the attempt to establish connection to a host, an ICMP message was 
received indicating that the host is not live or not accepting connection on the 
port number that was used.  
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The compromised host did not have any success establishing connection with 
hosts (IP) from the first DNS query. From the trace, the author notices that the 
compromised host will start a second DNS query aiming at the canonical name 
(CNAME) that was in the DNS response on step 2. This will be referred as step 
4. 
9 337.528083 10.129.211.13 10.129.56.6 DNS Standard query A 
ypgw.wallloan.com 
From the latest DNS query, stage 4, the DNS response will give another set of 
IPs.  
10 337.757036 10.129.56.6 10.129.211.13 DNS Standard query 
response A 61.189.243.240 A 61.145.119.63 A 151.198.6.55 A 202.98.223.87 
A 218.249.83.118 A 68.186.110.158 A 68.112.229.228 A 218.12.94.58 A 
216.234.235.165 A 216.234.247.191 A 221.208.154.214 
 
Step 5 of the attack process:  
Again, the DNS query has returned 11 IPs, which is also highly unusual.  From 
the next few packets, one could notice that the compromised host will attempt 
another connection with the first host from the DNS response. On this occasion, 
the connection was successful.  In Table 5 , packet 11 shows that the malicious 
IP 10.126.211.13 tries to establish the connection with other IPs. On packet 13, 
the three hand shake process is completed. From packet 14, the malicious IP 
start sending packets using the PUSH flag (this will be referred to as step 6). 
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The PUSH flag indicates that no delay should be observed, whether the 
receiving system is ready to accept the packet or not.  
Packet   
No 
Timestamp Source IP Destination IP Protocol Info 
11 337.763493 10.129.211.13 61.189.243.240 TCP neod2 > 18067 [SYN] Seq=0 
Win=64240 Len=0 MSS=1460 
12 338.160099 61.189.243.240 10.129.211.13 TCP 18067 > neod2 [SYN, ACK] 
Seq=0 Ack=1 Win=65535 
Len=0 MSS=1460 
13 338.160284 10.129.211.13 61.189.243.240 TCP neod2 > 18067 [ACK] Seq=1 
Ack=1 Win=64240 Len=0 
14 338.160379 10.129.211.13 61.189.243.240 TCP neod2 > 18067 [PSH, ACK] 
Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=64240 
Len=13 
15 338.719557 61.189.243.240 10.129.211.13 TCP 18067 > neod2 [ACK] Seq=1 
Ack=14 Win=65522 Len=0 
16 338.719607 10.129.211.13 61.189.243.240 TCP neod2 > 18067 [PSH, ACK] 
Seq=14 Ack=1 Win=64240 
Len=17 
17 339.122268 61.189.243.240 10.129.211.13 TCP 18067 > neod2 [PSH, ACK] 
Seq=1 Ack=31 Win=65505 
Len=23 
Table 5: malicious IP establishing connection 
Tracking down the conversation between the infected host 10.129.211.13 and 
the target host 61.189.243.240 the following payload was recorded 
 
USeR l l l l 
NiCK p8-00196671 
:a7 001 p8-00196671 : 
 
USeRHOST p8-00196671 
:a7 302 p8-00196671 :p8-00196671=+l@010.129.211.13     
 
JOiN #p8 ihodc9hi 
:a7 332 p8-00196671 #p8 :!Q 
gfcagihehehadkcpcpgigpgngfhegphhgocogbgpgmcogdgpgncphihihigmgpgmhh
hegggjgigbhihihihicphdgpgdglhddjgbcogkhagh 
 
:a7 333 p8-00196671 #p8 a 1134159047 
 
:a7 366 p8-00196671 #p8 : 
 
From the recorded payload, one could identify commands that botnet use. The 
author argues that at least three of the different steps described above could 
have triggered an alert indicating some sort irregularities.  A further analysis on 
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the DNS servers revealed commands that are commonly used by a the IRC-
MocBot virus [1], which communicate through a port 18067 to a bot master and 
awaits command such as scan, DDOS or execute other malicious programs [2].  
Going a few steps back into our analysis, the malicious user had tried to 
establish communication with all IPs that were under the CNAME of the DNS 
server.   Figure 4-6 shows the matrix of communication between the malicious 
users and all the targeted computers. Having one IP communicating with 
multiple IPs is not a problem neither does it necessarily indicate something 
unusual. However, the nature of the communication between that one IP and all 
the other IPs will help us to understand and identify any sort of irregularities.  
 
 
Figure 4-6: Matrix of communication between attacker and victims PCs 
From the Matrix, it is clear that all communications are centred on one IP. Again 
this is very unusual and should be flagged by any sensitive IDS. The case is 
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made worse by the amount of data exchanged between the different IPs.  Only 
one packet was exchanged in most cased between the attackers and the 
targeted IPs. Not being able to establish communication with all the hosts there 
were a good number of ICMP generated afterward. Again, a big number of 
ICMP messages from different IP belonging to the network should have been 
an indication that something was not right. Table 6 shows that there have been 
59 ICMP Port Unreachable messages and from different, consecutive sources.  
Name Count 
All Diagnosis Events 133 
Transport Layer 7 
TCP Invalid Checksum 5 
TCP Retransmissions 2 
Network Layer 126 
ICMP Port Unreachable 59 
IP Invalid Header Checksum 67 
Table 6: strange behaviour IP 
 
4.3.2 Snort analysis of the attack trace file 
 
The trace file was passed into Snort for analysis and the following result was 
obtained. 
Snort exiting 
Run time for packet processing was 0.8000 seconds 
============================================================
=================== 
Snort processed 209 packets. 
============================================================
=================== 
Breakdown by protocol (includes rebuilt packets): 
      ETH: 209        (100.000%) 
  ETHdisc: 0          (0.000%) 
     VLAN: 0          (0.000%) 
     IPV6: 0          (0.000%) 
  IP6 EXT: 0          (0.000%) 
  IP6opts: 0          (0.000%) 
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  IP6disc: 0          (0.000%) 
      IP4: 209        (100.000%) 
  IP4disc: 0          (0.000%) 
    TCP 6: 0          (0.000%) 
    UDP 6: 0          (0.000%) 
    ICMP6: 0          (0.000%) 
  ICMP-IP: 0          (0.000%) 
      TCP: 144        (68.900%) 
      UDP: 6          (2.871%) 
     ICMP: 59         (28.230%) 
  TCPdisc: 0          (0.000%) 
  UDPdisc: 0          (0.000%) 
  ICMPdis: 0          (0.000%) 
     FRAG: 0          (0.000%) 
   FRAG 6: 0          (0.000%) 
      ARP: 0          (0.000%) 
    EAPOL: 0          (0.000%) 
  ETHLOOP: 0          (0.000%) 
      IPX: 0          (0.000%) 
IPv4/IPv4: 0          (0.000%) 
IPv4/IPv6: 0          (0.000%) 
IPv6/IPv4: 0          (0.000%) 
IPv6/IPv6: 0          (0.000%) 
      GRE: 0          (0.000%) 
  GRE ETH: 0          (0.000%) 
 GRE VLAN: 0          (0.000%) 
 GRE IPv4: 0          (0.000%) 
 GRE IPv6: 0          (0.000%) 
GRE IP6 E: 0          (0.000%) 
 GRE PPTP: 0          (0.000%) 
  GRE ARP: 0          (0.000%) 
  GRE IPX: 0          (0.000%) 
 GRE LOOP: 0          (0.000%) 
     MPLS: 0          (0.000%) 
    OTHER: 0          (0.000%) 
  DISCARD: 0          (0.000%) 
InvChkSum: 209        (100.000%) 
   S5 G 1: 0          (0.000%) 
   S5 G 2: 0          (0.000%) 
    Total: 209 
============================================================
=================== 
Action Stats: 
ALERTS: 0 
LOGGED: 0 
PASSED: 0 
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As shown by the result above, Snort did not detect any of the different attack 
steps what were identified as part of this research.  Referring to the different 
attack steps, Snort does not provide:  
 A way to detect known bad DNS server 
 A way to detect irregularities within DNS response 
 A way to detect botnet communications 
 Snort does not track connections 
 Snort does not correlate different alerts to have a wider view of the attack 
that is taking place. 
 A modern Intrusion Detection System should be able to cover the points 
mentioned above. Hence the need to design a new approach of tackling the 
latest attacks.  
Scenario interpretation  
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Figure 4-7: Attacks stages: bot infected computer 
Scenario interpretation 
In the light of events that took place in this scenario, it is difficult to identify each 
of the steps as a successful attack if considered separately.  In step1, the 
attacker contacted a DNS server which is completely legal and does not violate 
any law. However, there was an indication that the intention behind this activity 
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was not good as the DNS server contacted is known as a bad DNS server 
[113].  Step2 in this scenario is a normal DNS response. Yes, the responses 
contained more entry that usual, but the response was quite legitimate. The 
activity of the attacker could have been stopped when the scans were 
performed.  However, unless the scans are of a type that will create a DDOS 
attack, most systems would consider them as noise. The only step that could 
have been flagged as a medium step is the last step. Again, this very step is a 
normal activity of IRC chat servers.  Here are nine steps that could be 
interpreted as very legal when taken individually but yet, put together, they form 
a very powerful attack. From this scenario, many attack trees can be deducted.  
As shown in Figure 4-8, the system would identify a successful attack if the 
malicious user starts by scanning one of many computers, with some possible 
failure in the scans, then move in to sending botnet commands or IRC 
commands.  
Figure 4-8: Attack Tree 1 - bot infected 
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The attack tree in Figure 4-8 could be altered by using proxy server. A malicious 
user will proxy server to perform SCANs. Also, proxy can be used to push data 
to victim computer. The new attack tree would be as shown in Figure 4-9 
Figure 4-9: Attack tree bot infected with proxy 
 
4.4 Scenario Beta  
In this scenario, the author used a trace file provided by the Honeynet project, a 
live capture as an attacker takes advantages of Windows XP SP1 vulnerability.  
Using an automated malware, the attacker takes advantage of one of the 
vulnerabilities disclosed in the Microsoft Security Bulletin MS09-059 [114] i.e. 
vulnerability in the Local Security Authority that could lead to a DDOS attack.  
The objective of this analysis is to show that the attackers could have been 
identified if attacks indicators were set correctly. At the end of this analysis, the 
research will suggest some attacks indicators and the diagram representing the 
different stages of the attack will be drawn.  
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Trace file statistics summary  
 
Figure 4-10: Attack-trace.pcap file summary 
In order to discover the actions of the attacker, the author ran a command that 
gave a summary of all the conversations between the attacker and the victim 
PC.  As shown in Figure 4-11 , they had been five conversations.   
 
Figure 4-11: conversation between the attacker and the victim PC 
Taking a closer look at conversation 1, the attacker was trying to establish 
whether the targeted PC was live: the reconnaissance phase. On this occasion, 
as shown in packet 7 & 8, the [FIN, ACK] & [ACK] were received. The first 
conversation could be considered as the first step of the attack.  
N
o. Time Source Destination Protocol Info 
1 0 
98.114.20 192.150.11.11
TCP 
donnyworld > microsoft-ds [SYN] Seq=0 Win=64240 Len=0 
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5.102 1 MSS=1460 SACK_PERM=1 
2 
0.000
464 
192.150.1
1.111 
98.114.205.10
2 TCP 
microsoft-ds > donnyworld [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 
Win=5840 Len=0 MSS=1460 SACK_PERM=1 
3 
0.119
058 
98.114.20
5.102 
192.150.11.11
1 TCP 
donnyworld > microsoft-ds [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=64240 
Len=0 
4 
0.134
175 
98.114.20
5.102 
192.150.11.11
1 TCP 
donnyworld > microsoft-ds [FIN, ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 
Win=64240 Len=0 
7 
0.135
193 
192.150.1
1.111 
98.114.205.10
2 TCP 
microsoft-ds > donnyworld [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=2 Win=5840 
Len=0 
8 
0.238
169 
192.150.1
1.111 
98.114.205.10
2 TCP 
microsoft-ds > donnyworld [FIN, ACK] Seq=1 Ack=2 
Win=5840 Len=0 
1
2 
0.354
302 
98.114.20
5.102 
192.150.11.11
1 TCP 
donnyworld > microsoft-ds [ACK] Seq=2 Ack=2 Win=64240 
Len=0 
Table 7: reconnaissance phase 
From a closer look at the reconnaissance, the attacker contacted the victim PC via port 
445 as shown in Figure 4-12. Port 445 was used for file sharing service [115] and 
allowed both inbound and outbound traffic. Most security settings would recommend 
blocking that port number [116]. In the instance of having port 445 open, the remote 
system accessing the local resource should be known in advanced and a list should be 
built to keep out any other intruders. This conversation was not flagged in Snort as 
potentially dangerous, yet most systems fail to protect this port [117].  Even though 
there was nothing technically illegal, Snort should have set a flag for port 445. Also 
Snort could have set a variable for systems allowed to access the local shared 
resource externally – like $EXTERNAL_SHARE. One of the problems is that Snort  
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Figure 4-12: Conversation 1 Graph  Analysis 
 
In the second conversation, the attacker took advantage of the buffer overflow 
vulnerability and then compromised the shared folder ipc$ and invoke 
\LSARPC. LSARPC is generally used to gain system information in the 
intension to launch an attack [118].  
 
Figure 4-13: buffer overflow and service binding 
After successfully compromising the IPC$ share, the attacker set an FTP server 
in the third conversation using the command. He then called 
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DsRoleUpgradeDownlevelServer() which was used to overflow the stack. The 
shell code is then executed through port 1957. After connecting to the victim’s 
system on port 1957, the attacker then gained access to the command line, 
cmd.exe.  
 
Figure 4-14: Command exploits (FTP) 
 
In the fourth conversation, the attacker transferred the files to the victim system 
using FTP  
 
Figure 4-15: File transfer to victim system 
In the last conversation, the malware is then executed as shown by the key 
signature of .exe files in Figure 4-16 MZ and PE [119] [120] [121].  
 
Figure 4-16: Windows executable file in traffic  
In summary the sequence of attack is presented in [Table 8: sequence of attack] 
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 Attack steps Possible security  
1 
Connection to port 445  Nothing illegal in the 
connection 
 Flag on port 445  
 Predefined list of remote 
system allowed to 
access local shared 
resources 
 2 
 SMS session as NULL user over port 445 
 Connection to \\192.150.11.111\ipc$ 
 Flag on NULL user 
 Flag on access local 
shared resources 
3 Connection to LSARPC over SMB  
4 
Calls DsRoleUpgradeDownlevelServer() with a 
long szDomainName parameter containing a 
shellcode of type "bind shell", which will overflow 
the stack (again, through the same port, 445). 
Signature  to detect buffer 
overflow 
5 Execution of the shellcode Binds port 1957 and waits for connection 
 
6 Connection to port 1957 Get access to shell command  (cmd.exe)  
 
7 FTP session initialisation   
8 Sending executable to the victim system  
9 Malware code execution  
Table 8: sequence of attack 
4.5 Scenario Charlie 
 
The two traces files used in this scenario are the results of the scan of the 
month 28 [122]. In the files provided by The Honeynet Project, the attacker use 
IPv6 tunnelling to realise the attack.  Based on the analysis strategy defined 
earlier in this chapter, different statistics are retrieved from the trace file in order 
to have an idea of what sort of activity could be going on.  This analysis is a 
typical example of how clever the attacks are becoming.  
Trace file statistics summary  
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Figure 4-17: File information Scenario Charlie 
4.5.1 Trace files analysis 
Tools  
In order to achieve the result presented later in this section, a selection of 
opensource tools were considered. 
List of IPs involved 
In the first trace file, 453 IPs were retrieved. Looking at Table 9 IP.Address = 
192.168.100.28 appear to be at the centre of all conversations and 
communications. This could be an indication that it is the attacker of the target 
system. Further studies will reveal that that IPs was actually the IP from the 
Honeypot.  Based on the table which is an extract of the summary of IP 
addresses and their activity, it appears that less than 20 IPs are at the centre of 
the activities recorded. However, there are many more IPs addresses that have 
been involved but at a low level. This technique is a typical demonstration that 
attacks are decentralised in order to make the detection difficult and, render 
scoring algorithms useless  
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IP value rate percent 
192.168.100.28 18853 0.000219 100.00%
206.252.192.195 4109 0.000048 21.79% 
61.219.90.180 3732 0.000043 19.80% 
62.211.66.53 2115 0.000025 11.22% 
192.18.99.122 1543 0.000018 8.18% 
148.244.153.91 859 0.00001 4.56% 
217.116.38.10 846 0.00001 4.49% 
61.134.3.11 846 0.00001 4.49% 
80.117.14.44 821 0.00001 4.35% 
62.211.66.16 377 0.000004 2.00% 
200.33.146.213 105 0.000001 0.56% 
192.12.94.30 104 0.000001 0.55% 
192.31.80.30 102 0.000001 0.54% 
140.135.18.25 78 0.000001 0.41% 
200.33.146.217 75 0.000001 0.40% 
192.5.6.30 72 0.000001 0.38% 
200.33.213.66 64 0.000001 0.34% 
192.35.51.30 58 0.000001 0.31% 
63.250.206.138 52 0.000001 0.28% 
192.168.100.196 50 0.000001 0.27% 
Table 9: List of IPs day1 
List of Operating System 
Various OS have been detected (Figure 4-18) 
 
Figure 4-18: Operating System List - Day1 
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At this stage, there is no quick indication as to what could be taking place.  
However, one could guess that an attacker is controlling various systems or 
using various systems to attack the targeted system.  
 TCP Transactions  
Looking at the TCP transactions, it appears that the many attempts were made 
to connect to the system. Also, there is a possibility that there had been a lot of 
data exchanged between the honeypot and the other participant systems 
(Figure 4-19).   
 
 
Figure 4-19: TCP Transactions summary 
TCP Conversations  
On the trace file provided for the first day, 57 TCP conversations, as well as 394 
UDP and 452 IP conversations were identified 
56 conversations were observed amongst which the following ports number 
have been recorded: 21, 80, 1524, 5555, 6112, 6667, 7000, 32784, 32785, 
32786, 32788, 32792, and 32794.  
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It appears that FTP and HTTP traffic were recorded. The presence of FTP could 
indicate that the attacker had successfully connected to another system and 
then uploaded files.   
 
Por
t 
Nu
mb
er 
Description  
21 File transfer protocol – Normal operation 
80 Web browsing and related activities (e.g. file transfer)  
152
4 
well-known port for Trojan activity [123][124] 
555
5 
A well-known malware ServeMe uses this port for communication [125] 
666
7 
Well-known port for IRC communication [126] 
700
0 
Well-known port used by “malware Exploit” translation [125] 
327
84 
Sometimes used as RPC in Solaris Boxes [127] 
327
85 
Sometimes used as RPC in Solaris Boxes [127] 
327
86 
Sometimes used as RPC in Solaris Boxes [127] 
327
88 
Sometimes used as RPC in Solaris Boxes [127] 
327
92 
Found in DNS poisoning 
[128][128][128][126][125][125][125][125][124][123][122][121][120][119][118][117][
116][115][114][113][112][111][110][109][108][107][107][107][107][107][107][107][
107][107], generally opened on Solaris port as listeners [129] 
327
94 
No Particular activity found on this port 
  
Table 10: compromised port numbers 
There is a good indication of malicious activity based on the port numbers that 
have been used during the different conversations.  This will be confirmed when 
looking at the details of packets. Given the large number of conversations, it 
was not appropriate to look into each conversation. However, based on the port 
numbers that are present in the different conversation, a number of intelligent 
filters will be applied to identify any possible malicious activity.  
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Scenario interpretation 
They are twelve major steps that the attackers took to perform all his tasks. 
Each major step can be elaborated into many smaller steps. More interestingly, 
the attacker did not use the same IP to perform the different attacks.  The IPs 
that were used to perform the attacks are located in different countries. Applying 
a multi-stage detection technique to an IP that is not tracked would not be of 
much help. Rather, it is important to understand the nature of the different steps 
(attacks) and collate them for a bigger picture to actually see what was going 
on.  
From this scenario, it is important to learn that attacks, when viewed separately, 
could generate alerts that will not mean much. Few of these steps, when taken 
individually do not actually violate any protocol definition that will cause any 
firewall or IDS. For instance, in step 2, the attackers download files using FTP 
which is absolutely normal.  Step 7 could also be interpreted as normal because 
performing a remote control does not technically hold a protocol violation or 
abuse. The same analogy will apply to step 11. 
After setting up the IPv6 tunnelling in day one, the attacker came back on 
another day to configure and use the IPv6 tunnelling where many files there 
send to and from the victims systems.  
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Figure 4-20: Sequence of attack scan28 
 
Attack trees  
Based on this scenario, multiple possible attacks trees can be defined.  
 
Figure 4‐21: attack branches 
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4.6 Modelling multistage attacks  
 
Modelling attacks can be a rather complex when working in an environment 
where there is no specific format or pattern used by the attackers.  The level of 
sophistication of attacks has raised considerably and, it is becoming more 
difficult to distinguish normal behaviour from attack behaviour. In some cases, 
only the intention behind the actions performed make the difference between 
the legitimate user and the malicious one. The difficulty resides in the 
uniqueness of almost every single attack. In scenario 1, the attacker took 
advantage of the weakness of DNS protocol to get information about “bad DNS” 
and their associate IPs. After a scan, the attacker identified live hosts which 
were made part of a botnet. In the second scenario, the attacker took 
advantage of a vulnerability found in Windows XP; he went on executing a 
buffer overflow that allowed him to remotely take control of the victim system. In 
the third scenario, the attacker used either many proxies server or various 
compromised hosts to scan for vulnerabilities, exploit the vulnerabilities, 
remotely control the system, create an IPv6 tunnel over IPv4 to copy file and 
execute the program. At the time of the attacks, hardly any system had a good 
knowledge of IPv6. Not only was IPv6 not properly identified, but hardly any 
system was able to decode it. As a direct consequence, any attack performed 
using IPv6 would be successful.  Even though many systems are now capable 
of IPv6 decoding, using IPv6 tunnelling over IPv4 remains a security challenge 
[130] [131] [132].  
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In the light of the scenarios that were used to understand multistage attacks, the 
model built in this chapter makes some assertions:   
 very little differs from legitimate traffic to illegal traffic  as shown in 
Scenario Alpha  
 Legitimate but not innocent steps are taken in favour of the attacks. 
These steps are detectable by current IDS as being a problem which is in 
fact right.  
 tracking even legitimate steps are important but will be costly [resources]  
 predefined actions will be defined 
 known attacks patterns are predefined into an attack tree 
 An administrator should have a knowledge of the system being protected 
to build attack trees 
 an attack tree should be built 
o For Windows based systems, all Microsoft bulletins should be 
transformed into attack tree enabling a multi-stage detection 
technique 
 the attack tree should be updated regularly 
 Interaction with internal event: this will be done by installing an IDS agent 
on local system so that they can report events (events that are generally 
sent to SYSLOG) 
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To successfully detect attacks, the framework proposed in this chapter will 
consider the activities as performed by the attackers and the activities as 
received by the victim. As demonstrated in the different scenarios, tracking 
attackers activities could be a tedious task.  However, all activities convey to a 
victim. Hence, keeping track of both attacker and victim activities are important. 
On the attacker side, tracking the illegal activities as well as the intermediary 
activities would be crucial. Two major aspects will be considered at this stage: 
classifying known attacks into attack classes and classifying known network 
activities into behaviours  
4.6.1 Attack classification for multistage detection  
Classifying attacks is a challenging task as for an ideal classification a full 
knowledge of all attacks would be required. Various attacks classifications have 
been already published [133-143]. Each of these methods of classification has a 
different approach. However, the DARPA classification method [144] was 
considered for discussion as it was one of the first public attack classification 
methods. Five attacks categories were then identified: 
1. Probe: the gathering of information 
2. Denial of Service: Attacks that cause the system not to be available 
3. Remote to Local: outside attacker targeting the local system  
4. User to Root: unauthorised access 
5. Data: Exfiltration of data 
The above classification used with DARPA dataset was representing the attack 
level of period. Attack sophistication has increased and the classification that 
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would represent such level would require to have more granularities in order to 
represent the finest of attacks.  Another comprehensive computer attack 
classification was done by [145]. However, the classification suggested is 
exaggerated has some of the sections have nothing to do with detection. For 
instance, one of the sections is “attack by automation” with the different 
automations being automatic, semi-automatic, and manual. The author did not 
see any practical application of such classification. The classification that the 
author suggests below is geared at improving detection and mitigation.  
Based on the scenarios used earlier in this chapter, it appears that the only 
activity that was a regular suspicious behaviour from the attacks was the scan. 
Most security systems unfortunately disable scan traffic as scans are generally 
considered pure noise without much security importance.  In the classification 
proposed here the author makes a deliberate choice to include scans as 
important stages of attacks. The classification used by the author is a 
modification of what was proposed by [146]. Even though his classification 
made more sense to the author, there was a level of granularity missing for a 
better management of attacks.  
For successful detection of malicious activities, the various attack classes have 
been defined and considered:  
a. Reconnaissance  
b. Network mapping 
c. Port scanning and banner grabbing a host 
d. Vulnerability identification 
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e. Exploitation 
f. Privilege escalation 
g. Rootkit installation 
h. Hiding tracks 
i. Monitoring 
j. Using unauthorized privilege gained for benefit 
k. Botnet traffic  
l. Silent Response  
Reconnaissance: 
 Reconnaissance is a well know steps in the from the ethical hacker 
methodology [147]. In this class of attack, the malicious users do not 
necessarily need to have direct access to the target system. The attacks 
generally comprise DNS queries, WHOIS, Ping, Finger, Traceroute, and 
running sniffers. Also, Google can be used for this class of attack with 
command such as !Host=*.* intext:enc_UserPassword=* ext:pcf to steal 
usernames and passwords. In a more generic way, the following types of attack 
will fall in this class 
 tcp connect scan 
 tcp syn scan 
 tcp fin scan 
 tcp Xmas Tree scan 
 TCP Null scan 
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 TCP ACK scan 
 TCP Windows scan 
 TCP RPC scan 
 UDP scan 
Network Mapping:   
In this class of attacks, malicious users attempt to build a picture of the network 
they are targeting. This is generally done by using NMAP. TCP scans can also 
be used for this purpose when the malicious users do not have direct access to 
the physical network. Also, if the network is infected by a worm or Trojan, the 
same objectives can be reached.  
Port Scanning and banner grabbing 
This class of attacks is a step that is generally looked at as not very critical. Yet, 
it could be the only step an attacker would perform to know what vulnerabilities 
exit on the victim system. The vulnerabilities database is a good source for 
hacker as well as for other users that want to protect their system. For example, 
knowing that a system use Windows XP SP1 give a good indications of the 
problem he can have. Banner grabbing leads to vulnerability identification.  
Vulnerability identification 
In this class, the malicious users use the information collected during the 
banner grabbing to identify vulnerabilities. Vulnerability information is widely and 
freely available either from the  
Exploitation  
Once the vulnerabilities have been identifies, they are widely and freely 
available tools and videos that anyone can access in order to take advantage of 
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the problem found on the system. A common tool is Metasploit. In a more 
generic way, the class is subject to the following type of attacks  
 shellcode-detect 
 inappropriate-content  
 rogue ssl certificate 
 system-call-detect 
Privileged escalation  
In this class of attack, the malicious users will try to gain administrator/root 
access. This class is generally subject to the following type of attacks: 
 attempted-admin 
 attempted-user-login  
 ftp failled login attempts 
Rootkit installation 
Once the access as root or administrator has been achieved, the malicious user 
will then install tools that will allow exfiltration of information or exploitation of 
the victim system. This class is subject to the following types of attacks:  
 web-application-attack 
 trojan-activity 
 suspicious-filename-detect 
 web-application-activity 
 misc-attack 
 malware detect 
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Hiding attacks 
Skilled malicious users will erase or attempt to erase any trace of their activities. 
This level of attacks is not always visible from the IDS. However, these attacks 
can be detected by using a “radar”, a software agent, that will track the changes 
to system files and system parameters. When a trace file is deleted, the radar 
will send an alert to syslog. Syslog will be configured to send certain or all alert 
type to the MIDaPS, the IDS designed in this research.  
Monitoring 
Malicious users always ensure that the target system is still in the loop. Hence 
monitoring is practice generally by the use of ICMP request.  
Using unauthorized privilege gained for benefit 
In this class of attack, malicious users take social advantages of other users by 
stealing credit card information for example. This is generally done by fake 
email that will ask the user to submit his back details or purchase a fake 
antivirus. Fishing is the typical attack type of this attack class.  
Botnet traffic  
The author chose to put botnet traffic into a separate category as specific 
studies are done to identify botnet activities.  
Silent Response  
This attack class is based on error messages that are generally received as 
normal behaviour. Yet these messages are generally good indications that an 
attack is taking place.   
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Attacks type within the attack classes identified above are designed to be 
recognised either by signatures or by algorithms based on a deviation from a 
normal behaviour. However, the mitigation method found in this thesis have 
identified that some attacks are performed by using less illegal actions that 
illegal one. For instance, one attack will use two usual illegal activities whilst 
using 4 legal steps.  
4.6.2 Behaviour classification  
Alongside attack classes, key network behaviours have been defined as to 
trace the full attackers’ activities. Network behaviours are steps that do not 
violate any protocol violation or exploit any vulnerability, but rather, they are 
steps that attackers have to go through to exploit vulnerability or to complete an 
attack. The classification done on malicious behaviour is based around the 
services found in a computer system. For instance, the FTP service would 
generate the following behaviour:  
 TCP Connection 
 ftp upload from different server 
 ftp download for different server 
 ftp download in action 
 ftp upload in action  
 PSH flag irregular used  
 ftp traffic non ftp port 
Services based on web traffic would be:  
 file download via http 
 file upload via http  
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 HTTP traffic non http port 
 HTTP Proxy in used 
 Socks Proxy Server in use 
Services based on computer status would be:  
 admin activity 
 computer reboot  
 policy-violation 
 username creation 
 username deletion  
 new log file created 
 disable antivirus 
Services based on email communication would be: 
 fishing email identified 
 email received 
 email sent 
 SPAM received 
 Attachment (suspicious) download 
Sometimes, computer systems are abused by using non regular activities. 
These will fall into: 
 OS Unknown 
 incoming distributed port 
 incoming distributed IP 
 non-standard-protocol 
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4.6.3 Interpretation  
In this scenario, an attack taking advantage of Joomla, a Content Management 
System (CMS), will be described whilst putting into display both attack class 
and behaviours.  
i. intitle:"Joomla - Web Installer" 
Here, the attacker will use Google to identify the vulnerable system.  This 
step does not hold any illegal action. However, the objective of getting 
this sort of information is not from a good motive.  
ii. create mysql db to another server 
After successfully identifying victim systems, the attacker will prepare a remote 
server with MySQL to which the database will be directed during the installation. 
This stage is somehow legal even though it contains level of Xsite Scripting. 
Having said that, there is an anomaly to install the file of a website on one 
server and the database on another sever.  
iii. Install joomla 
At this stage, the attacker will install Joomla as it is normally done. This stage is 
100% legal.  
iv. install shell component joomla 
Installing a component in Joomla is absolutely legal and it is common practice 
as Joomla CMS is based around components.  
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v. install file EXTPLORER joomla component  
Xplorer is one of the best and useful components of Joomla to install. It offers 
an excellent interface for uploading files to the remote computer without the 
need of any FTP information. This component is free to download and to use. 
The malicious user can then upload any file that he plans to use with minor 
restriction (i.e. 10MB in size)  
vi. upload remote exploit code though joomla (like netcat)  
This component allows administrator users to upload virtually any file as long as 
they are not restricted. In the event of a file being blocked, the administrator has 
full rights to modify and lift the restriction of file type that can be uploaded.  
vii. using shell component, open listening port with access to command line 
Using the shell component, the malicious user could open ports with program 
such as netcat which will wait for instructions from the remote user.  
viii. remotely control the victim computer  
Once the remote user executes the appropriate command, he then takes 
control of the remote system. This can be done via command line or even via 
graphical User Interface. Actions performed here could be identified by 
signatures 
ix. install IRC client  // steal information on the computer // install trojan // 
key logger  
After taking control of the remote system, the malicious user can then install 
IRC client, or can copy all existing data (or a particular folder). Alternatively, the 
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attacker can install Trojan, key logger. Most of the actions performed at this 
stage are malicious and could be identified by using signatures.   
x. Join botnet 
As a major step, the computer can be register to a botnet either for SPAM, 
DDOS, or any other malicious purpose. Joining an IRC server is not necessarily 
a malicious action. However, well designed signatures can identify the 
difference between a normal IRC client try to join a chat and a command used 
to register computer systems as zombie.  
A representation of the Joomla scenario putting in perspective the attack 
classes and network behaviour is represented in Figure 4-22  
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Figure 4-22: Remote code execution - Joomla scenario 
 
In the light of Figure 4-22, the victim system does not have any knowledge of its 
information that Google made public. Once the information about victim 
systems are received, there is no indication that something malicious is 
happening.  Installing components in Joomla is a normal procedure for setting 
the CMS. However, there should be reason for concern if a known exploit is 
uploaded to any server even if the reasons are legitimate.  In addition, sending 
shell code over the network especially over the Internet must be a concern.  
Even if the purpose of the shell code is unidentified, this action should be 
flagged a serious security threat. Remotely controlling a computer system is 
becoming more and more common. There should not necessarily be a concern 
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when a computer is remotely accessed. However, if the system being remotely 
controlled has recently been scanned by a host or especially by a known proxy; 
a serious flag should be raised to stop the on-going action. 
4.6.4 Attack tree  
Modelling attacks using a tree structure are not new and were first introduced 
by Schneier[148]. In this research attacks will be used to represent possible 
sequencing of attacks processes. A similar structure was used by [149]. The 
structure defined in this research will be used as part the architecture built to 
defend against multistage attacks. Various elements need to be considered 
when building attack trees 
4.6.5 Threat modelling process  
[150] defines a process used to model threats for web application. However, 
that process is very specific to web application. In the work carried for this 
research, a more general threat modelling process is defined. Some of the 
steps are similar but their content is very different.   
Identify assets:  identifying assets is the first and probably one of the most 
important steps to achieve when thinking about security. What needs protection 
needs to be clearly defined in order to provide relevant security. When testing 
Snort performance, it was identified that Snort did not have a enough 
information on the system that it was protecting. This resulted in a loss of 84% 
of the time Snort was using to run through the rules.  A solution was provided 
for this earlier It is important to have a full list of all servers, networks, and any 
specific item connecting to the network in order to provide the most efficient 
configuration 
146 
 
Create system architecture: During the analysis of multistage attacks, it 
was noted that the attacker was taking advantage of specific weaknesses that 
did not, in most cases, have a solution ready in Snort. Creating system 
architecture resolved into creating the list of servers with their corresponding 
IPs; the services used i.e. the ports number that are opened; the access time 
for each of the servers if this information can be known. This will help to predict 
any unusual behaviour and consequently provide the corresponding solution. In 
addition, the list of IPs that will have access to the system remotely with root 
privileges should be known in advance.  
Map interaction between systems: A clear picture of the 
communication taking place between the different systems should be known in 
advance.  Each participant IP and its associate participant ports should be 
identified as well as the data exchange that takes place between systems.  The 
following questions should be answered: 
 Who connects to whom? 
 What type of connection is it i.e. uploads-downloads?  
Identifying threats: Three types of threat can be distinguished: network, host, 
and applications.  Security does come without effort. Securing a system 
demands effort and time. All participant hardware should be identified as well as 
their corresponding threats. A comprehensive list of hardware and their related 
threats should be provided in order to cater for the named threats and provide 
solution.  
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A comprehensive list of software installed on the target computer system should 
be produced along with their related possible problem. For example, having 
SQL server installed would mean potential SQL Injection attacks.  
At the host level, if the IDS is meant to be protecting a network, each host 
should be identified and when possible their possible problems. For instance, 
having a Windows Operating system would mean keeping a close eye Microsoft 
Security Bulletins.  
Create attack tree:   
The structure and semantics used in this research are closed to the one used 
by [150]. In the light of recent attacks and analysis performed in this research, 
attacks are very similar to normal behaviour. However, there are sometimes 
strong strop that indicate an attack is happening. These steps were not 
identified by the work of [151]. The author introduced these steps as critical link 
and critical path. Also, [151] use a root node as the ultimate goal of the attack. 
Yet, in this work, the author defined attack tree based on the model of Aho-
Corasic algorithm.  
The model used to create trees is based on seven elements: the root node, 
active node, passive node, critical link, connectors, critical link, and critical path.  
The active node is a step in the attack process that indicates a step that can 
standalone as an attack 
The passive node is a step that leads to an attack or a step that is important in 
the attack process but does not represent an attack on itself 
The connectors indicate whether two linked step are compulsory or optional 
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A critical path represents a number of steps that represent an attack. Typically, 
the IDS should be set to fire an attack when a critical link is completed.  
A critical link is an important step to an attack.  
 
Figure 4-23: Attack Tree Objects 
Attack trees can be simple or very complex depending on the nature of the 
attack.  In the scenario that follows, a typical process of malware download is 
presented in Figure 4-24. The process for a malware download is one of the 
processes that is commonly used to bypass IDS and other security devices.  A 
typical step by step would be:  
Step 1: a user visits a compromised website. This process is not always visible 
to IDS yet there are public lists available that can be used to filter such as the 
Google safe browsing initiative. Good scan URLs that host or have host 
“badware” in the recent past  [152].  
Step2:  the page requested by the “innocent” user is then redirected to another 
page that will be used to download malware.  
Step3:  obfuscated or encrypted JavaScript is then downloaded to the visitor’s 
computer without his knowledge. This step is not easily visible by IDS as most 
IDS or security software do not deal with encrypted traffic.  
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Step4: the code downloaded to the visitor’s computer generally perform 
preliminary task to the attacks 
Step5: the visitor’s computer reports to the attacker  
Step6:  the attacker scans the visitor’s computer for any possible vulnerability. 
Step7:  the appropriate malware is downloaded to the victim’s computer based 
on the result of the scan 
Step8: once the malware has been downloaded, the computer is open to any 
sort of attack.  
 
Figure 4-24: Malware download 
 
The attack tree would then be:  
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Figure 4-25: attack tree - malware download 
Many attack paths can be deducted from the above tree:  
<a,b><b,d><d,g><g,h><g,h><h,i> 
<a,b><b,d><d,g><g,h><g,h><h,j> 
<a,b><b,d><d,g><g,h><g,h><h,k> 
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<a,b><b,d><d,g><g,h><g,h><h,l> 
<a,b><b,d><d,g><g,h><g,h><h,m> 
<a,b><b,d><d,g><g,h><g,h><h,n> 
<a,b><b,d><d,f><g,h><g,h><h,i> 
<a,b><b,d><d,f><g,h><g,h><h,j> 
<a,b><b,d><d,f><g,h><g,h><h,k> 
<a,b><b,d><d,f><g,h><g,h><h,l> 
<a,b><b,d><d,f><g,h><g,h><h,m> 
<a,b><b,d><d,f><g,h><g,h><h,n> 
<a,b><b,d><d,e><g,h><g,h><h,i> 
<a,b><b,d><d,e><g,h><g,h><h,j> 
<a,b><b,d><d,e><g,h><g,h><h,k> 
<a,b><b,d><d,e><g,h><g,h><h,l> 
<a,b><b,d><d,e><g,h><g,h><h,m> 
<a,b><b,d><d,e><g,h><g,h><h,n> 
<a,c><b,d><d,g><g,h><g,h><h,i> 
<a,c><b,d><d,g><g,h><g,h><h,j> 
<a,c><b,d><d,g><g,h><g,h><h,k> 
<a,c><b,d><d,g><g,h><g,h><h,l> 
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<a,c><b,d><d,g><g,h><g,h><h,m> 
<a,c><b,d><d,g><g,h><g,h><h,n> 
<a,b><b,d><d,f><g,h><g,h><h,i> 
<a,c><b,d><d,f><g,h><g,h><h,j> 
<a,c><b,d><d,f><g,h><g,h><h,k> 
<a,c><b,d><d,f><g,h><g,h><h,l> 
<a,c><b,d><d,f><g,h><g,h><h,m> 
<a,c><b,d><d,f><g,h><g,h><h,n> 
<a,c><b,d><d,e><g,h><g,h><h,i> 
<a,c><b,d><d,e><g,h><g,h><h,j> 
<a,c><b,d><d,e><g,h><g,h><h,k> 
<a,c><b,d><d,e><g,h><g,h><h,l> 
<a,c><b,d><d,e><g,h><g,h><h,m> 
<a,c><b,d><d,e><g,h><g,h><h,n> 
Documenting threats: documenting the threats will help in the 
configuration of the target system.  [150] suggests the options threat 
description, threat target, risk, attack techniques, and countermeasures.  An 
example of threat documentation would be: 
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Table 11: Threat description sample 
Threat Description Attacker to deceive IDS by using spoofing IP 
Threat target SQL Server – SQL Injection 
Risk  Steal valuable information 
Attack techniques Use multiple virtual machine to perform each step 
Countermeasures Use attack tree to link the different actions 
 
4.7 Multistage attack detection and mitigation framework  
 
Our multi-stage attack detection and mitigation framework will look at attacks 
from various angles.  When packets arrive, they are checked against known 
patterns.  If a match has occurred, the flag will be raised.  Concurrently, each 
packet will be assigned the flow ID and then pass those IDs  (FID(x)) to the 
Behaviour Record Manager.  The behavioural record manager will tag each 
FID(x) to a specific action.  At the same time the local IDS sensor will report to 
the detection engine.  The detection engine will check for existing patterns 
against a database of patterns already defined.   Various algorithms can be 
applied in the detection engine. For instance, any IP that is flagged with any 
critical path will be blocked and added into the blacklist.  
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Figure 4-26: Functional diagram multistage attack detection and mitigation framework 
 
4.8 U-Case 
In their latest security intelligence report [153], Microsoft describes a typical 
distribution scenarios used by botnet, when spreading the attacks. The attack 
process will start by a SPAM message sent by a bot. The message sent out 
contains a link to malicious software. The victim user is convinced to click on 
the link within the message. Social engineering is generally used to convince 
user to click. The fake message will be designed around very common theme, 
generally a theme current to the society such as Christmas. The victim users 
the download the malware either by downloading directly the malware to his 
computer or by opening a crafted page, that contain all the necessary to exploit 
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browser exploits. This technique is generally referred to as “drive by download” 
[153].  Alternatively, the victim user is sent the malware directly by attachment.  
 
Figure 4‐27: Drive by download scenario [153] 
Detection scenario 
a. Usr1 visit page – this action is classed as a behaviour (i.e. with or without 
risk). If the page is recorded as a page previously used for malicious 
purposes, the action will be recorded as: usr1  visit malicious page. In 
the former case, the action is considered precursor to attack.  
b. Usr1  visit page with iframe, if the page is not encrypted. This action is 
considered as a potential danger and precursor to attack. Alternatively, 
the page can be encrypted. If the page uses a popular encryption 
technique, the encrypted block will be decrypted and the iframe will be 
revealed. If the page cannot be decrypted, the action is recorded as: 
user1  encrypted page identified. The two actions: user1 visit 
malicious page and usr1: iframe are good enough to raise an alert. At 
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this level there is a very little chance that the alert is a false positive as 
action 1 has been recorded previously as malicious. However, if action 1 
was only recorded as “visit page” and action 2 recorded as “iframe”, no 
serious flag will be raised. An alert could indicate a potential danger and 
not an imminent danger. Since both action 1 and action 2 have two 
variants, there is a total of 4 possibilities.  
c. Usr1  page redirect. Redirecting a page has nothing in itself that cause 
a security threat. However, based on the “drive by download” scenario 
and in the light of previous actions, this action 3 could be an indicator 
that the malicious user is on its way to complete a drive by download 
process. Using the doubtful quality of the website visited in action1, the 
attack can be blocked at this level. Taking this attack further, another 
action could be recorded 
d. Usr1  download form encrypted page, or download from website 
previously recorded as malicious. When the download is completed, 
more actions are likely to be produced.  
e. Systems file change in usr1. In this action, the malicious user should 
have had access to the usr1 system and possibly take control of it.  
In all, the case can be interpreted as follow:  
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4.9 Conclusion  
In this chapter, honeynet have evidenced the dark side of the Internet. 
Sophisticated attacks were captured, modelled to create a strong detection and 
mitigation engine for complex multistage attacks. Multistage attack referring to 
attacks performed in multiple steps.  The design presented here is geared at 
multicore architecture to ensure the maximum performance possible. The big 
number of features could however generate many problems related to 
performance it this architecture is implemented in a top down way. There is a 
risk that some features performance in this architecture could impact on other 
features. Many studies need to be done in relation to the interdependence 
performance for each of the element here identified for the detection and 
mitigation of complex attacks.  
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5 Distributed Denial of Service Attack 
(DDOS): Detection and Mitigation 
 
5.1 Introduction  
Recent recorded attacks have indicated that the level of sophistication used by 
the malicious users have risen significantly. As a consequence, the activities of 
malicious users are still very high especially those of botnets Figure 5-1.  In the 
previous chapter, a generic attack detection system was built for multistage 
attacks. Malicious users employ methods that are almost identical to legitimate 
users’ actions. In Figure 4-22 the author demonstrates that an attacker can take 
control of a whole network without much indication of illegal activities.   
In this chapter, analysis of live traffic capture will be done.  Based on the 
analysis done here, DDOS detection and mitigation solution will be proposed. 
Both corporate networks and honeynet data will be used for the analysis. In 
addition, complex detection algorithms will be written to support the proposed 
detection and mitigation architecture.  The work presented in this chapter will be 
used as a module, an extension, to the core IDS framework that will be 
proposed later   
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Figure 5-1: Bot activity June 2010 
5.2 Threat analysis: real live capture of DDOS attacks revealed  
 
This section presents an analysis of a capture that was done in a corporate Lab 
using a DeMilitarised Zone (DMZ). Over a fortnight, packets were captured and 
a summary of the findings are discussed in bellow. The first capture is based on 
UDP. Looking at the packet structure, the IP header has not been violated and 
has remained equal to 20bytes. Not only was the header conformed to the 
protocol description, but the remainder of the packet had not violated any 
description from the RFC describing UDP packets. The packet at a frame 8 
shows of one of the capture shows:  
0000   00 18 39 dd 6c a2 00 03 0d 7c 5a d7 08 00 45 00  ..9.l....|Z...E. 
0010   00 1e 39 e3 40 00 80 11 00 00 c0 a8 0f 66 0a 9c  ..9.@........f.. 
0020   87 55 ef a8 47 86 00 0a 62 1b 87 00              .U..G...b... 
 
The next packet along shows: 
0000   00 18 39 dd 6c a2 00 03 0d 7c 5a d7 08 00 45 00  ..9.l....|Z...E. 
0010   00 1e 3a 04 40 00 80 11 00 00 c0 a8 0f 66 0a 9c  ..:.@........f.. 
0020   87 55 ef a8 47 86 00 0a 62 1b 87 00              .U..G...b... 
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As shown in this offset hexadecimal text representation of the packet, one 
would notice their integrity to the protocol definition. Looking deep into the 
packet, one could notice that the payload (data) has not changed “87 00”. About 
10 packets were recorded per transaction at this stage of the capture process.  
An extract of Wireshark capture shows the consistency in field throughout the 
early stages of the attack.  A quick summary of the capture of the surrounding 
packets shows 
 data are sent from the local source to foreign IP address 
 the source port is the same = 61352 
 destination port is the same 1831 
 payload size = 2 bytes (the same size and payload content remained the 
same)   
Using small packets have proven to be very efficient in DDOS attack has they 
consume a lot of CPU [151], [154], [155]   whereas big packets consume  
bandwidth.  
 
Frame Time SourceIP Destination IP Proto Comments 
7 1.003061 192.168.15.102 10.156.135.85 UDP Source port: 61352  Destination port: 18310 
8 1.251077 192.168.15.102 10.156.135.85 UDP Source port: 61352  Destination port: 18310 
9 1.500085 192.168.15.102 10.156.135.85 UDP Source port: 61352  Destination port: 18310 
10 1.749109 192.168.15.102 10.156.135.85 UDP Source port: 61352  Destination port: 18310 
11 1.998123 192.168.15.102 10.156.135.85 UDP Source port: 61352  Destination port: 18310 
12 2.248137 192.168.15.102 10.156.135.85 UDP Source port: 61352  Destination port: 18310 
13 2.501157 192.168.15.102 10.156.135.85 UDP Source port: 61352  Destination port: 18310 
14 2.752169 192.168.15.102 10.156.135.85 UDP Source port: 61352  Destination port: 18310 
15 3.002183 192.168.15.102 10.156.135.85 UDP Source port: 61352  Destination port: 18310 
16 3.2552 192.168.15.102 10.156.135.85 UDP Source port: 61352  Destination port: 18310 
17 3.491208 192.168.15.102 10.156.135.85 UDP Source port: 61352  Destination port: 18310 
Table 12: UDP traffic showing DDOS attack 
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Looking at the IP address, it is clear that the IP belongs to an IANA Reversed IP 
range that should not normally appear on the Internet routing table (Internet 
Assigned Numbers Authority, 2005.) 10.0.0.0/8 block is reserved to be used in 
private networks. Hence no address from that range should appear on the 
Internet Table (RFC 3330)[156] 
 
Figure 5-2: IANA record showing private address related information 
 
The traffic generated by the malicious user at first glance seems legitimate and 
good. However, giving that a reserved IP from IANA is used, the same traffic 
that was supposedly legitimate and “clean” is no longer “clean” as the IP used 
should not appear in the routing table. Ensuring that IPs that should not appear 
in the routing table are not used in the Internet communication is a 
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recommended feature to implement in system security as this will reduce a lot 
of unwanted traffic  [157].  
Snort can be used to report on any occurrence of such traffic with the rule:  
Rule 1 
alert UDP $HOME_NET any -> 10.156.135.85 61352 (msg:"UDP flooding – DDOS 
attack"; classtype:ddos-attack; reference: threshold:type both, count 10, seconds 1, 
track by_dst;  sid:; rev:1;) 
 
Similar traffic was captured in another instance and is represented in the table 
below:  
 
Frame Timin
g 
SIP DIP Proto comment 
21 0.036
635 
192.168.1
5.102 
149.254.20
0.237 
UDP Source port: 38140  Destination port: 19304 [UDP 
CHECKSUM INCORRECT] 
22 0.260
65 
192.168.1
5.102 
10.156.135
.85 
UDP Source port: 38140  Destination port: 18310 [UDP 
CHECKSUM INCORRECT] 
23 0.262
307 
192.168.1
5.102 
149.254.20
0.237 
UDP Source port: 38140  Destination port: 19285 [UDP 
CHECKSUM INCORRECT] 
Table 13: Table showing UDP DDOS attack - Same port for multiple IPs 
From the table above, another entry of the IANA reserved IP was used. The 
payload of the three packets was identical and equal to “87 00”. A quick search 
on the other IP used in is known to be from Tmobile . Given the size of the 
packets, 22 bytes, the attack aimed at exhaust system resources [158], [159].  
 
Hostname Country 
Code 
Region Name City ISP 
149.254.200.237 GB Nottinghamshire Mansfield T-Mobile 
International UK 
Limited 
Table 14: IP resolved to its country 
A snort rule can be written in order to detect this attack: 
Rule 2 
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alert UDP $HOME_NET any -> [10.156.135.85, 149.254.200.237] 38140 (msg:"UDP 
flooding – DDOS attack"; classtype:ddos-attack; reference: threshold:type both, count 
10, seconds 1, track by_dst;  sid:; rev:1;) 
Rules 1 and 2 can be optimized to  more generic rules in order to detect the use 
of IANA reserved IPs. An entry to snort variable can be added such as 
IANA_IP= [list of IP all IPs and ranges reserved] [160] 
A more generic rule would be: 
Rule 3 
Alert udp $HOME_NET and  $IANA any (msg: “Private IP in routing table”; 
classtype:bad-traffic;reference:; sid:; rev:1)) 
In rule 3, any traffic using IANA reserved IPs will be detected. This solution is 
not applicable if the attacker use a wide range of IPs address. Currently, 
Emerginthreats [161] a Snort research community uses a list of IPs provided to 
represent the IPs that have been subject to an attack in the recent hour or so. In 
this scenario, one has to be victim of an attack; the attack has to be reported, 
then the IP will be added to the list of compromised IPs. The IP is then 
populated into a Snort rule that is available to download. Unfortunately, bot 
master infect computers randomly and the list of IP may not be the same every 
time the attack is launched [52], [162].There is a need to introduce a new 
mechanism that will understand the behavior rather than relying on a static field. 
Relying on a static field here would mean being successfully attacked at least 
once before writing the rules. Unfortunately, DDOS traffic has been generated 
by botnet which could involve a few thousands of computers. A recent 
demonstration by BBC has shown 20,000 computers infected and participing in 
a botnet [52], [163-165].  
Scenario 2: unused protocols  
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A sudden change of protocol has been noticed in the communication but further 
investigations suggests that the communication could originate from the same 
malicious user. Frame 78 of one of the capture shows the presence of IPv6. A 
closer look at the surrounding packets show that the payload found in the 
packet using IPv6 is the same as the payload use in packet using IPv4. In this 
instance the payload was 22 bytes.  
 
 
Figure 5-3: DDOS attack using IPv6 
 
A malicious user could take great advantages of poorly configured computer 
system environments. It is important to turn off all unused services or protocols 
as these can be used for the benefit of malicious users.  
IPv4 view 
 
Figure 5-4: DDOS attack pattern in IPv4 identical to pattern in IPv6 
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Further analysis of frame 79 reveals that another IP, the destination IP 
[224.0.0.252] is a reversed IP from IANA. There is no real security mechanism 
offered by snort to detect unused services. An effective security mechanism 
would be to perform a behavioral analysis of the traffic whereby if a behavior 
appears from nowhere then it can be flagged.  
 Scenario 3: Randomly generated IPs 
 
Having the chance to witness the attack live, the decision was made to 
challenge the attacker. After blocking the destination port that was used, there 
was no activity for few seconds. Then, the local host started sending data to 
various IP addresses. Interestingly, all transactions were originating from the 
same source IP.  
 
Fram
e 
Time SourceIP Destination IP Prot
o 
comments 
1828 298.53309
6 
192.168.15.10
2 
88.102.78.141 UDP Source port: 26811  Destination port: 
33752 
1829 298.53509
6 
192.168.15.10
2 
91.145.5.58 UDP Source port: 26811  Destination port: 
9403 
1830 298.53809
5 
192.168.15.10
2 
163.1.175.92 UDP Source port: 26811  Destination port: 
31151 
1831 298.54110
2 
192.168.15.10
2 
71.130.243.11
7 
UDP Source port: 26811  Destination port: 
34610 
1832 298.54409
8 
192.168.15.10
2 
145.97.196.24
3 
UDP Source port: 26811  Destination port: 
48211 
1833 298.54711
9 
192.168.15.10
2 
66.56.10.99 UDP Source port: 26811  Destination port: 
13098 
1834 298.54909
3 
192.168.15.10
2 
24.237.34.41 UDP Source port: 26811  Destination port: 
18853 
1835 298.55310
3 
192.168.15.10
2 
88.181.92.134 UDP Source port: 26811  Destination port: 
28818 
1836 298.55609
6 
192.168.15.10
2 
68.226.102.24
9 
UDP Source port: 26811  Destination port: 
37750 
Table 15: Randomly generated IPs with identical packet patterns 
An offline analysis of the IPs was done using MAXMIND [166] tools and the findings 
were as follow: 
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Hostname Country 
Name 
Region 
Name 
City ISP Organization
88.102.78.141 Czech 
Republic  
Jihlava Dvur 
Kralove 
Cesky 
Telecom, 
A.S. 
XDSL 
NETWORK-
ADSL 
91.145.5.58 Sweden  Gavleborgs 
Lan 
Edsbyn Helsinge Net 
AB 
Helsinge Net 
AB 
163.1.175.92 United 
Kingdom 
Oxfordshire Oxford Oxford 
University 
Oxford 
University 
71.130.243.117 United 
States 
California Alhambra SBC Internet 
Services 
SBC Internet 
Services 
145.97.196.243 Netherland
s  
Utrecht Utrecht Surfnet Stichting 
Sociale 
Huisvesting 
Utrecht 
66.56.10.99 United 
States 
Georgia Acworth Comcast 
Cable 
Comcast Cable 
24.237.34.41 United 
States 
Alaska Anchorage GCI GCI 
Communication
s 
88.181.92.134 France Midi-
Pyrenees 
Toulouse Free SAS Free SAS 
68.226.102.249 United 
States 
Arizona Tucson Cox 
Communicati
ons 
Cox 
Communication
s 
Table 16: IP resolved to their country name 
Using the two tables above, transactions were generated from the local IP to 
various foreign IPs in less than a second, all these IPs being from various 
regions in the world. There is little explanation as to why a local IP, a local 
system with no special service would be sending from the same port data to 
nine IPs that do not seem to have much in common.  Also, the data size of each 
of the packet was different in each frame.  
Further down the attack capture, the same scenario was repeated with more 
intensity. Not only was the local IP was sending data to many foreign IPs from 
the same ports, the foreign IPs were also sending data to the local IP on the 
same port. This implies that the local system was being flooded at the same 
time it was being used to flood other systems.  
 
Fram
e 
Time SourceIP Destination IP Prot
o 
comments 
1742
9 
5329.83621
7 
192.168.15.10
2 
86.71.201.195 UDP Source port: 26811  Destination port: 
5037 
1743
0 
5329.84323
2 
69.14.80.32 192.168.15.10
2 
UDP Source port: 50032  Destination port: 
26811 
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1743
1 
5329.85222 91.145.5.58 192.168.15.10
2 
UDP Source port: 9403  Destination port: 
26811 
1743
2 
5329.85622
1 
64.181.41.45 192.168.15.10
2 
UDP Source port: 59069  Destination port: 
26811 
1743
3 
5329.86221
7 
91.67.120.221 192.168.15.10
2 
UDP Source port: 8133  Destination port: 
26811 
1743
4 
5329.86622
3 
78.42.101.192 192.168.15.10
2 
UDP Source port: 54140  Destination port: 
26811 
1743
5 
5329.86922
2 
155.41.152.13
3 
192.168.15.10
2 
UDP Source port: 9660  Destination port: 
26811 
1743
6 
5329.87521
8 
92.140.95.73 192.168.15.10
2 
UDP Source port: 11818  Destination port: 
26811 
1743
7 
5329.89522
4 
89.25.9.62 192.168.15.10
2 
UDP Source port: 18034  Destination port: 
26811 
1743
8 
5329.90822
4 
87.6.132.100 192.168.15.10
2 
UDP Source port: 29880  Destination port: 
26811 
1743
9 
5329.91122
9 
86.71.201.195 192.168.15.10
2 
UDP Source port: 5037  Destination port: 
26811 
Table 17: Variation of DDOS attack 
Resolving the IPs to their location, the following table was created: 
 
Hostname Country 
Name 
Region Name City ISP Organization
69.14.80.32 United 
States 
Michigan Warren WideOpenWest WideOpenWest 
91.141.5.58 Austria Wien Vienna Orange Austria 
Telecommunicatio
n GmbH 
Network of Orange 
Austria 
Telecommunicatio
n GmbH 
64.181.41.45 United 
States 
West Virginia Weston FiberNet of West 
Virginia 
FiberNet of West 
Virginia 
91.67.120.221 Germany Nordrhein-
Westfalen 
Kabel Kabel 
Deutschland 
Breitband Service 
GmbH 
Kabel Deutschland 
78.42.101.192 Germany Baden-
Württemberg 
Dauchingen Kabel Baden-
Wuerttemberg 
GmbH & Co. KG 
Kabel Baden-
Wuerttemburg 
GmbH & Co. KG 
155.41.152.133 United 
States 
Massachusett
s 
Boston Boston University Boston University 
92.140.95.73 France Ile-de-France Paris France Telecom France Telecom 
89.25.9.62 Bulgaria Plovdiv Asenovgrad ITD Network SA Asenovgrad.net 
87.6.132.100 Italy Toscana Florence Telecom Italia Telecom Italia 
86.71.201.195 France Ile-de-France Paris Neuf Cegetel Neuf Cegetel 
131.215.35.197 United 
States 
California Pasadena California Institute 
of Technology 
California Institute 
of Technology 
88.102.78.141 Czech 
Republic 
Jihlava Dvur Kralove Cesky Telecom, 
A.S. 
XDSL NETWORK-
ADSL 
74.75.228.38 United 
States 
Maine Kennebunk Road Runner Road Runner 
59.127.100.126 Taiwan T'ai-pei Taipei CHTD, Chunghwa 
Telecom Co., Ltd. 
Chunghwa 
Telecom Data 
Communication 
Business Group 
137.189.133.163 Hong 
Kong 
00 Central 
District 
CUHK CUHK 
Table 18: Distribution of Host taking part in the attack in less than a Second 
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As shown by the table, the distribution of IPs by their geographical area make it 
difficult to find a pattern under which “normal” and legal network transactions 
will take place. The honeypot did not have any service running such as web 
server, FTP server or any other type of service that would require many 
connections from around the world in the same second.   
 Scenario 4: Error Messages (Host Unreachable) – ICMP messages 
 
Another important element has drawn attention in the capture. UDP packets 
were sent using random ports. As a result, when trying to communicate with a 
host that is not available an ICMP message was sent back to the local host. 
Snort does not provide any mechanism to analyse ICMP error message yet 
they carry a lot of meaningful message that could help improving security [167], 
[168]. If the states of connections are kept, then a simple algorithm could 
analyse the reason why the ICMP was generated [Table 19]. In this particular 
case, such analysis would inform that there is a one way communication that is 
taking place. Most importantly, the same scenario is repeated for many IPs. 
Hence, a possible DDOS attack.  
 
Fram
e 
Time Source IP Destination IP Prot
o 
comments 
1488
3 
4303.2944
7 
192.168.15.10
2 
125.224.103.2
43 
UDP Source port: 26811  Destination port: 
52749 
1488
9 
4303.6104
73 
125.224.103.2
43 
192.168.15.10
2 
ICM
P 
Destination unreachable (Port 
unreachable) 
Table 19: ICMP message tracking 
Further investigations show that the host is real but communication on the port 
that was used was not accepted.  Hence an indication that something could be 
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wrong. Also, there is a tendency of systematically blocking ICMP packets yet 
blocking ICMP removes the stateful nature of UDP connections.  
 
Hostname Country 
Name 
Region 
Name 
City ISP Organization 
125.224.103.243 Taiwan T'ai-pei Taipei CHTD, Chunghwa 
Telecom Co., Ltd. 
Chunghwa Telecom Data 
Communication Business 
Group 
Figure 5-5: IP revolved to its country 
Each error message is related to a particular system behavior. These behaviors 
are generally known and each time one of them is encountered, an investigation 
should be done as per why the message as occurred.  In this case, the ICMP 
message indicates that the system is talking to another system that is not live or 
does not allow communication. After investigation, our local system has 
received a message from the foreign system, yet the foreign system is not 
accepting a message back. Looking at the issue further, the port used between 
our local system and the foreign system has been in used by other systems IPs 
during the attack.    
Creating a snort rule that drops ICMP error messages at this level would help to 
limit the traffic load. However, important information about the state of the 
connection would be lost. Prior to dropping the packet, analysis of the state of 
the connection should be done.  
 Scenario 5: Terodo IPv6 over UDP tunneling IPv4 
Some elements of the captured file reveals that the malicious user has 
attempted to hide traffic using Terodo IPv6 over UDP tunneling. Further 
analysis shows that protocol integrity was violated.  
 
170 
 
 
Table 20: IANA reserved IP used for DDOS 
 
Hostname Country Name Region City ISP Organization
224.0.0.253 N/A N/A N/A   
 
Classic tunneling methods envisaged for IPv6 transition operate by sending 
IPv6 packets as payload of IPv4 packets [169]; 
  
Scenario 6: Malicious payload 
Malicious users at times use a payload that could give a good indication of an 
attack.  
9l);"E&mHxplX-R own you bitch! 
 
0000   00 18 39 dd 6c a2 00 0c 29 3b c9 22 08 00 45 00  ..9.l...);."..E. 
0010   00 84 a5 2a 00 00 80 11 8e ff c0 a8 0f 6d 48 b1  ...*.........mH. 
0020   ed 78 0c e0 0c 02 00 70 02 61 ff ff ff ff 58 2d  .x.....p.a....X- 
0030   52 20 6f 77 6e 20 79 6f 75 20 62 69 74 63 68 21  R own you bitch! 
0040   00 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01  ................ 
0050   01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01  ................ 
0060   01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 00 01 01 01 01 01 01  ................ 
0070   01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01  ................ 
0080   01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01  ................ 
0090   01 01                                            .. 
 
Retrieving the payload from the above packet will give "….X-R own you bitch!”. 
In this attack, the malicious user was changing the source port number on every 
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single connection. A snort rule which can then be writen to stop this attack is the 
following: 
alert tcp $HOME_NET any -> $EXTERNAL_NET any: (msg:"ET TROJAN 
Backdoor.Win32.VB.brg C&C DDoS Outbound"; flow:established,from_server; 
dsize:>100; content:"|ff ff ff ff|"; depth:12; content:" own you bitch!"; within:25; 
content:"|01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01|"; classtype:trojan-activity; threshold 
gen_id 1, sig_id 1853, type both, track by_dst, count 100, seconds 3;reference: 
VIRUS/TROJAN_Backdoor.Win32.VB; sid:; rev:1;) 
 
Further analysis led to investigate what program was sending these packets. 
Using netstat, the command netstat -aob -p UDP   has help to identify the 
program responsible of the damages.  In this instance the attacking executable 
were csrss.exe, mssrv32.exe and svohcst.exe. A scan of the system by 
Comodo Antivirus has confirmed the same problem Figure 5-6: Virus Captured.   
 
 
Figure 5-6: Virus Captured 
 
Statistics and traffic pattern  
Looking at traffic patterns, once could easily note that there is an excess of 
packets when compare to the normal routine. Under normal circumstances (no 
attacks) an average of 3.902 packets per second was recorded.  
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Figure 5-7: normal traffic pattern- traffic not under attack 
  
Figure 5-8: packet per second under medium UDP DDOS attack 
Under attacks, a medium DDOS attack, 2554.251packets per second on 
average was going across the network Figure 5-7.  
 
 
173 
 
Figure 5-9: packet per second HTTP DDOS attack 
Based on the traffic pattern, one could easily identify a misused or abuse of the 
system. However, systems are not static and momentarily may have heavy load 
due to a VOIP application or a video over the internet. Monitoring traffic requires 
a lot of time and patience as the normal behavior of a system has to be built 
over certain period of time. Once this normal behavior has been built, a range a 
threshold values can then be set to alarm in case of any drastic change.  
5.3 Summary of DDOS attacks 
 
There are certainly known ways of launching a DDOS attack. However, the 
techniques used by malicious users go beyond any classification. Based on the 
knowledge of publicly available DDOS attacks recorded, an attempt to classify 
DDOS attack was made.  
 
Figure 5-10: DDOS attack classification 
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There are many types of DDOS attacks. Sometimes experts in the field will refer 
to an attack by the name used to perform the attack such as the stacheldraht 
[170].  
 
In this classification, flooding attacks are considered as one type of attack in 
opposition to logic attack. In the flooding attack, there is no specific need to 
identify a vulnerability of the system. As long as a port number is open, a 
malicious user can flood that particular port [171-176]. As long as a webserver 
is running, a malicious user can request a large number of open connections, in 
the hope of making the server very busy until it crashes. More recently, when 
performing DDOS attacks, malicious users will request a page or series of 
pages repeatedly from various sources (compromised IP) [177], [178]. The 
requests whilst being syntactically correct, have a malicious intent.  Due to their 
nature, it has been very difficult to distinguish between the requests made with 
good intention and those that are not.  
Another class of DDOS attack is identified by the different attacks resultant from 
a certain violation of Protocol behaviour. In this category, the protocol definition 
is not violated but rather it is abused.  
Another interesting group of DDOS attacks are attacks based on virus. The 
behaviour of these attacks is not very predictable. However, when the virus is 
identified, the problem can be rather easy to solve.  
A more serious type of DDOS attack occurs when the hardware that has been 
sold was modified leaving a bug that will then be used for attack or by updating 
the firmware of the attack [179], [180]. This category or class of attack is very 
difficult to identify. However, when such a problem is identified, it can be easily 
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fixed by replacing the faulty hardware.  The work performed in this research will 
not address that type of attack as it is out of the author’s competences. To the 
best of the author’s knowledge there is no framework available or solution to 
detect such attack.  
5.4 Solution Architect  
This section will discuss the design of the new architecture  
5.4.1 DDOS features requirements 
The number of features to be considered for an optimal DDOS protection is 
important (Figure 5-11).   These features have been organized into five main 
categories: 
 Static list: these are the lists that exist in the community but are not 
currently fully considered for an IDS 
 Dynamic elements: algorithmic based and flow management 
 Analyzer: classic protocol analyser  & flow management 
 Mixed: features that have both static and dynamic elements  
 Signature: classic Snort rules 
For the purpose of this diagram, the static list and Signature will be represented 
with the same colour.  
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Figure 5-11: DDOS Protection Elements 
5.4.2 IDS States 
During the course of its action, an IDS should be able to switch between simple 
operation mode i.e. when there is no attack detected to attack mode where an 
attack is detected, and to mitigation mode when trying to get rid of the attack. 
As well as detecting, IDS should be able to react to attack, hence switch to IPS.  
Three states are identified in this architecture Figure 5-12 
 
Figure 5-12: IDS States 
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5.4.3 Normal state 
During the normal state, the IDS runs without knowledge of DDOS attack. In 
this state, the IDS can be subject to unlimited attack not classed as DDOS. The 
core security engine will be dealing with those attacks. However, a number of 
“radars” are activated to identify any potential DDOS activity. A radar is a 
behavioural monitoring agent. The radar would generally sits on the protected 
system sending regular updates to the IDS. The link between the radar and the 
IDS would be protected by a layer of TLS to avoid any malicious user tampering 
with the data being sent across. Radars that have been identified are known as:  
5.4.3.1 Radar on Destination IP Address: R_DIP 
The R_DIP is a radar that monitors the number of incoming request to the 
server over a rolling period predetermined by configuration.  Over a rolling 
period of time Tx, if the number of IP participant go above the 80% percentile, a 
trigger will be sent to the management station (IDS) to change the state. This is 
considered as a hotspot.  
5.4.3.2 Radar on Destination Port number: R_DPORT 
The R_DPORT is a radar that monitors the number of incoming connections 
and the amount of data sent through that port number. If over a rolling period Ty 
configurable in the settings of the IDS is reached, a trigger will be sent to the 
management console to request a change of state. This is also considered as a 
hotspot. 
5.4.3.3 Radar on resource monitoring  
This radar monitors the overall performance of the protected system. On a 
regular basic, over a period of time Tz, the radar will send the level of resources 
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available on the protected PC. A configurable range of resource level will 
indicate various actions that the IDS will take, and change the state accordingly.  
5.4.4 Server response time 
At the management console, a radar querying the Server (the protected system) 
would be installed. This will monitor the response time of the server and instruct 
the IDS to take the appropriate action.  
5.4.5 Attack state 
When radars have sent triggers to the management console signalling the 
presence of an attack, the IDS will enter the attack stage. Different levels of 
attacks are set by the severity of the attack.  
5.4.6 Mitigation state 
The IDS will come into the mitigation state when an attack is detected, and 
when that attack is rate critical. This is similar to a survival mode 
5.5  Countermeasures  
Mitigating DDOS attack is a very complicated task due to the nature of the 
attack itself. The model designed in this chapter is a multi-layered mitigation 
approach with three states Figure 5-13.  
In the normal state, the number of features running as security measure is fairly 
limited to Ingress traffic, ACLs, protocols analysers which include basic 
threshold, and the resource monitoring agent. When an attack is detected and 
the status is changed to “attack mode”, many other features are activated: 
compromised host, Socks proxies, HTTP Proxies, non-supported protocols 
rules, and advanced patterns recognition.. If the attack persists, more security 
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features are turn on. These are: country based filtering, corporate proxies, white 
lists and scoring algorithms.  
 
Figure 5‐13: the DDOS architecture 
 
5.6 DDOS attack detectors: RADAR  
In this section, a number of studies are performed in order to determine attack 
indicators.  
Based on the services provided and the number of participants, servers have 
different loads. The level of detection of attack for each server would be 
different depending on its normal activity curve.  It is therefore important that the 
server keeps a baseline of the services provided.  In this series of experiments, 
the baseline would be set and the appropriate security measure to detect attack 
will be produced.  Data analysed here were collected on a commercial server 
from Vision Intel Ltd  
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Figure 5-14: Server Cheetah - normal activity stream - HTTP performances 
An analysis of Figure 5-14 reveals the number of connections failures during the 
capture. However, the reasons why there are so many connection failures are 
unknown since the author did not have access to the log files or any traffic 
capture to look into the problem.  The trace file represents 34hours of web 
activity. The number of connections established was relatively low.  
Similar analyses were repeated many times and during normal activity, the 
graphs of activities are very similar. Given that the patterns across the different 
captures are very similar, the rest of the analysis will be based on the capture 
that lasted three days.  The latter file will then be compare to another capture 
where an experimental server was attacked.   
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Figure 5-15: HTTP observation 3 days activities 
In Figure 5-15: HTTP observation 3 days activities the patterns observed in 
Figure 5-14 are very similar. However, during the second capture that lasted 
three days, the servers seemed busier as the average of established 
connection is higher than previously recorded. At the same time, the number of 
connection failures was pretty high. Again, not having access to the trace files, 
the reasons for the high number of connection failures remained unknown.  
In this subsection, the two servers’ behaviours are compared with regards to 
connections failures, segments and connections established.  
Referring to Figure 5-16 and Figure 5-17 the ratio of connection failures is [0.01 
/ 0.000001] which workouts to be 1 to 10000. There is clearly a significant 
difference between the two behaviours.  
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Regarding the segments per seconds the ratio is 1 to 100 which again a 
significant gap.  
As to the connections established, the ratio is 1 to 10.  
Very few reasons can justify this change of pattern when there is no attack. In 
the recent events, the number of hit Google received   significantly increased 
when Michael Jackson passed away.   However, this behaviour can be 
expected from big companies. From small to medium companies, such a 
change in behaviour would indicate anomalies. The question now that arise is 
how to determine when to raise the alarm that an attack has started.  
 
Figure 5-16: Cheetah Server behaviour 1 
 
Figure 5-17: Lynx server behaviour 1 
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In order to find a point in time when an alert should be raised, this research 
looked at the percentile. However the author changed the default behaviour of 
the percentile. A rolling period was set over which the percentile would be 
computed. For the first stage of attack, if the average of the radar over the 
rolling period was more than 50% of the Xn percentile over n cycle an alert 
would be raised as the first level of attack.  
If the mean values of the radar was more than 70% or more of the Xn percentile, 
the alert would be raised as attack level 2.  
5.7 Conclusion:  
In this chapter, the DDOS mitigation and detection framework is presented. One 
of the unique features of the framework presented here is the multi-level 
detection capabilities. Three levels were defined under which the framework will 
have different behaviour. In addition, radars were introduced: attack detector 
that alert in case of any system performance degradation. All the features 
included in the DDOS framework could work as separate units and offer their 
level of protection. This framework will be later integrated into the multistate 
Intrusion detection and prevention. When the system protected is under severe 
attack (DDOS), the DDOS framework would be the priority of the MIDaPS 
framework.
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6 Multistage Intrusion Detection and 
Prevention System: MIDaPS 
 
The work presented in this chapter is the result of extensive experiments based 
on the problem found either by literature reviews or by personal experiments.  
In this chapter, the comprehensive list of features of the MIDaPS is presented 
here.  The author identifies four levels of visibility of attacks around which the 
new IDS will be built.  The work presented in this chapter is a form of summary 
of all the work that has been achieved in earlier chapters.  The author goes on 
presenting a new yet audacious Intrusion Detection and Protection architecture 
that is built around the fact that most recent attacks are vectors and multistage 
attacks that generally lead to a DDOS attack.  The architecture presented here 
is based on multistage attack detection scenarios as well as DDOS mitigation 
and detection technique. In addition, all the functionalities have been designed 
to be fully compatible with a multicore environment. The author stresses that 
multicore is not the main focus in this chapter or of this thesis.   
After defining the V-BANI framework, the chapter will compare the Snort 
features to MIDaPS features.  MIDaPs is designed as modular IDS. The rest of 
the chapter will discuss the default modules that form the base of the IDS and 
the reasons why these modules are important.  
6.1 The V-BANI Framework  
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Intensive research has been carried so far to understand and model attacks in 
order to build a solid detection and mitigation system. There are 4 different 
categories that emerged from the different analyses done earlier when looking 
at vector and multistage attacks and the kind of protection needed against these 
attacks.  
The first category of attacks is composed of attacks that are visible to network 
security systems. These attacks can be detected and stopped by a well 
configure detection and mitigation system.  This could be a violation of protocol 
definition, a protocol abuse, a known pattern used by malicious users in order to 
disrupt, change, or stop any legitimate activity 
The second category is composed of attacks or at least part of attacks that are 
generally considered to be legitimate actions and therefore not a subject of 
concern for security systems. For instance, a computer could be sending 
information out to another computer. This is completely legitimate and it is the 
basis of any communication. However, sending data from one computer to 
another would stop been legitimate if the previous action was a brute force 
attack on root passwords.  
The third category is the type of attack that affects a system without any 
physical contact to the system.  For instance the command will return username 
and password of website that use Frontpage extension. Even though the 
password is encrypted, it can be unencrypted by “john the ripper” in few 
minutes.  
"# -FrontPage-" filetype:pwd inurl:(service | authors | administrators | users)  
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This is an excellent starting point for a malicious user. The victim system in this 
case is not aware of the details that are made public and has no knowledge of 
someone accessing them.  
In the fourth category attacks are partially performed inside the local system. 
Some rootkit or malware require rebooting after installation. Rebooting the 
system can be visible within the local host and not on a network level. Also, 
malwares generally perform modifications of system files. In order to have the 
full picture of the attack, it is important to understand the changes that are made 
on local systems. Depending on where the IDS is installed, there might not be 
any direct communication within the systems protected and the IDS. A good 
security system should consider investigating the critical changes on the 
protected systems.  
 
Figure 6-1: V-BANI framework 
 
The V-BANI framework [Figure 6-1: V-BANI framework] takes its name from the 
fact that four levels or categories of visibility of attacks. Current IDS or systems 
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tend to address one or two at most at a time yet the level of sophistication of 
attacks is such that, if any level of visibility of attack is ignored, attack will go 
undetected.  
Based on the V-BANI framework a number of features that need to be 
considered when designing IDS have been identified and compared to Snort 
IDS.  
6.2 Comparing MIDaPS features to Snort features  
 
Features  MIDaPS Snort Comment  
Ingress traffic 
 Filter incoming traffic based on 
source and destination IP 
 Filter incoming traffic based on 
source and destination ports  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Outgress traffic  
 Filter outgoing traffic based on 
source and destination IP 
 Filter outgoing traffic based on 
source and destination ports 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Limit simultaneous communication 
 Block many connections matching 
a criteria 
    
 
Logging 
 Log traffic on request based on 
matching condition 
  
Existing in Snort 
but not fully 
functional 
Grouping and naming of IPS 
 Ability to group IPs by network   
 
Grouping by ports number 
 Ability to group traffic by services  
  
Snort can block 
traffic based on 
port but have no 
knowledge on the 
type of services 
Operating System identification 
 Ability to filter traffic based on OS   
 
Layer 2 filtering 
 Ability to bridge interface and filter 
traffic between them 
  
 
Packet normalisation 
 Normalising packet for protocol 
analysis 
  
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Deep packet inspection 
 Ability to look into packet content   
 
Protocol Analyser 
 Comprehensive interpretation of 
protocol definition 
 Comprehensive interpretation of  
limitation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Full state management  
 Flow manager 
 Limit states per host 
 Limit concurrent connection per 
unit of time 
 Limit concurrent response per unit 
of time 
 Synproxy state management  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
X-header analysis 
  
Can be 
implemented in 
Snort as a 
signature 
Slow path 
 In-depth packet analysis   
This will be an in-
depth analysis  
Compromised IP list 
 Known list of IPs compromised   
Exist in Snort as 
rule 
RBN 
Russian Bot Network   
Exist in Snort as 
rule 
DNS Blacklist    
Privileged List 
 Known IPs that access specific 
services (admin access)   
Very limited in 
Snort but can be 
implement with 
some rules 
MD5 rogue list 
 Known list of server using 
vulnerable SSL 
  
 
Attack classification 
Categorise attack by group of severity  
Categorise attack by level of violation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Packet fragmentation handling     
Baselines    Exist as threshold  
Packet obfuscation   Very limited in Snort 
Stream segmentation    
RPC Fragmentation handling     
URL Obfuscation    
Remote sensor/Agent     
HTML Obfuscation    
URL filtering 
  
Can be 
implemented in 
Snort as rules 
Stateless capability    
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Raw packet processing     
HTTP Load management    
Slow path – packet decoding     
Modular – Plugins     
TCP Reset    
    
Table 21: Features comparison between Snort and MIDaPS 
There are clear differences between Snort and MIDaPS. There are many more 
features in MIDaPS than they are in Snort. However, our experiments have 
shown that the Snort did not handle perform well under high speed. This under 
performance was due to the fact that Snort was performing unnecessary work. 
This actually suggests that the number of tasks to perform when analysing the 
traffic should be kept to minimum. Even though MIDaPS was built with many 
more features that what Snort has, all the features are not to be used at the 
same time. Also, the filtering mechanism introduced in MIDaPS is such that the 
amount of traffic decrease as it goes down the chain of the IDS functionalities. 
For instance, module1 is responsible of eliminating any unnecessary traffic that 
comes into the system. The ingress traffic is the first level of filtering. In this 
module, the traffic can be limited to a certain range of IPs. Also, depending on 
policies, any unknown proxy traffic can be filtered. If any reserved IP is used, it 
will be filtered at this level. Snort does not provide these facilities.  
 Module 2 is another module that aims at reducing to workload of the IDS. By 
using a multilayer of classification (by port, destination IP, service, flow) the 
traffic is organised In such a way that packets related to the same flow are 
directed toward the same core. However, the redirection of traffic is managed 
by a load balancer which ensures that each core within the architecture 
receives the same amount of work.  This module takes into account the load 
variation that may be cause either by the variability in the load or by the 
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computational power of the various nodes, or by the computation required for 
each task (i.e. we use an iterative scheme to compute and the number of 
iterations depends on the difficulties encountered to solve the problem). 
Module 5 is another module that introduced traffic filtering. This module can 
significantly reduce the traffic load by adding a protection over a number of IP 
that do not need to be checked (corporate proxies) or by applying limits to a 
range of IP address.   
In module 6, when URL filtering is active, the traffic load will be great reduced. 
By filtering by URL, the packets will be blocked and prevented from going any 
further into the system. Depending on the options that need filtering, they could 
be thousands or even millions of URL that could be affected. A company may 
choose not to allow fashion website, gaming, sexual adult theme website, social 
networking, and many more.  
We argue that the number of features is not always an inconvenient when the 
features are used appropriately. In their study, [181] argues that the number of 
features will reduce the performance of the IDS and went on experimenting the 
behaviour of the IDS with reduced features. From the empirical results they 
obtain, it is seen that by using the hybrid model Normal, Probe and DOS could 
be detected with 100% accuracy and U2R and R2L with 84% and 99.47% 
accuracies, respectively. This shows that reducing the number of features is not 
always an advantage.  
6.2.1 Remote sensor/Agent  
Depending on the settings of the network, the intrusion detection system will be 
located in or at the border of the system being monitored.  Remote sensors are 
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responsible for checking the changes that occurs on the system. Once changes 
on system files or system parameters have occur, an alert will be sent to 
SYSLOG who will then send another alert to MIDaPS as shown in Figure  6‐2. 
Both system monitoring and syslog are on the remote system.  
 
Figure 6‐2: remote agent architecture 
6.3 The architecture 
 The Multistage Detection & Prevention System is built around seven core 
components and three functional modes: Normal operation mode, Attack mode 
and Mitigation mode. 
MIDaPS is design (Figure 6‐3) to change its operation mode depending on the 
attack level. The overall architecture is presented in Figure 6‐3  
MIDaPS is organised into modules, each module carrying a set of function. 
However, the different functionalities of each module will be available 
depending on the level of attack. The general description of modules is as 
follow:  
File Monitoring 
System Parameters 
monitoring 
MIDaPSSYSLOG
Secure link
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Figure 6‐3: MIDaPS architecture 
6.3.1 Module 1: Ingress traffic filter  
This module is responsible for determining what traffic is accepted into the 
network. The Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) made public the list 
of IP addresses that are not in used. When spoofing IPs, attackers generally 
use this IPs to generate illegal traffic, causing the attack system to generate 
many ICMP messages [182]. In addition, the range of local IPs that is allowed to 
access the network is specified in this module. Depending on its position in the 
network, the IDS will deal with both local IPs and External IPs. The checks are 
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performed on the IP header only. This eliminates the need of any other check 
and reduces the load of all subsequent modules. [183] describe ingress filtering 
as one of the most effective way of protecting against spoofing IP addresses 
This feature is not is not implemented in Snort. However, it is possible to write 
rules that will perform the ingress filtering. The drawback of using rules for this 
purpose is that the spoofed IP will go through all the checks right up to the 
security engines before stopping any traffic originating from a spoof IP. The 
method of implementing ingress traffic in MIDaPS is therefore more effective 
that using Snort rules.  
The algorithm for filtering ingress traffic would be:  
var  
IANA_RESEVED_IP = {list of IP range reserved by the IANA} 
HOME_NET = {List of IPs currently in used in the network} 
 
ingress_traffic(SIP)  
 { 
 // SIP = Source IP 
    if (SIP exist in IANA_RESEVED_IP) AND (not In HOME_NET)  
  terminateflow() // this function will terminate (kill) all traffic related to the 
SIP 
    else  
   Proceed with packet  
 } 
6.3.2 Module 2: traffic classifier and its associate elements.  
Module 2 is composed of 3 core elements: The traffic classifier, the flow 
manager and the stream manager.  
6.3.2.1 The traffic classifier:  
Network traffic is heterogeneous and can be categorised in many ways 
depending on the objectives.  The IDS proposed in this research uses three 
modes of operations: Normal, Attack, and Mitigation.  The Normal mode is the 
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operations in which the IDS check for irregularities in the traffic as well as 
checking any indication of serious attack. In this research, DDOS is considered 
to be a serious attack. All other attacks will be dealt with during the normal 
operation mode.  DDOS attacks can be performed a many ways. For instance, 
attackers can target one particular port or service (one or many ports numbers), 
or a protocol (P2P). In such scenarios, a traffic filter is part of the mitigation 
method.  It is important to detect attacks before they become very severe. The 
objective of setting various statistics is to apply an algorithm that will detect any 
irregularity in the traffic pattern. Each network has its own unique pattern. In 
order for the IDS to recognise a significant change, the IDS should learn to 
recognise the traffic pattern: It’s only then that anomalies could be detected. 
The intelligent threshold imposed on the traffic is not used as a defence tool but 
rather as a detection of possible attack.    
Different traffic classification methods and their impact were studied:  
 Payload  
 Application  
 Protocol 
 Port number  
 Statistical methods  
Classification by payload 
In regards to payload, traffic group by tuples (flow) i.e. source IP and destination 
IP, source IP + destination IP + source Port + destination Port, TCP options 
(SYN, PSH, ACK, RST, etc.) [184], [185]  
 
195 
 
 
Name  Percentage Inbound Percentage Outbound Bytes  Packets  
10.2.195.247 36.232%  
  
0.001%  331.859 MB  1,198,957 
10.2.20.30 0.000%  
  
35.556%  325.657 MB  1,179,984 
10.2.20.5 0.000%  
  
23.441%  214.700 MB  232,376  
10.2.198.238 20.180%  
  
0.005%  184.869 MB  171,288  
10.2.20.40 0.000%  
  
15.939%  145.986 MB  137,561  
10.2.197.251 9.506%  
  
0.003%  87.093 MB  65,948  
cdx.portal 1.903%  
  
3.151%  46.291 MB  113,558  
10.2.192.251 4.513%  
  
0.000%  41.338 MB  44,483  
www.usmma.bluenet 0.000%  
  
4.111%  37.651 MB  156,712  
10.2.200.254 3.260%  
  
0.003%  29.884 MB  68,766  
 
 
Table 22: traffic classification - Top 10 IPs 
Based the information provided by Table 22: traffic classification - Top 10 IPs an 
administrator is able to make the decision to turn off any communication to or 
from that host.  An IDS should be able to provide live statistics on the network 
traffic. The objective of classifying traffic by payload enables the IDS to identify 
the level at which each IP is involved in the different communications. Based on 
intelligent threshold (dynamic threshold), the IDS will identify IP who have 
significantly changed their behaviour. A profile will be built for each IP. When 
there is a significant change, the IDS will flag that IP.  
Classification by application:  
Most applications can have a signature that can be used to identify the 
presence in the network.  Traffic classification is often used in deep packet 
analysis [186]. Classification by application enables the administrator to have to 
power to decide to block a particular application. For instance, all P2P 
application traffic can be stopped if an administrator wishes to do so. This will 
reduce the flow of traffic coming into the network as well as reducing the 
amount of traffic subject to checks. An overview of patterns used to filter traffic 
is given in Table 23 
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Application Name Patterns 
Apple Juice - P2P filesharing 
^ajprot\x0d\x0a 
 
Jabber (XMPP) - open instant 
messenger protocol - RFC 3920
<stream:stream[\x09-\x0d ][ -~]*[\x09-
\x0d ]xmlns=['"]jabber 
 
GTalk, a Jabber (XMPP) client ^<stream:stream to="gmail\.com" 
HTTP by Download Accelerator 
Plus 
User-Agent: DA [678]\.[0-9] 
 
VNC - Virtual Network 
Computing. Also known as RFB 
- Remote Frame Buffer 
^rfb 00[1-9]\.00[0-9]\x0a$ 
 
SSH Secure shell 
^ssh-[12]\.[0-9] 
 
 
Table 23: Application patterns [187] 
Classification by protocol  
Each network would have fairly standard proportions of traffic. If the patterns 
generally observed change significantly, an alert should be raised. The most 
common protocols are: 
Protocol ID  Protocol ID 
ICMP      1  ESP 50 
IGMP 2  AH 51 
TCP 6  EIGRP 88 
ICMP      1  OSPF 89 
EGP 8  PIM 103 
UDP 17  VRRP 112 
IPv6 41  L2TP 115 
RSVP 46  Other 0-255 
GRE 47    
     
 
Table 24: common protocols 
Classification by port number  
Classification by port number is fairly common. However, grouping traffic by port 
number alone is not efficient enough as there are no physical limitations on 
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which port number an application can use.  The classification used here will 
allow the IDS to track any irregular activities.  
 
Figure 6-4: Top 10 application protocol based on [25] 
An efficient way to detect a DDOS attack would be the change in regular 
patterns. For a given network, if TCP connections are over 80% of the traffic 
observed in the network and UDP less than 1%, an increase of UDP traffic over 
10% or a decrease of TCP traffic to 50% would indicate a serious anomaly. This 
change of behaviour should be flagged and monitored. In general, any protocol 
that goes beyond its normal usage should be subject to inspection.  
 
Figure 6-5: Top 10 application protocol based on a DDOS capture 
Looking at Figure 6-4 and Figure 6-5 one could easily notice the big difference 
between the two traffic patterns.  In the first case, the traffic can be considered 
fairly normal, but for the second case, DNS traffic is as high as TCP traffic 
which is a very rare pattern on normal behaviour. Port 139 [Netbios] is very 
popular amongst DDOS attacks. An increase of traffic on port 139 would 
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indicate serious irregularities. Once an alert is fired, the IDS will change its 
mode of operation to a more defensive mode.  
Classification by statistical method 
Based on the analysis done earlier in this research, one would notice that 
different IPs had the same payload content and hence the same payload length; 
the frequency of packets sent was similar; the number of bytes downloaded was 
similar. In this section, any metric could be computed 
The following graphs (Figure 6-6, Figure 6-8, and Figure 6-9) are based on the 
“2009 Inter-Service Academy Cyber Defence Competition” [25] 
 
Figure 6-6: traffic classification - packet size distribution 
In this scenario, most packet send are bigger or equal to 1518bytes. During an 
attack, if the problem is found to be the amount of data sent, Figure 6-6 gives 
enough information to make an informed decision. Blocking all traffic for which 
the packet Len >= 1518 will considerably reduce data flow. The packet 
distribution size is a good way to identify DDOS attacks. Most script kiddies do 
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not use intelligent packets size distribution during the attack. Looking at Figure 
6‐7, it is fairly easy to notice that the attacker was using different source port 
against one destination port. More interestingly, the payload_Len (data size) did 
not change during the course of the attacks. Classifying the traffic by payload 
helps to identify such attack and stop them.  
 
Figure 6‐7: DDOS patterns 
Classifying the traffic using TCP flags are one improves the detection of SYN flood attacks. At 
any given time, the administrator will be able to see how many IP have opened a connection 
without activity. When too many connections are open, the resources are used and the system 
runs out of resources causing the system to crash. A baseline should be defined per system in 
order to ensure that the threshold set reflects the environment in which the IDS is installed.  
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Figure 6-8: traffic classification - TCP connections 
 
 
Figure 6-9: Traffic classification - TCP Flags 
The average number connections per seconds Figure 6-8 and the average 
number of packet per seconds   Figure 6-9 can be used as indicators as to a 
201 
 
serious change in the pattern distributions.    A SYN Flood attack is considered 
to be in progress if the number of unanswered SYN/ACK’s sent by the receiving 
host (half-opened TCP connections) exceeds the threshold set in “Flood rate 
until attack logged (unanswered SYN|ACKs per second”;  on average the 
default value is 25, the minimum is 5, and the maximum is 999). However, this 
threshold is protocol dependant and application dependant. In a P2P scenario, 
dozens or hundreds of connections can be opened at the same time. The 
threshold set above is mainly for HTTP connections.   
Flow manager 
In this research the author considers a flow as being the source IP, source port, 
destination IP, and destination Port.  The flow manager as defined by this 
research will have the following functionalities: 
 Organise traffic by flow: tuples of the same nature will be analysed by 
threat or within the same core (referring to a multicore architecture) 
unless the threat becomes saturated. In that case, the flow manager 
would:  
 Manage load balancing: MIDaPS is an architecture that is aimed at 
multicore environment. In a multicore framework, if the load is not well 
balanced, one core would perform more tasks than order defying the real 
purpose of multicore. It is important that a balance is kept amongst the 
flow the ensure maximum performance  
 Flow threshold management: In a DDOS scenario, script kiddies usually 
keep the same tuple in the course of a flooding attack. A load balancing 
algorithm will continually direct (in the best case) the same tuple to the 
same threat. This behaviour could result in creating a bottleneck in the 
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thread. As a solution, the flow manager keeps basic threshold values to 
ensure that a threat is not overloaded by data 
 SYN flood attacks generate infinite number of flow per source IP. The 
flow manager keeps threshold value regulating the number of 
simultaneous flow that can be open by a single source IP. In this case, 
the flow manager would consider a limit of flows in which a source IP can 
be found.  
6.3.3 Module 3: the remote monitory agent 
This feature does not exist in Snort. The remote external agent acts as a host 
intrusion detection system.  Based on the analysis done previously in this 
research, it is very important to have knowledge of what is happening in the 
victim system as well as knowledge of what is happening at the network level. 
Many of the recent attacks are performed with such sophistication that any IDS 
will not alert. It is only the combination of all the actions that would indicate the 
presence of an attack. The remote agent will be responsible for  
 Monitoring local shell i.e. file and directory changes 
 Monitory CPU usage – this section has been fully discussed in the 
previous chapter.  
File monitor agent 
The list of files to monitor will be specified in a configuration file. Few options 
are presented. The user can choose to monitor specific hard (Figure 6-10) or 
choose to monitor the whole system (Figure 6-11)  
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Figure 6-10: Monitoring Specific Hard Disk 
 
 
Figure 6-11: Monitoring the whole system 
6.3.4  Module 4: Protocol analyser  
The protocol analyser is responsible for checking the integrity the traffic making 
sure that the protocol definition is not violated. Besides checking the integrity of 
protocols, most protocol analysers do not report when this occurred. Various 
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protocol analysers have already been implemented. The idea in this thesis is 
not to recreate what is already existent, but rather extend the current 
capabilities.  
6.3.5 Module 5:  special features 
 This module has a fairly limited set of functionalities. 
 Whitelists: a set of IPs that have unmonitored access. However, a 
threshold monitoring will be applied to any of these IP to prevent abuse 
from the system. Also, whitelists are set IPs that will be allowed to use 
the system under heavy attacks.  
 Corporate proxies:  some companies route the internet traffic of their 
users via proxies or Network Address Translators. By so doing, 
companies prevent their users to be targeted directly by an external 
malicious user. However, securing against proxy traffic, especially 
corporate traffic is very difficult as the actions of users cannot be 
individually identified.  
 Non supported feature: in the occurrence of a non-supported feature, 
and unless defined in a specific algorithm, a basic threshold will be 
applied.  
6.3.6 Module 6: Dynamic algorithms 
This module is responsible of handling the difficult scenarios. For instance, from 
the different attacks scenarios of DDOS and multistage attacks discussed in the 
previous chapter, various patterns were identified. 
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Table 25: Patterns Identified 
SIP SPORT DIP DPORT PROTO Data length 
Data content 
hash note 
One One Many Many UDP identical identical  
many many one one UDP identical identical  
 
The patterns identified were clear and simple to understand. However, further 
investigations were made to avoid blocking legitimate transactions. The patterns 
identified are similar to those find in P2P conversations Figure 6-12.  
 
Figure 6-12: P2P traffic 
There are important differences between the traffic recorded during the attack 
and the traffic recorded during P2P conversations.  
 Attack used UPD and P2P used TCP 
 Some of the packets have the same Len but  investigations revealed that 
the payload content are different  
 The traffic is not unidirectional  
Algorithms 
In this algorithm, the system will compare the values that do not change 
between two packets based on the variances presented in Table 25. When a 
match is found, the IDS will enter the attack stage, which will then turn the IDS 
into an IPS.  
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Various actions can be taken from the moment an attack is detected. For 
instance, every single IP found matching the rules, and block the port number 
related to the attack. Blocking the port number will stop all subsequent 
communication to that port.  
 
Figure 6‐13: Algorithm for complex traffic patterns 
 
6.3.7 Module7: Attack trees  
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In this work, attacks are organised into attack trees which represents the 
different ways an attack can occur. This section was developed earlier in 
“Multistage attack detection and mitigation framework”.  
6.3.8 Module 7: scoring algorithm  
 
A scoring algorithm is introduced to prioritise the traffic during the recovery or 
mitigation period.  Based on a configuration file, the administrator will decide 
which host will have access to the network. Each packet that arrives in the 
network is analysed and passed through the attack tree system. The participant 
host will score +1 when there have been no matches with any critical path or 
active nodes.  
 
Figure 6-14: Scoring algorithm 
6.4 Attack modes 
There are three different modes of functioning of our IDS: a default mode 
(normal) where the IDS is not subject to particular challenges. During the 
default mode, a DDOS attack could be detected by an external agent i.e. a 
malicious attack such as a botnet attack or it could simply be a malfunctioning 
program that is causing the computer system to freeze. Either way, the DDOS 
attack should be prevented and stopped.  MIDaPS is built to change its 
behaviour depending on the level of attack.  
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Figure 6-15: MIDaPS Modes 
6.5 Additional experiment and results  
 
In this section, results from testing the MIDaPS architecture will be presented.  
One of the difficulties in testing multistage detection is the availability of data.  
The logging facilities that exist in current systems are generally triggered when 
an alert is raised.  Unfortunately, this does not represent the full picture of the 
attack and does not allow a good offline analysis. Most offline analyses are 
based on alert rather than related traffic.  
During the hacking conference context named DEFCON 17, data were capture 
and made public for purposes such as this theses [188].  
Objectives of tests:  
The MIDaPS architecture has been implemented and, the efficiency of its 
detection mechanism tested as long with the effectiveness of using attack tree 
in a multistage environment. In addition, the number of false positive tested and 
compared with Snort.  
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Data: the results presented here have been tested using the 7.5GB of data 
provided by DEF CON 17.  
Test 1: in this first series of tests, the analysis is based 
on the source IP.  
 
Figure 6-16: Tree attack detection 
In this test Figure 6-16, an analysis of how often an attack IP appears in a tree. 
This literally represents the number of steps taken by a particular attacker. For 
instance, IP = 10.31.6.100 was found to match fives nodes of attacks when 
attacking IP = 10.31.4.2. The different steps are given in [Table 26: Attack tree 
breakdown] 
Attack Occurrences Start time End time 
Portscan - TCP Portscan 116 2009-08-01 2009-08-02 
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00:05:23 21:47:59 
Portscan - Open Port 18330 2009-08-01 
00:00:26 
2009-08-02 
21:59:38 
portscan TCP Decoy 
Portscan 
65 2009-08-01 
22:27:22 
2009-08-02 
21:02:54 
portscan TCP Portsweep 113 2009-08-01 
00:00:24 
2009-08-02 
21:59:28 
portscan TCP Distributed 
Portscan 
3 2009-08-01 
01:50:19 
2009-08-02 
04:26:08 
Table 26: Attack tree breakdown 
IP = 10.31.6.100, was found in six different nodes. However, each attack step 
was performed many times as represented in Figure 6-17. During the completion 
at which the data used here was collected, they was no security IDS installed 
on the system.  
 
Figure 6-17: attacking IPs occurrence per tree path 
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However, the data was replayed in Snort during an offline analysis and 
compared with the result obtain in MIDaPS 
Comparing Snort to MIDaPS is rather interesting as the two system aim at 
protecting computer system but they are actually very different in their 
operations. The objective of MIDaPS is not to generate a security alert for each 
step of the attack. Rather, attacks are synchronised in an intelligent way to 
reduce the output as much as possible. It was noted that some of the IP 
performed exactly the same sequence of attacks to various IPs.  This is where 
there is an important difference between Snort and MIDaPS. Snort does not 
keep any record of what has happened, Snort does not keep any history of the 
different IPs activities. In MIDaPS, each IP activity is logged. The logged 
information then becomes valuable information for future actions by the same 
IP. Snort looks at identifying each attack or occurrence of partial attack as a 
separate alert. In MIDaPS, attacks are analysed as they go through the tree 
structure. When an attacker has been found on at least one active node, then 
the alert is generated and the attacker is stopped. Alternatively, if there is no 
active node, the attacker would need to reach a level of the tree marked as 
critical. An alert will then be generated.  
Most attacks were found to in at least five different nodes Figure 6-18. This is 
another clear indication that if an IP is blocked after two attempts, the system 
will save on resources as they will be no need for further check on the same IP.  
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Figure 6-18: Attacking IPs per tree node 
 
 
 
Attacking IPs    Total occurrence in tree   Tree level  
  10.31.8.2   79 7 
  10.31.6.100   155974 6 
  10.31.1.2   3862 5 
  10.31.2.3   26273 5 
  10.31.2.100   1363 5 
  10.31.3.103   147071 5 
  10.31.3.110   87112 5 
  10.31.3.129   77955 5 
  10.31.3.130   76224 5 
  10.31.3.140   7889 5 
  10.31.3.172   143212 5 
  10.31.3.175   16170 5 
  10.31.4.99   4357 5 
  10.31.4.152   34284 5 
  10.31.5.3   16806 5 
  10.31.7.99   3295 5 
  10.31.8.22   701 5 
  10.31.8.40   142 5 
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  10.31.8.90   7251 5 
  10.31.9.2   572 5 
  10.31.10.3   12964 5 
  10.31.3.160   53967 4 
  10.31.4.254   3132 4 
  10.31.5.2   18 4 
  10.31.5.5   339 4 
  10.31.7.28   40 4 
  10.31.7.199   1177 4 
  10.31.8.51   25 4 
  10.31.10.2   411 4 
  10.31.3.141   57 3 
  10.31.3.153   141 3 
  10.31.4.2   1549 3 
  10.31.4.123   82 3 
  10.31.4.201   9 3 
  10.31.7.2   3 3 
  10.31.7.156   11 3 
  10.31.8.20   142 3 
  10.31.8.50   16 3 
  10.31.8.74   7 3 
  10.31.8.87   45 3 
  10.31.8.91   119 3 
  10.31.10.10   1898 3 
  10.31.3.109   314 2 
  10.31.4.13   22 2 
  10.31.4.36   5 2 
  10.31.6.2   15 2 
  10.31.6.11   4 2 
  10.31.8.21   20 2 
  10.31.8.30   8 2 
  10.31.8.33   5 2 
  10.31.8.79   25 2 
  10.31.8.142   3 2 
  10.31.9.17   7 2 
  10.31.10.9   8 2 
  10.31.6.218   5 1 
  10.31.8.10   1 1 
  10.31.9.6   3 1 
  10.31.9.10   7 1 
Table 27: Attacking IPs per tree nodes 
Interpretation   
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In this experiment, the author has been able to identify 58 unique occurrences 
of attack paths. However, each of these attack paths have been repeated a 
number of time.  The largest number of attacks found had five branches which 
in order terms represent five stages in attacks. There is a tendency that when 
an IP is found using a port scan technique, that it appears many times at the 
same node level in the tree architecture. It is important that threshold values 
should be set in order to avoid a large number of false positive.  Blacklisting 
appears to be an efficient method of reduce the number of attack occurrences 
by the same IP. Once the IP is blacklisted, all subsequent attacks from the 
same IP will not exist.  
From these results, one would learn that an IP can be stopped before damage 
is done in most case when using attack trees.  Attack detection rate really relies 
on the efficiency of the nature of the attack tree. The more elaborate an attack 
tree is, the more attacks will be detected. However, it is important to define 
critical paths as the model defined here uses active nodes and passive nodes.   
Test 2: In this second series of tests, the analysis is based on the destination 
IP. The rationale behind analysing traffic based on the destination IP is that the 
number of destination IPs is generally known as compared to the number of 
source IP that can be unlimited.  The results are as follow:  
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Figure 6-19: attack tree view from destination IP 
From the receiving point, we look at how often an IP was hit by an attack. as 
shown in Figure 6-19, each IP was hit at least one by a type of attack and at 
most by 6 types of different attacks. The reason why this research looks at book 
the attacker and the victim is that attacker can easily obfuscate their identity by 
using a proxy server or by using a combination of virtual machines installed on 
the same host. Each virtual machine installed on a host will have its own IP 
address but they will all have the same netbios name. if the attacking IP is hit by 
a number of attacks that match a certain path in the attack tree, all subsequent 
attack attempts will be blocked immediately. In addition, the overall level of 
attack can be raised.  
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Figure 6-20: attacks view from the destination IPs 
Interpretation  
Looking at attacks from a destination IP, each IP was the most attacks in 6 
stages.  Compared to looking at attacks from source IPs, there is clearly less 
effort to look at destination address as the number of destination IP is generally 
very limited. The trees visible by each destination address are different from the 
trees viewed by source IPs. A source IP may attempt to attack multiple 
destination addresses. However, one destination IP will not have any 
knowledge of the activities (attacks) taking place at other destination address.  
Also, the number of attempts per source is much higher that the number of 
attempts received by each destination IP. Protecting against attacks by 
protecting destination IP rather than tracking source IP is definitely more 
efficient.  
6.6 False positive rate 
The number of alert between Snort and MIDaPS was compared. For the same 
subset of data, Snort raised 411170 alerts whereas MIDaPS fired only 278861 
alert. The difference is due to the fact Snort does not keep any history of IP 
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activities. When an IP is found to repeat the same attack at most twice, the later 
IP is suspended and further activities are blocked.  
Snort MIDaPS 
451170 278861 
 
Table 28: False positive result 
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Figure 6‐21: Snort vs. MIDaPS false positive 
 
As shown in Figure 6-21 and Table 28, MIDaPS produced 38.19% less alerts 
than Snort 
6.7 Conclusion 
This chapter summarises the different efforts made to design a multistage 
detection and mitigation intrusion detection system. The author argue that with 
the level of attacks encountered in recent months and years, any security 
system should provide preventive and defensive capabilities. This research 
defined a four level visibility of attacks around which the MIDaPS framework 
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was built: the V-BANI framework. The author argues that any good system 
should be able to provide those four levels of visibility. Also, the author 
assembles the different parts of this research into a novel and highly effective 
solution: MIDaPS which is a multistage Intrusion Detection and Prevention 
System.  MIDaPS is built around 3 main modes of functioning: default, attack 
and mitigation. Experiments performed in this research show that IDS are more 
likely to drop packets without analysing them when the speed of packets 
increased. This is generally the case with DDOS attack. This research then 
defined a different mode of functioning for our architecture depending on the 
level of severity of the attack to ensure that legitimate users can continue using 
their services.  
Tests of MIDaPS were performed based on the detection system. During the 
tests, results identified 58 attack trees that repeated many times. Based on this 
detection, alerts can be reduced and IPs can be blacklisted to avoid the same 
IPs causing the same repetitive attacks. A great deal of research still need to be 
done to have a fully system ready off the shelves but the author strongly 
believes that the work achieved in this will set the ground for future research.  
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7 Conclusions and future work  
 
This chapter will start by summarising the outcomes that have been 
accomplished and the make recommendations accordingly for future work at a 
higher level.  
7.1 Thesis Contribution  
In this research, the current design and implementation of Snort IDS was 
challenged. Numerous vulnerabilities were found from which the most important 
are discussed below. 
Snort weakness in handling fast traffic for any protocol. The level of packet drop 
was very high when the traffic was above 1.5mbps. Snort was not able to detect 
up to 26% of IPs when the traffic was accelerated. An attacker could look a 
network with a lot of noise to perform attacks. When packets are dropped at the 
IDS, they traverse the network without any prior analysis. Hence, the network is 
exposed to any sort of attack that such packets will carry. This weakness was 
address by adding another dimension to Snort rules.  
Snort displayed an inability to detect HTTP DDOS attack when many IPs are 
used. Snort was able to detect repetition for an attack using 150 IPs or less; yet, 
current implementations of botnet use thousands, hundreds of thousands and 
up to, in some cases, few millions of IPs all at once. The consequence of this 
weakness is that Snort will not protect or detect any recent DDOS attacks. 
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Damages caused by DDOS attacks can be tragic if the target system is a 
Critical National Infrastructure (CNI). MIDaPS is designed to stop such attacks.   
Snort does not provide any mechanism of securing against encrypted attack. 
Even though they are well known encryption algorithm used by attackers, Snort 
does not provide any mechanism for analysis encrypted attacks. MIDaPS, the 
novel IDS introduced source code analysis. Many patterns of encryption 
coupled with the attacker activity can be used to identify attacks. Hence the new 
approach of attack tree with passive nodes. Attackers use the latter technique 
to steal information. 
Snort remained blind to JavaScript encrypted attack. Yet, attacker use 
commonly used tools to obfuscate their script for which de-obfuscator are also 
available. The author suggested in the novel IDS to use a slow path for analysis 
of ambiguous source code.  
In a multistage scenario, Snort was only able to detect very little indication that 
an attack was taking place. MIDaPS was designed with attack radar to indicate 
an early stage of attacks. This new feature could be a life saver for critical 
business who can then take actions before any serious damage is done.  
Snort rules are not optimized for performance and this causes the system to be 
less efficient in detecting attacks. When checking the rules, Snort spent a lot of 
time checking rules that are not relevant to the system protected. As part of the 
new architecture, the author designed and tested a new rules extension that 
ensured that only rules relevant to the system being monitored are checked. 
Snort performance was greatly improved allowing more packets to be checked 
before they are passed into the network.  
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Snort architecture is built with sequential implementation. Yet, hardware is more 
capable of handling heavy process by using concurrent processing. This clearly 
indicates the need for a parallel IDS implementation. MIDaPS is designed with 
multicore capabilities. This feature will improve the IDS performance.  
The ultimate aim of this research was to produce a new IDS architecture 
capable of multistage attacks whilst working in a multicore framework. The 
architecture was presented and named MIDaPs. Within the overall architecture 
a few distinct elements can be noted  
 An extension to Snort rules that enable the IDS to only search through 
the rules relevant to the protected system. An improvement of 84% was 
achieved with our system compared to the current performance of Snort 
 A multistage detection architecture capable of analysing stealthy attack. 
Also, the architecture presented is capable of behaviour analysis 
 A DDOS framework capable of detecting most DDOS attacks with a 
record of detecting flooding attack within 10 minutes of the start of the 
attack. It is important to note that the DDOS engine can be implemented 
as a separate complete unit.  
 A new IDS architecture capable of detecting multistage attacks and 
DDOS attacks while compatible with multicore parallel programming.  
 A four level of attack visibility framework that maps every single attack 
  
7.2 Challenges and limitations  
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Throughout the research the author has looked at designing a new Intrusion 
Detection System. The journey has certainly not been an easy one. There have 
been many constraints the author have faced. Some of these constraints are 
discussed below.  
The wide range of elements to consider when designing a new IDS. 
Unfortunately, the expertise the author had was somewhat limited. A team of 
people with different and strong skills would be required to design and 
implement an IDS. In the design presented in this thesis, a strong emphasis 
was put on the security aspect. Not much consideration was giving to the 
physical limitations of computer systems. As noted, there are a good number of 
elements to integrate into MIDaPs to ensure maximum security. Some of these 
elements will require the system to decode traffic before it is analyzed. This 
could have a serious impact on the performance. More studies need to look at 
the performance implications of decoding traffic during live traffic analysis.  
Hardware knowledge: the hardware knowledge that the author has is limited 
in the sense that a full understanding is needed on how the components 
integrate together in a computer. During an industrial experience, as I designed 
the security framework for a  10GB IDS appliance, there were frequent clashes 
between the design and the hardware capabilities.  Even though the design 
presented in this work is not for hardware, a full understanding and a full study 
of multicore systems needs to be done for the best integration of the different 
component that were suggested during the design.  
Ability to fully test the system: The range of tests performed in this research 
was limited as the full system has not yet been implemented. Individual tests 
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may well be successful, but do not guarantee that once all the components are 
all integrated together, the same level of success will be achieved.  
Lack of data: Even though there are some data available, there is not, to be 
best of the Author knowledge, a set of data available that leverages the level of 
technicalities seen in recent attacks. However, this research has made intensive 
use of data capture at honeynet and on site while working as a consultant. More 
studies need to be done on how to use honeynet to generate attack patterns. 
Manually writing attack patterns and attack tree is a tedious task and this may 
not allow the security community to keep up with malicious users.  
Time: the time has been a serious issue. Ideally, each of the processes 
suggested should have been fully tested. Vern Paxon and his research group 
have been working for over four years now to come up with the best 
implementation of IDS into multicore. Even though the security specifications 
are ready, it is another matter to implement it. Intel Corporation performed a 
quick modification of Snort to prove the point of their multicore device. However 
no technical improvement was brought to Snort. Yet, Snort on itself was found 
vulnerable at different levels during our studies. Each process should have 
been full tested with various approaches and algorithms. In addition, a full study 
of the cost of adding each of the features should be done in order to have a 
realistic implementation where security does not interfere with performance or 
at least to an acceptable level.  
Lab equipment: At the time of doing the research, the lab equipment available 
was fairly basic. However, even though more equipment was added to the lab, 
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there was not enough time to repeat all the experiments with more sophisticated 
material.  
The transition between classic research and applied research: Most 
research is based on theoretical model that generally do not end in a lab for 
production. In this work, the author aimed at presenting a piece of work that, 
with some improvement, will be able to go to production.  
Finance: the availability of finance has been a major problem during the course 
of this research. The work had to be interrupted on so many occasions because 
of the lack of finance. Fortunately, opportunities allowed the Author to not only 
gain a lot of practical experience within the industry but also, gave him enough 
funding to complete his work for which he is extremely grateful.  
The DDOS framework that was designed does not take into consideration the 
analysis of traffic generated by human users against the traffic generated by a 
bot army. More studies that would probably require a very complex 
mathematical model would be needed. The Author does not have the 
mathematical knowledge required for such analysis. This section would require 
some strong mathematical computations.  
7.3  Recommendations and future work 
 
The nature of this work in itself is a challenge which has generated many other 
challenges which can serve as full research projects. These projects could be:  
 Consequence analysis of interdependencies and potential cascading 
effects across related processes within the MIDaPs framework.  
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  Develop and execute a coordinated research to fully utilize the potential 
of honeypot, honeynet and honeyfarm to capture and analyse attacks 
trends; to generate complex detection algorithms; to build attacks tree 
and attack patterns; and to predict possible new attack patterns 
 Design and implementation of a parallel implementation of libnet, the 
default packet used for packet capture.  
 Design and develop an attack tree capable of a full integration for a 
multicore environment.  
 Develop and execute a coordinated research to model strictly legitimate 
traffic against HTTP flooding whereby an attack will launch an army of 
bots to download various pages on the websites.  
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